Ballistic Missile Capability

Missiles and space launch vehicles belong to the family of basic rocket technologies. In yesteryears, the US space launchers were developed from missiles. The basic difference between these two different genre of missiles arise from the goal of placing a nuclear weapon payload in a ballistic (i. e. reentering) trajectory, versus placing a satellite payload in orbit. Launch trajectory, size and number of stages all have a role in distinguishing the two different uses [8]. The capability to launch a satellite indirectly demonstrates the potential of a state to develop a missile. Certain states that are under constant international scanner due to their defiance of certain global nonproliferation/arms control norms find it difficult to conduct missile testing to prove their prowess and hence follow a ‘satellite launching’ route. A detailed discussion regarding this issue has been done elsewhere in this book.

Today, almost half of global nuclear weapon powers (within and outside NPT) are from Asia. Suitable delivery platform for launching of a nuclear weapon is a prerequisite for establishment of any nuclear force. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is an important component of any nuclear weapon architecture, globally. In Asia, nuclear-capable countries like China, India and Pakistan already have a reasonably well-developed missile infrastructure. Amongst them, China has proven ICBM capability (Dong Feng). There have been unconfirmed reports that India plans to develop the 8,000-km range ICBM called Surya. India has successfully tested 5,000-km range Agni-V (the strike envelope is whole of Asia, 70% of Europe

and other regions) missile during April 2012. North Korea has unsuccessfully test fired a missile called Taepodong-2 in 2006 with a range of around 4-4,500 kms. States like Japan have an active commercial space launch programme and hence have technology ‘available’ which could provide the basis for a long-range ballistic missile programme.

Currently, Iran and North Korea are being viewed as states using satellite programme as a frontage for their missile ambitions. North Korea has already conducted nuclear tests, and Iran could be on its way. Hence, the space programmes of these states are being viewed with suspicion. However, it could be inaccurate to dismiss their space programme only as a front end for missile testing.

In 1959, Tehran became a founding member of the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). In initial years, Iranian political leadership viewed space technology as a tool to improve their political, social and economic standing. Leaders like Rafsanjani and Khatami wanted to modernise the country. Khatami issued various reforms to modernise the country to include reinvigorating efforts for the nation to become more active in space. He gave the country a vision of becoming a space power as a vehicle for modernity [9]. Its space programme began in 1998 [10] with a stated aim to use this technology for socioeconomic development. During February 2009, Iran successfully launched its first domestically produced satellite using indigenously built rocket launcher. They have also another satellite during February 2012. North Korea did a launch during April 2009. However, in spite their claims of success, there is no evidence available to corroborate their claim. Indonesia is also interested in launching its own satellite with own launcher. Its space agency Lapan, set up in 1964, is collaborating with the military to develop more efficient rockets. Few years back, they have inked a formal technology transfer agreement with China (2005) for the development of missiles [7]. Space programmes of these states are being viewed with some suspicion for their missile ambitions.

Another reason to doubt the intentions of Iran and North Korea is because undertaking unimpeded space launch is possible only if the state’s geography offers it that luxury and that is not the case with these states. Geography puts major compulsions on Iran to undertake any launches. It is surrounded by states both on its western and eastern border which are unlikely to grant over flight permissions to their launches. Even with friendly states in north, Iran cannot evade the issues of liability and public and environmental safety. Only possibility of undertaking safe launches (not 100%) could be from region close to Chah Bahar [11]. If this be the case then why is Iran interested in developing launch vehicle technology? Is it in support of their increasing nuclear ambitions? North Korea also faces similar challenges. The best option for both of them could be to have cordial relations with other states that can provide them launching facilities.

By and large, Iran and North Korea needs ‘fake’ satellite launches to develop their own missile programme. On the other hand, both the states understand that satellite technology in itself is important for socioeconomic development and also has military utility. Hence, these states are likely to continue investing in both satellite manufacturing as well as launcher technologies with more bias towards missile-specific technologies. China and Russia could help North Korea to satisfy its genuine requirement of having access to space. North Korea’s space ambitions could be used as a tool to engage that state in the post-Kim Jong-il era. A regime change in Iran could bring a possibility of third party interlocutors-under such scenario India could play a role towards helping Iran to launch its satellites (presently India is avoiding such requests from Iran).