Terrestrial risks of air snipers

On September 30 on tapes of news agencies there was a message: «Russia began military and air operation in Syria». At once we will correct: from the point of view of a military science air operation – destiny especially the Air Force operative association, namely air army. In Russia similar associations disappeared in the second half of the 90th years. So, also there is nobody to perform air operations more. To an aviation regiment (namely to it on number there corresponds Air Force aviagroup of Russia on air base "Hmeymim") such task obviously not on a shoulder. "Operations" – only this way it is correctly possible to characterize activity of the Russian aviagroup in the corresponding terms.

Actually, both all further remarks and offers we will formulate from the point of view of a military science as a whole and the author – as the officer-operator of a staff – in particular. Let’s group all this in the form of short theses.

1. Protection and airfield defense Hmeymim.

"From cheap at cost of 120-mm of a mortar planes at the price of 50 million euros are easily put by mines out of action"
According to available data, protection is carried out by divisions of marines of the Navy of the Russian Federation. As anti-aircraft weapons ZRPK "Armour" and ZRK of "Torahs" are used.

Let’s remind, as organized protection and defense of airfields earlier, in particular, in Afghanistan (only this experience really approaches to air base "Hmeymim"). First and there many cones were filled. And only in 1981 protection of objects and communications in Afghanistan started to develop in rather harmonous system. At insistance of the Soviet military-political management with a view of safety and a public order, the prevention and suppression of hostile actions of forces of opposition by the decision of the leadership of Afghanistan round important administrative centers, airfields, power plants, tunnels so-called 15-kilometer regime zones were created. In these zones the special order of life and population activity is established. All males from 13 years also are more senior, which constantly lived in this territory, should be registered by bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan and receive the relevant document, which everyone is obliged to have always with itself(himself) (before the Afghan population had no documents). To hold in a zone the events connected with a congestion of a large number of people in one place (weddings, funeral, etc.) it was possible only after coordination with local bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Any moving of people in a zone after 23 hours was forbidden. Arrival in a zone and departure from it was authorized only through check-points with obligatory registration of people and cargoes. There were also other restrictions directed on suppression of penetration into a zone of groups and groups of opposition. Internal protection of objects of airfields was organized by commanders of air units who appointed guard for direct protection and defense of barracks, warehouses, parking of planes, etc. On perimeter of airfield and round its objects wire entanglements and alarm minefields were created. Dangerous approaches were covered with fighting minefields.

Defense of a regime zone of airfield (option)

Antiaircraft installations (in the majority it were ZSU-23-4, ZU-23, ZPU), except airfield cover from air, prepared for defeat and the land opponent. The system of protection existing at that time and defense not fully provided its reliability owing to what airfields Kandahar and Jalalabad were systematically fired by the opponent. The transport planes which were coming in the land on airfields to Hooks, Shindand, Fayzabad were exposed to attack.

Only for the first half of the year 1983 from attacks by rebels of airfields Jalalabad and Kandahar were damaged on the earth three Su-17 planes, nine Mi-24 helicopters, four Mi-8 of the Air Force of army and the Afghan helicopter. There were damages of control facilities and ensuring flights, staff wound.

The opponent changed ways of attack of airfields, used motor transport and other means for this purpose. However divisions of protection of the 40th army poorly reacted to these changes, mobile groups on armored machinery were not created, interaction with the helicopters which were keeping watch in airfields, was not organized.

So, on June 3, 1984 from mortars were fired an arrangement of management of the 108th мсд and a firing position of the artillery battery defending airfield to Hooks. Being in 400 meters from a shooting mortar of the opponent the post with the tank not only did not try to destroy it, but at all did not notice it.

Check of protection of airfields in the 1984th showed that in many cases their protection against fire of mortars was not provided. All system of protection was under construction that the opponent will apply fire from small arms while it passed to mortar attack of objects.

Despite accepted measures, even by 1985 when the system of protection of airfields developed finally, it was not possible to exclude completely attacks which proceeded up to a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It speaks not only periodic (in 1,5-2) replacement of staff of divisions of protection, but also impossibility to provide closing of a zone of responsibility from penetration of rebels as the difficult relief and existence in a zone of a large number of kishlaks did not allow to achieve it.

There were problems with protection and defense and at the U.S. Air Force in the territory of Afghanistan. In particular, in September the military Camp Bastion base in the Afghan province of Helmand underwent the 2012th attack of Talibs. Attacking, armed with machine guns and grenade launchers, were dressed in a form of the military personnel of the USA, on them there were «waistcoats of the suicide bomber». Fighters attacked planes and the helicopters standing on a runway of airfield, hangars and other structures of a military facility. As a result of attack six fighters AV-8B Harrier are put out of action and two more received considerable damages. Three stations of the refueling, six easy hangars for aviation equipment were strongly damaged.

Whether available experience in a course of the organization of protection and air base defense "Hmeymim" is completely considered? Let’s hope that so it and is. But doubts nevertheless remain.

2. Engineering equipment of air base "Hmeymim".

It seems that as that on this air base it is absent. Planes are located a wing to a wing on open parking. And on a science each squadron should be in the area of dispersal. Thus each plane settles down in obvalovanny shelter, and it is even better – in an arch construction. There is no confidence that stocks of aviation means of defeat and fuel are at least in obvalovanny shelters. Are not protected in any way from automatic and machine-gun fire and splinters of mines and artillery shells of a place of a raskvartirovaniye of flight and technical structure.

Consequences of it can be the most catastrophic. City building (private households) practically closely approach to VPP and air base MRD "Hmeymim". As a result of penetration into vicinities of airfield of diversionary groups of the opponent the air base "Hmeymim" can be easily subjected to a sudden fire raid. From cheap at cost of 120-mm of a mortar planes at the price of 50 million euros are easily put by mines out of action. And effective repair in the conditions of "Hmeymim" – business very problem. And hardly the possible. The fire raid is rather easy for organizing and from distance of 20-30 kilometers from air base volleys from RSZO. At last, the blow on airfield can be carried out by means of tactical missile systems.

One such blow – and fighting work of the Russian aviagroup in fact is finished. Therefore to be earthed for the purpose of minimization of a possible damage it is necessary simply immediately. Let’s hope that substantially it is already made and the corresponding engineering constructions of air base simply did not get to frames of the chronicle.

3. Fighting tension.

The Russian aviagroup in "Hmeymima" from September 30 till October 3 made about 60 departures. It is a lot of it or a little? For comparison: in 1991 during operation «A storm in the desert» the aircraft of the Ministry of Taxes and Tax Collection for the first two days executed more than four thousand departures. During air campaign in Yugoslavia the aircraft of the USA and other countries of NATO made more than one thousand departures per day. Hardly 8-20 departures per day will cause shock and awe in IGIL paramilitary groups. To a word speaking, all in a course «Storms in the desert» the aircraft of the Ministry of Taxes and Tax Collection (and it is more than 2300 warplanes) made about 38 thousand самолетовылетов, including about 1700 departures strategic, about 27 000 tactical and more the 6000th deck aircraft. If the Russian aviagroup makes even on 20 departures per day, it will reach this level approximately in five years.

As the reference. In Soviet period the domestic Air Force had two VGK armies of operative appointment (the 24th VA VGK (IT) – Vinnytsia, the 4th VA VGK (IT) – Legnica) on the Su-24 bombers. These two armies in a week would destroy by bombing IGIL to atoms.

4. Intelligence data.

Earlier it was reported that data on a dislocation of military facilities of IGIL provide (including) and armed forces of Syria. And allegedly these data the most exact. It is necessary to treat similar information with the maximum care and not less than two times to recheck. The Syrian companions are objectively interested, that Moscow as it is possible plunged into this conflict more deeply.

5. Allies.

While two coalitions – "correct" (Russia, Syria, Iran and Iraq) and "wrong" (The United States and allied to them the states) are available. It seems that any association of efforts and close interaction between them it is not supposed. Nobody hastened to register and in Information center in Baghdad. Moreover, a number of the influential countries of the region opposed actions of Russia in Syria. And it means at best only one – to be at war to Moscow in foreseeable term it is necessary alone.

6. And where Syrian approach?

It was supposed that after the first series of the Russian airstrikes Bashar Assad’s army will pass to resolute counterattack and will release hometowns and lands. However while did not pass. It is quite possible that the Syrian army remains on initial positions. Assad’s armed forces rather измочалены during the previous four years of civil war in Syria. Mobilization reserves алавитов are almost settled to the bottom. For replenishment there is no place to wait practically. And the forthcoming street fights in the conditions of dense city building are fraught for Bashar Assad’s army with essential losses in manpower and equipment. In addition, this army over the last 50 years anywhere did not win. And the sad spirit eternally beaten invisibly soars over Bashar Assad’s battalions. Whether this troops will win the forthcoming fights – a question open.

And how many still the Russian aircraft should bomb terrorists that Bashar Assad collected the strength and started to win, too it is unclear.