Organizing a Review of the U. S. Space Program

The incoming Nixon administration was advised that there was a need for a focused review of the future options for the U. S. civilian and national security space programs. Arthur Burns, an economist and long-time Nixon associate whom Nixon had appointed as his top domestic policy advisor, had reviewed the reports of the 17 Nixon transition task forces and had extracted from them recommendations for President Nixon’s early attention. With respect to space, Burns had identified three items:

1. Opportunities for increasing the amount and broadening the character of international cooperation in space;

2. Opportunities for significant reduction in the costs of space launches;

3. The need for a comprehensive review of the nation’s space programs.

The second and third of these items were quickly incorporated into February 4 memos from President Nixon to science adviser DuBridge. With respect to lowering launch costs, Nixon told DuBridge “I would appreciate hav­ing by February 10, 1969, your assessment of this matter, and also of the recommendation that the Department of Defense and NASA be directed to coordinate studies in this area.” With respect to the overall program review, Nixon noted that “there is general agreement that our space efforts should continue, although there are notable differences of opinion in regard to specific projects and the amount of annual funding.” Burns had pro­posed “the establishment of an interagency committee which would include you [DuBridge], the Administrator of NASA, and a senior official from the Department of Defense. The primary function of this committee would be to furnish recommendations to me [Nixon] on the scope and direction of our Post Apollo space program.” Nixon also asked for an assessment of this pro­posal by February 10.34 A similar presidential memorandum regarding the first of Burns’s recommended items for attention, international space coop­eration, was sent to Secretary of State William Rogers only on February 21.

NASA learned of the plans for the White House space review only by acci­dent. The agency’s public affairs office had noticed a news item in a Florida newspaper saying that the president had asked his science adviser to evalu­ate ways of achieving lower costs in the space program. NASA contacted DuBridge to learn what was going on. While the story had to do with the transition task force’s suggestion that it might be possible to lower launch costs, when DuBridge talked to Paine, he was confused, and began to explain to Paine his not-yet-final plans for the overall space review. He told Paine that what he had in mind was a steering committee composed of DuBridge as chairman and including Paine from NASA, either Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard or Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans from the Department of Defense, and Vice President Spiro Agnew in his role as chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the high-level interagency group set up in 1958 to develop a national perspective on space issues. DuBridge suggested that after this group had examined the space program he would integrate their views and would prepare a summary docu­ment that he would present to President Nixon. Paine “dissented strongly” from this proposal, saying that “it was not proper for the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology to put himself in a position superior to the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of NASA, all of whom report directly to the President.” DuBridge suggested that Paine’s objections were a “question of protocol.” Paine disagreed; to him, the issue was “a basic question of executive authority, organization, and responsibility.” DuBridge closed their conversation by telling the NASA chief he would be in contact with a new proposal that he hoped would meet Paine’s objections.35

DuBridge’s apparent intent in organizing the post-Apollo review, with himself as its chair and his OST staff and the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) playing key roles, was to make sure that the review “covered all the necessary bases and got all the necessary points of view exposed for the president.” There was a concern within OST that if NASA controlled the review the science adviser “would be called upon to rubber stamp a NASA document.” Paine’s negative reaction was aimed at preserving NASA’s direct access to the president; Paine feared that what DuBridge had in mind “might result in some diminution of NASA’s authority. . . because you never want one bunch of guys to do the planning and another bunch to carry it out.” NASA was also concerned about DuBridge having the key role in the review, given his reported skepticism regarding the value of human space flight.36

After two days, DuBridge came back to Paine with a new proposal. It met many of Paine’s objections. One change was making Vice President Agnew the chair of the review. Paine asked DuBridge about “the delicate matter” of whether the White House really wanted to put Agnew in such an impor­tant role; even three weeks into the Nixon administration, it was clear that Agnew would not be part of Richard Nixon’s inner circle. DuBridge assured Paine “that he had discussed this question with both the President and the Vice President and this was their decision.” With this assurance and word that the White House did not want to wait until a permanent NASA admin­istrator was selected to begin the review, Paine agreed to DuBridge’s new proposal.37

Later that day, DuBridge sent a memorandum to the president suggesting a “Task Group” composed of the acting administrator of NASA, the secre­tary of defense, the chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the director of the Office of Science and Technology (DuBridge him­self) to oversee the review, with Vice President Spiro Agnew in his role as Space Council head as chair of the Task Group. DuBridge still proposed to reserve to himself the key role of “staff officer” and coordinator of the staff studies that the Task Group would review. He earlier had suggested that the separate review of space launch cost reductions be folded into the general review of the space program. DuBridge noted that “there is some urgency in proceeding with this review because of the very long lead time for space proj­ects” and suggested a September 1, 1969, date for submitting the group’s recommendations. DuBridge attached to his report a draft memorandum for presidential signature.

Richard Nixon on February 13 signed that memorandum. It said that “it is necessary for me to have in the near future definitive recommendation on the direction which the U. S. space program should take in the post-Apollo period.” Thus was created what came to be known as the Space Task Group (STG). Over the next seven months, the STG would be the forum for debate over the American future in space.38