First Reactions

Press reaction to the STG report was generally positive. The Washington Post commented that the STG report “brought some rationality back to the dis­cussion of whither the space program,” noting that acceptance by President Nixon of the long-range goal of Mars exploration “would eliminate talk of abandoning manned space flight, which would be a foolish course of action, or of proceeding toward Mars in a crash effort.” The New York Times characterized the report as recommending a “soft deadline for [a] trip to

Mars,” noting the absence of “the ringing phrases that had launched the Apollo Project in 1961” and saying that the “sooner-or-later Mars goal was carefully phrased for reasons of politics, economics and technology,” since “neither Congress nor the American public seems in any mood to pledge the money for another accelerated, Apollo-like space project.” Less positively, Science magazine called the report a “blurred vision of the future” with a primary objective of justifying “a long term continuation of a manned space program.”54

NASA’s Milton Rosen had assisted Homer Newell in Newell’s role on the STG Staff Directors Committee. Reflecting on the outcome of the STG process, he told Tom Paine that “considering the initial attitude of a number of Space Task Group participants,” the final STG report should be seen as “a favorable result,” since it

• recognized “the importance of the first manned lunar landing” and the significance “of a focusing goal such as Apollo”;

• accepted “a strong manned-flight activity as part of any acceptable future space program”; and

• accepted “exploration, in particular manned exploration of the planets, as the principal focus of activity for the future.”

Rosen also suggested that the report “does not give much to anybody. After the ring of the glorious words in the report has subsided and the press has had a chance to examine it critically, it will be apparent to them that no com­mitments are involved.” Rosen thought that the attitude of the press, and ultimately that of the public, would be “so what?”55

The STG report certainly did not produce a “so what?” response from NASA Administrator Paine. The report over the next six months became Paine’s touchstone as he argued within the Nixon administration for budget and policy decisions that would allow NASA to implement the report’s rec­ommendations and as he traveled to Europe, Australia, Canada, and Japan seeking international engagement in the programs outlined in the report. What he was to discover during that time was that this was not a productive strategy. As the Nixon administration faced decisions on the NASA budget for the Fiscal Year 1971 and developed its policy response to the report, NASA would find its budget tightly constrained and its ambitious plans for the future dashed.