Nixon’s Decisions and NASA’s Response

Shultz and Ehrlichman met with President Nixon on the afternoon of December 1. After hearing the OMB recommendation to cancel both Skylab and NERVA, Nixon indicated he was very reluctant to take those actions, with Skylab being a particularly “tough problem.” Nixon suggested slip­ping the NERVA schedule by one year rather than canceling the program, and asked if there was also a way to stretch out the Skylab schedule to avoid terminating the program and thus causing immediate job losses. There is no record of the discussions regarding the space shuttle or Apollo 17 during the meeting.21

Based on this presidential guidance, OMB developed a proposed NASA budget that included $3.3 billion in new budget authority (NASA had requested $3.7 billion) and $3.2 billion in FY1972 outlays (NASA had requested $3.4 billion). Apollo 17, Skylab, and a start on shuttle engine devel­opment remained in the budget, but NERVA was canceled and a start on developing the space shuttle airframe was not approved. Rice called Low on December 7 to communicate this result. Meeting with Low a few days later, Rice said that the major reason for retaining Skylab and thus approving the NASA budget at a higher level than the OMB staff had recommended “was the employment situation in the aerospace industry.” Apollo 17 had been approved “because of the inputs from the scientists.”22

Low wrote President Nixon on December 14, requesting reconsidera­tion of the NASA budget decisions. He offered two reasons for such action. One was “the grave unemployment situation in the aerospace industry.” The other was that “the Soviet challenge in space science and technology threat­ens our hard-earned superiority.” With respect to the former reason, Low argued that a “visible effect” in countering unemployment was possible by 1972 “by adding only the relatively small amounts needed to make a start on the space shuttle airframe.” With respect to the Soviet challenge, adding funds for a start on the airframe would reduce the period during which the Soviet Union would be flying people to space while the United States was not “by a year and permit us to point clearly to the time when the US will again be first in space.” Low was able to meet with OMB Deputy Director Weinberger as he hand-delivered the NASA appeal letter. The meeting “was not a very satisfactory one in that Weinberger received a half a dozen or so phone calls during the course of our discussions, and I was never really able to complete a point.” Low left the meeting with the feeling that “our request for reconsideration on. . . the shuttle would be denied.”23