The Space Council Seeks a Role

Another of the early recommendations of the Ash Council was to abolish the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), on the grounds that its policy coordination function could be performed by the combination of OST and OMB.6 As discussed in chapter 2, the Space Council, composed of the head of NASA, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the secretary of transportation (added by Congress in 1970), and chaired by the vice president, had seldom met at the principals level during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, and its staff had had little influence on Johnson administration space policy decisions. Vice President Agnew in early 1969 had taken initial steps to revitalize the coun­cil, selecting Apollo 8 astronaut Bill Anders as the council’s executive secre­tary and trying to build up a high-quality professional staff under Anders’ direction.

However, the Space Council staff did not play a significant role in the decisions with respect to the FY1971 budget or the content of the March 1970 presidential space statement. A key reason for the lack of influence on the part of Anders and his staff was that they were working for Vice President Spiro Agnew. Richard Nixon and his immediate advisors were disinclined to give Agnew any meaningful policy role, preferring to use him for political attacks on administration opponents and as a link to state and local officials. Agnew soon lost interest in space issues. Without the “top cover” of an influential vice president, Anders was largely left on his own to find ways to involve himself and his staff in ongoing policy debates. He had some success in this regard in areas such as space science and applications and aeronautics, and he got personally involved with Cap Weinberger with respect to the NASA program, but neither Vice President Agnew nor the Space Council as a body from 1970 on had any involvement in discussions related to the future of human space flight.7

As preparations for developing the FY1972 Nixon budget began, White House staff secretary Ken Cole on August 24 wrote the new director of OMB, George Shultz, reminding him of the Ash Council proposal to elimi­nate the Space Council and suggesting that “it seems appropriate to again consider” abolishing the council and that “perhaps this is a project that the Office of Management and Budget will want to undertake.” The response to this suggestion took some time to develop. In September, OMB Assistant Director Dwight Ink commented that “the Space Council has not really played a significant policy role since its inception.” He noted that Anders had “assembled a vigorous staff who want to exert more leadership, but the Space Council does not provide a viable base for their efforts.” In October, OMB Assistant Director Don Rice indicated his “general feeling” that “organiza­tions [such as the Space Council] spend money and make paperwork—both of which are bad until proven otherwise.” OMB Associate Director Arnold Weber on October 29 suggested that “the Council should be abolished effec­tive June 30, 1971.” He added “the change in emphasis on space programs as we attempt to fit those programs into overall national priorities makes it unnecessary to retain” the council. The OMB recommendation recognized “some political and public relations problems,” such as the appearance of “an insensitivity on the part of the Administration to the problems of the aerospace industry” and of “an attempt to reduce the stature of the Vice President.”8

As it turned out, the White House in December 1970 decided to keep the Space Council. Vice President Agnew called Ehrlichman, inquiring about the fate of the council. Ehrlichman told him that “the President’s State of the Union [speech] undoubtedly would involve changes in organizational structure which would contemplate elimination of the Space Council as a separate and independent entity.” Agnew asked for a meeting to discuss the situation. Agnew persuaded Ehrlichman that the council’s staff could be an asset in selling the administration’s space and aeronautics programs to Congress and an effective liaison with the aerospace industry. These assign­ments would not involve the council staff in policy formulation, but rather use the staff as a “selling device.” Ehrlichman agreed that it would be “bad politics to dismantle [the Council] now,” since it could send a signal that such an action marked “the end of the space program.” That was not a mes­sage that the Nixon White House wanted to send; there was already concern about the impact of aerospace unemployment on the 1972 presidential elec­tion. After lunching with Ehrlichman a few days later and learning that the council was not likely to be dissolved, Bill Anders told him “I believe the Council and its staff can fit into the reorganized White House team quite nicely and can provide valuable support to both domestic and national secu­rity interests across a broad front.”9