A Skeptical Perspective

In preparation for the director’s review, Dan Taft, head of the OMB space unit, prepared a lengthy paper on “The U. S. Civilian Space Program: a Look at the Options” that at its core reflected the budget office’s long-held skeptical view of the value of human space flight. The options paper recognized that the “key issue” with respect to FY1973 budget decisions was “the future role of man in space.” It noted that “historically, [the] primary reason for man in space has been the international technological image of the U. S.,” and asked “are our historical reasons for keeping man in space still sufficient to justify keeping man in space? If so, how much extra should the U. S. be willing to pay for manned flight relative to an unmanned program which could pro­duce comparable scientific and practical benefits?” The paper observed that

The contrast between President Nixon’s [March 7, 1970, space] statement and former President Kennedy’s 1961 address on space provides an interest­ing illustration of the change in attitude of the national leadership towards the space program. In contrast to President Nixon’s call for a balanced and orderly space program, former President Kennedy’s address conveys a sense of urgency, international competition with the Soviets, and the battle “between freedom and tyranny.”

With the passage of time and the achievement of successful programs, the importance of international competition and world opinion seems to have diminished. . . And yet, the significance of international competition in space is not over. . . With the Soviets steadily continuing their manned space pro­gram, would the U. S. be willing to terminate manned space flight?3

The paper declared “the objective of the future space transportation system is to reduce the total investment and operating costs (launch vehicles plus payloads) of space operations.” New capabilities provided by the shuttle, a point that NASA was advocating, did not enter into OMB’s evaluation. The paper concluded that “at the 10% discount rate, all of the shuttle options save less systems cost” than a new expendable launch vehicle. To Taft, “only the need to resupply a Space Station begins to justify investing in a reusable shut­tle capability.” Recognizing the reasoning behind NASA’s 1970 decision to give priority to shuttle development, the paper presciently commented: “In a sense, a commitment to a shuttle is an implicit commitment to a subsequent space station program.” Given that station development had been deferred to an undefined future date, this perspective led to the conclusion that there was no justifiable reason for approving shuttle development in the FY1973 budget.4

Taft’s paper set out “an illustrative future space program.” That program would complete the remaining scheduled Apollo and Skylab manned space flights, but would “postpone the space shuttle indefinitely.” It acknowledged “the possibility that the shuttle might become more economically attractive and be initiated in the 1980’s,” but until then a slow-paced human space flight program would use expendable launch vehicles. With the deferral of shuttle development, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, could be closed; reducing NASA’s institutional base by closing Marshall was a particular OMB objective. Taft’s proposed program would reduce NASA’s budget to $2.6 billion per year by the mid-1970s.5