Richard Nixon, "Exploring the Unknown," and Ending Apollo

Richard Nixon liked grand concepts. Such was the case with respect to space. Nixon frequently mused about the importance to U. S. interests and national vitality of “exploring the unknown”; he connected the space program with that impulse. A particularly full example of Nixon’s thinking about space exploration came in a March 9, 1971, Oval Office meeting with a group of current and past NASA astronauts who had been touring college campuses to gauge reactions to administration policy. He told them

I know what people say, we are being jingoistic. America stays number one and so forth. In the history of great nations, once a nation gives up in the com­petition to explore the unknown, or once it accepts a position of inferiority, it ceases to be a great nation. It happened to Spain. It happened in the 20th century to the French and then to the British. And it could happen to the United States. That is what it’s all about, and so when we look at. . . the space program, whether it’s Mars or whether it’s the shuttle or who knows what it is. I don’t care what it is, but the main thing is we have to go, we have to go, we’ve got to find out.

The majority of the people in all of the polls show that they are against the SST [supersonic transport], they are against the space program. They just want to sort of settle down. . . If the United States just didn’t. . . have the prob – lems of going to space, then what a wonderful country this would be. And the answer is it wouldn’t be at all. It would be a terrible country. It would be a country big, fat, rich, but with no sense of spirit. . . If an individual does not want to do something bigger than himself, he is selfish. That’s what space is about.12

Nixon’s line of thinking was somewhat different when he was talking to a person not strongly involved with the space program. For example, on the morning of March 24, 1971, he met with several senators in a last minute (and unsuccessful) effort to avoid the Senate voting that afternoon against the supersonic transport program. Reflecting on his meetings, Nixon told his Congressional liaison Clark MacGregor that “the United States should

not drop out of any competition in a breakthrough in knowledge—explor­ing the unknown. That’s one of the reasons I support the space program.” Without pausing, he added “I don’t give a damn about space. I am not one of those space cadets.”13

Congressional refusal to continue funding for the supersonic transport was deeply disappointing to Richard Nixon, and may have reinforced his belief in the importance of the space program as a means of symbolizing America’s commitment to leadership in “exploring the unknown.” John Ehrlichman observed that “Nixon died very hard on the SST; he had a com­mitment to that which had to do with chauvinism.” To Nixon, the United States “had to be at the leading edge of this kind of applied technological development. And if we weren’t, then a great deal of national virtue was lost, and our standing in the world.”14

However, remaining first in space in Nixon’s mind did not include repeated trips to the Moon; in fact, he was much more interested in eventual human trips to Mars and at least once mused about exploring the moons of Jupiter. He had been talked out of canceling Apollo 17 at the end of 1970, but in May 1971 returned to that idea, this time including also canceling Apollo 16. Meeting with Ehrlichman on May 13, Nixon said “I personally think [we should] stop at probably five Apollos, no more. . . The reason for the space program, the best reason, is not going to the moon but is the fact that we are exploring the unknown. I don’t know what the hell is up there. We’ve got to continue to explore just for the sake of it.” Later the same day, he told Ehrlichman “the one [part of the NASA program] that seems to me to have the least appeal are more Apollo shots. Why in the hell would they have to go up there and take a look around the damn thing again?” On May 18, he asked Ehrlichman “did you get those moon shots knocked off?” Ehrlichman replied “we’re working on it.” Nixon suggested “do your best.” Finally, on May 26, Nixon told Ehrlichman “we have got to get a way to get off those damn moon-shots. . . There can’t be any after July [the date for the Apollo 15 mission]. And we all agree, none after July.” Referring to the Apollo 13 mis­sion, he said “I don’t want risk any more.”15

In response to Nixon’s interest in canceling the last two Apollo missions, Ehrlichman told Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director George Shultz “the President would like us to review and analyze the NASA budget and future program with an eye to cutting the number of Apollo shots.” OMB’s Don Rice responded, providing estimates of the budget savings and job losses associated with canceling both missions and with canceling only Apollo 17. That latter action would save $101 million in FY72-74 and result in the loss of 9,000 jobs; canceling both missions, $192 million and 15,000 jobs. Rice commented that “California, Long Island, and Cape Kennedy would be hardest hit” by the job losses. Ehrlichman used Rice’s informa­tion in a memorandum to the president, noting that job reductions resulting from canceling the two Apollo missions would be “centered principally in the South and Southern California.”16

Aerospace unemployment was by this point becoming an important polit­ical issue for the White House in advance of the 1972 presidential campaign. Meeting with science adviser Ed David on February 22, Nixon indicated that he wanted David and his external advisors to direct particular attention “to the unemployed from the space and defense industries.” The president met with OMB Deputy Director Cap Weinberger and Flanigan on May 5 to discuss “what could be done about high unemployment areas with spe­cific emphasis on California.” Nixon “indicated a very great concern about the California area and the high level of unemployment among technically – trained individuals.” He directed his associates to review federal programs to identify those “which could be moved either in time or in place. . . to areas of high unemployment.” Weinberger and Flanigan agreed to meet with a number of government agencies, including NASA, to pursue this directive. During the rest of 1971, aerospace unemployment, particularly in California, would be an influential factor in shaping White House space decisions.17

By mid-1971 Richard Nixon’s interest in trips to the Moon had defi­nitely waned. When Apollo 15 was launched on July 26 at 9:34 a. m. EDT, the White House put out a statement that Richard Nixon had watched the launch with great interest; in fact, he was still asleep.18