NASA Planning in Disarray

Tom Paine’s intent was to have NASA’s input into the STG deliberations emerge from the planning process initiated under Homer Newell’s direction in 1968. Newell made an initial presentation of the proposed NASA submis­sion to the STG to Paine on May 27. Paine was not impressed “with the level of imagination and the level of innovation and the level of forward thrust” of Newell’s proposals; he characterized the product as “good, workmanlike, but sturdy and unimaginative.” He directed Newell to work on developing a more exciting prospectus.18 During June, a strategic focus began to emerge in Newell’s plan—exploration of the solar system with both robotic and human missions. This was perhaps the first time that exploration—going to new places to learn about them—was put forward as a justification for mov­ing forward in space, distinct from scientific discovery. A Newell position paper suggested “a commitment to the principle of manned planetary explo­ration would give focus to the exploration theme, and would guide related program activities of the agency.” By late June, Newell had a revised NASA “core plan” ready. It called for

• a 12-person space station by 1975

• a space shuttle by 1977

• a space station in polar orbit by 1977

• a space station in synchronous orbit by 1978

• beginning a build up to a 50-person space base in 1977, when the space shuttle would be available

• a small lunar base by 1976

• a lunar orbit station by 1977.

Newell suggested that a program of this scope could be accomplished for a NASA budget of $70 billion over a ten-year period, with budgets starting at $4 billion per year and increasing to $8 billion per year later in the 1970s. By comparison, NASA at that point was citing the cost of the Apollo program as $25 billion over eight years, so that the plan Newell was proposing was almost three times as expensive as the lunar landing effort. This proposal was totally disconnected from political realities, and was typical of NASA’s misreading of its likely post-Apollo environment. Newell also suggested that “the United States begin preparing for a manned expedition to Mars at an early date,” arguing that “the question for us to ponder is not whether man will go to the planets, for surely he will, but when this will take place and whether America will take the lead.”19

The plan developed by Newell and his associates formed the body of the July 9 NASA submission to the STG, titled “America’s Next Decade in Space.”[2] Included as an appendix was “a summary of one of the many stud­ies produced in NASA’s planning effort.” The report cautioned that “since the programs outlined [in the appendix] . . . are not official NASA propos­als,” their “cost and schedule estimates must be used with care since in many cases they are quite preliminary.” These caveats were quickly rendered inop­erative. By the end of July, what had been an appendix to the official NASA plan became its core.

What was contained in the appendix was “one way in which a versatile low-cost earth orbital space capability [i. e., the space shuttle] may be used as the basis of an integrated total space program.” This “integrated plan” was the brainchild of NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George Mueller. It had been developed in relative secrecy without consulting other elements of NASA, not as part of Homer Newell’s planning process. In this, it was typical of Mueller’s style, which was highly individualistic and control oriented. Mueller had become convinced that Newell’s effort was not likely to produce the kind of approach to the future that could gain political and public support, and viewed himself as a “white knight, saving the agency from itself.”20

Mueller had earlier come to the conclusion that high priority should be given to lowering the costs of space operations by developing not only a space shuttle but also reusable space “tugs” to move payloads from low Earth orbit to other destinations between the Earth and the Moon; he characterized the combination of the shuttle and tugs a “Space Transportation System.” His plan stressed three characteristics:

• commonality: the use of a few major systems for a wide variety of mis­sions;

• reusability: the use of the same system over a long period for a number of missions; and

• economy: the reduction of “throw away” elements in any mission.

As Mueller had previewed his planning effort to associates in the human space flight community, there was considerable skepticism that his proposed development schedules and cost targets were realistic. Mueller paid little attention to such doubters. He “forced people to give him numbers that were a lot lower in many areas than people wanted to give him,” resulting

George Mueller at the Apollo 11 launch. (NASA photograph)

in costs that were “vastly underestimated.” Eventually Mueller’s colleagues gave his scheme their support, recognizing that “the integrated plan was suc­cessful at telling the story, even if it was a fairy tale.”21

The integrated plan retained the Saturn V to launch its heavy hardware elements. Other components of Mueller’s plan were:

• a 33-foot diameter “core module” capable of operating as a 12-person space station in Earth orbit by 1975 and in lunar orbit by 1976. The same module could also be used to develop a larger space base through in-orbit assembly and by 1980 could be used to create a geosynchronous station;

• a space shuttle as a fully reusable Earth-to-orbit transportation system, available to support the initial space station in 1975 and fully operational by 1977;

• a reusable, chemically fueled space tug capable of moving crew, spacecraft, and equipment throughout cislunar space, the area between the Earth and the Moon;

• a reusable nuclear-powered tug, to be operational by 1979 and capable of operating in cislunar space and beyond;

• human-tended and fully robotic spacecraft for science and application mis-

sions.22

As he became aware of Mueller’s integrated plan in its fully developed form, Tom Paine decided that it should be central to what NASA would

propose to the STG. In doing so, he was accepting what was in essence a very clever repackaging of the hardware proposals identified by Newell’s plan­ning process, but with more optimistic estimates of NASA’s being able to overcome technological challenges and to meet ambitious, likely unrealistic, schedule and budget targets.

After hearing what his organization was preparing to propose, Paine also concluded that what was still missing was a truly bold goal. The objective of the integrated plan was developing capabilities that would allow the United States to carry out whatever activities it decided to pur­sue in the Earth-Moon region. But it lacked a unifying focus for the use of that capability. Vice President Agnew, with Paine listening carefully, had told the meeting of Invited Contributors on July 7 “when I consider the potential of a manned mission to Mars—and I recognize many cogent arguments counter it—I conceive of it as the possible overture to a new era of civilization.” Comparing a human mission to Mars to the explor­atory sea voyages of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Agnew asked “would we want to answer through eternity for turning back a Columbus or Magellan? . . . Would we be denying the people of the world the enlight­enment and evolution which accompany every great age of discovery?” On July 16, in the hours preceding the launch of the historic Apollo 11 mission to the Moon, Agnew went public, telling reporters at the launch site that it was his “individual feeling that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end of the century.” After the launch, Agnew told the launch team that he had “bit the bullet. . . as far as Mars is concerned.” Agnew’s statement at the launch was not spontaneous; it had been planned in advance, and Tom Paine was likely in on the planning.23

Spurred on by Agnew’s statement and by his own sense that there was a need for a dramatic goal for the 1980s to focus NASA’s activities in the 1970s, Tom Paine in July 1969 also “bit the bullet”; he decided in the excite­ment of Apollo 11 that it was time for NASA to propose sending Americans to Mars, not by the end of the twentieth century, three decades away, but as soon as possible.