"Giant Step": the Apollo 11 World Tour

Although both NASA and the White House certainly expected that at some point after their mission the Apollo 11 crew would embark on an interna­tional tour, there were no concrete plans for such a junket in place at the time of the Apollo 11 gala dinner. One characteristic of the Nixon White House evident early on was the intent to exercise close control over executive agency activities of direct interest to the president; there was little trust in the career bureaucracy. By early August, the White House was becoming increasingly impatient to hear from NASA regarding plans for the Apollo 11 tour. On August 6, three days after the president returned from his round-the-world trip, Nixon’s assistant Peter Flanigan wrote to NASA’s Julian Scheer, saying “No doubt you will be arranging for international trips for the Apollo 11 astronauts.” Flanigan requested that “before any specific schedule has been agreed upon, we would appreciate an opportunity to have the chief scheduler sit down here at the White House with the appropriate members of the White House, the National Security Council and the State Department [so] that we can coordinate the proposed schedule.” Five days later, Flanigan again wrote Scheer, this time saying “the President has again asked that he person­ally have an opportunity to review the Apollo 11 astronauts’ foreign travels. He has some strong opinions on this matter and wants to make sure he can express those opinions before any commitments are made.” Flanigan added “he is also anxious that there be some movement along this line, so I would appreciate hearing NASA’s thoughts with regard to the schedule in the near future.” On August 14, Nixon told Haldeman that the White House should control the tour schedule, with “no countries included w/o WH [without White House] approval.” As a result, Flanigan on August 15 wrote NASA administrator Paine, saying “the President is most anxious that the Apollo 11 astronauts commence their world-wide trip as soon as possible.”42

On August 15, the same day that Flanigan wrote Paine, Scheer finally replied, sending Flanigan a plan for the crew in the United States, to include an appearance before a joint session of Congress, as well as suggested “opera­tional guidelines for the overseas tour” and a proposed itinerary. Scheer noted that the plan was put together “with the guidance of U. Alexis Johnson of the Department of State.” Johnson was a veteran diplomat, then undersecretary of state for political affairs, who had long involvement in space policy mat­ters and was at the time part of the White House review of post-Apollo space plans. With respect to the proposed itinerary, Scheer noted that “it was more than advisable: 51 days, 28 countries and 30 cities. We would like to reduce this by 10 days.” With respect to the trip’s guidelines, Scheer suggested that “the Apollo 11 astronauts represent the President on a Presidential ‘Spirit of Apollo’ world trip.” He noted that “a Presidential aircraft, such as Air Force 2/3, is important for image purposes overseas.” Scheer proposed that

NASA supply both the “Chief of Mission” and the “Mission Director,” with a supporting staff of 11 additional NASA people; there would be four people from the U. S. Information Agency and only one from the Department of State in the traveling party.43

Little in what NASA was proposing was acceptable to the White House, which wanted a “highly political and carefully choreographed” tour designed to “reward friends, snub foes” and to produce “a flood of positive foreign headlines.” Nixon, reflecting his August 14 decision to take over from NASA the responsibility for planning the astronaut trip, told Kissinger “if you leave things in their [government bureaucrats] hands like this, they come out with an utter disaster.” Flanigan told Scheer on August 23 that “the President was dismayed at the proposed foreign schedule for the astronauts,” believing that “it went to too many countries, many of which were unimportant, while leaving out others of considerably greater importance.” Flanigan announced to NASA in no uncertain terms that “the President has given the White House staff the responsibility for reconstructing this schedule” and that “as soon it is completed it will be sent to you.” To make sure his point was clear, Flanigan added “Please be sure that all interested parties know that this is now a White House responsibility.”44

On August 26, completing the White House takeover of the trip plan­ning, Flanigan informed Administrator Paine that the astronauts would indeed “tour the world as his [the President’s] representatives.” Rather than NASA managing the tour, Nicholas Ruwe, a senior Department of State protocol officer, was designated “Chief of Mission” and would be “respon­sible to the President for its successful completion.” Both NASA and the State Department would provide staff, but only “as requested by the White House.”45

NASA was not at all pleased by the White House intervention in the tour arrangements; tension between Scheer, particularly, and the White House ran high. Ruwe on September 23, a week before the tour was to commence, reported to Kissinger “NASA and I are at complete loggerheads with regard to the execution of the Apollo 11 trip.” Dissatisfaction with tour planning extended to Armstrong, Aldrin, and Collins themselves. On September 17, the day after they had addressed a joint session of Congress, the three were briefed at the State Department with respect to tour preparations. The astro­nauts had set as their objectives for the trip “to demonstrate goodwill to all people in the world and to stress that what we had done was for all man­kind.” According to Aldrin, they were not impressed when they perceived from their briefing that an important objective of the tour was “to visit the American embassies anxious to score social coups.” The crew’s response was “we would take care of Americans in America.”46

The Apollo H tour was code-named “Giant Step.” It departed on September 29, with the first stop being Mexico City. The day before, Nixon, reflecting his personal concern that the tour serve his broader purposes, called Armstrong to give him some final thoughts. Using talking points prepared by Borman, Nixon urged Armstrong to convey to the leaders in each of the countries visited that the Apollo 11 flight and the astronauts’ tour represented “the interest of the United States in maintaining space explora­tion as a project of peaceful benefits for all nations of the world.” He sug­gested that Armstrong might repeat what the president had said during his post-mission trip—that “the success of the Apollo XI mission belongs to all the people of the earth and not just the people of the United States.”47

The crew visited 27 cities in 24 countries over 39 days. They returned to Washington on November 5. Neil and Jan Armstrong and Mike and Pat Collins enjoyed most of the exhausting trip; Collins remembers that “despite the fatigue and the repetitive nature of the ceremonies,” the tour “was the rarest of opportunities, to cram in slightly over a month’s time visits with the Queen of England, Marshal Tito, the Pope, the Emperor of Japan, the Shan of Iran, Generalissimo Franco, Badouin King of the Belgians, King Olaf of Norway, Queen Wilhemina of the Netherlands, the King and Queen of Thailand, and dozens of Presidents, Prime Ministers, ambassadors, and lesser lights.” In contrast, Buzz Aldrin found the trip extremely stressful, and became increasingly depressed as the tour continued; he and his wife were at times not on speaking terms.48

When the crew arrived back in Washington, they went by helicopter directly to the South Lawn of the White House. There they were welcomed by President Nixon, speaking “for all of the American people in expressing the heartfelt thanks of this Nation to the Armstrongs, the Aldrins, and the Collinses for what I think is the most successful goodwill trip in the history of the United States of America. . . Certainly the first men ever to land on the moon have demonstrated that they are the best possible ambassadors America could have on this earth.” That evening, President and Mrs. Nixon hosted a White House dinner; the only other people present were the crew members and their wives. Aldrin remembers a “friendly, warm evening.” The president told the crew that he had used his stop in Romania in his around-the-world tour to send a secret message to China’s leaders that he was open to normal­izing U. S.-Chinese relations and said that opportunity had “paid for every­thing we spent on the space program.” He asked each crew member what they wanted to do next. While Armstrong and Aldrin were non-committal, Collins expressed interest in continuing work in public diplomacy. In a con­versation with NASA Administrator Paine even before leaving on the “Giant Step” tour, Collins had learned that Secretary of State Rogers had expressed interest in Collins becoming the assistant secretary of state for public affairs. Collins told Nixon of his interest in that position. The president immedi­ately called Rogers, telling him that Collins would be an excellent fit for the job. After dinner, Pat Nixon led a tour through the White House and the Executive Office Building next door. When the crew had interacted with the First Lady at the August 13 banquet, they had found her distant and stiff. Now, she was “charming,” a “delightful, warm hostess who really tried to make us feel at home”; the tour was carried off “with unexpected enthusi­asm and a beautiful informality.” The three astronauts and their wives then spent the night at the White House. A few weeks later, “Giant Step” would be resumed for a two-day trip to Canada, but the White House evening pro­vided a satisfying conclusion to the mission of Apollo 11 and its immediate aftermath. According to Collins, Mrs. Nixon’s hospitality “made our stay at the White House the real highlight of our around the world trip.”49