NASA and Applying Technology to Societal Problems

The White House idea of turning NASA into a general-purpose applied technology Agency persisted through summer 1971. A first draft of Edgar Cortright’s internal study of broadening NASA’s role into other areas of tech­nology was ready by late June. The study concluded that there were indeed many areas where a high-technology approach was needed and that “NASA, and only NASA, could really bring many of these problems to an early solu­tion.” Problems addressed included “environmental monitoring, health care services, transportation needs, and urban needs,” among others.8

Also in July, the White House Domestic Council established a subcom­mittee chaired by science adviser David to take a government-wide look at the issue of applying technological solutions to national needs; NASA partic­ipated in that effort. George Low’s understanding of the Domestic Council plan was “to first worry about the problems, and to define the organiza­tion to solve the problems later on.” NASA supported the subcommittee’s efforts in the areas of short-haul air transportation systems, a global environ­mental system, a wide-band communication system, and, to a lesser degree, ground-based transportation and health services. Low found working in the interagency framework “very frustrating in that other agencies are, by and large, impossible to work with. Everybody wants to play in their own little sandbox and, particularly, wants to keep NASA out of that sandbox.” Low was becoming convinced that “if anything is to be done” with respect to applying technology to national problems, “it will have to be done by NASA under a Presidential mandate.” Fletcher agreed with Low, indicating his “pessimism about the possible success of the current interagency exercise.”9 William Magruder, who had been in charge of the canceled supersonic transport program at the Department of Transportation, moved to the White House as a “special consultant to the president” to take charge of what was becoming known as the “New Technology Opportunities” program. Magruder broadened the scope of the effort beyond looking at the technical issues that had been the focus of the David subcommittee, examining issues such as balance-of-trade, antitrust, and other nontechnical aspects involved in the kind of effort being contemplated. Magruder’s goal was to define a number of major initiatives to be included in President Nixon’s January 1972 State of the Union Address. He told NASA Administrator Fletcher that he “had the distinct impression that the President would like to give the whole job to NASA.” Responding to that possibility, Fletcher drafted a letter to Magruder in late September, suggesting that “it might be wise to place the ‘soluble’ [solvable?] problems in NASA, but begin to develop new capabilities in other agencies, particularly those in which NASA is not par­ticularly qualified. NASA might be given the responsibility for outlining a government-wide program through its systems analysis capability.”

Fletcher and Low by this time had decided that it would be a good move for NASA to try to take the lead in this new area. Discussing tactics on how to achieve that outcome, Fletcher thought that NASA should “not enlarge our contacts much beyond response to requests. . . I am convinced that it has to be their [the White House’s] initiative if we are to succeed in this venture; although we can respond with enthusiasm when asked, if we do too much politicing behind the scenes, word will get around somehow.” But, he added “this seems like a ‘sporty course’ for something we really think NASA and the country ought to undertake. . . The risk we take is that the President will decide to go some other route because of influence from various other vested interests. At this point in time I am inclined to take that chance.” Low agreed with Fletcher’s ideas, suggesting that NASA “would play the role of the reluctant bride, but would be prepared to jump in if the opportunity presented itself.”10