Barriers to Bilateralism

In succeeding months and into the fall, the funding prospects on both sides of the Atlantic worsened. Weiler argued with White House budget officials over a NASA Mars budget they were determined to lower. The year before, he had had to endure the paring of the joint missions with ESA from two to one. Now even that one was in jeopardy. As pressure on Weiler and his budget “racheted up,” he proposed more modest cuts across the board in NASA science to protect Mars. White House budget officials did not relent. They saw in the bilateral program another multimission big science effort that could become a standing commitment through international connections.58

OMB was correct. NASA wanted to move ahead on a program, not a single mission. The fact that the program was bilateral held down costs. But the U. S. expense still would be great, in view of the endeavor’s bold goal. Utterly frus­trated, Weiler wrote Bolden he had reached the end of the line in his nego­tiations.59 On September 30, Weiler retired, thereby concluding an admirable 33-year government career. For Mars supporters inside and outside NASA, he would be greatly missed. It would now be up to others to try to carry on what he and Southwood had begun. That task would be daunting.

The letter from Bolden affirming NASA’s intent to support the 2018 Mars mission, which was supposed to come in mid-September, did not arrive. A frus­trated Scott Hubbard spoke out against the delay, which was due not to Bolden, but to the White House and OMB. He pointed out that ESA was pledging 1 billion euros to the combined missions; how could the United States not do its part?60 But the United States was making further decisions to cause angst in Europe. It stated that it could not provide the Atlas V rocket to launch the 2016 mission. That had been part of the original bargain between NASA and ESA. Dordain once more scrambled to find additional money within ESA to keep contractors working until the end of the year. He managed to do so. He earnestly sought to keep open options to maintain the 2016 opportunity. But he now knew he would have to find an alternative rocket, from either Europe or Russia, and additional money from ESA to make up for the U. S. withdrawal. The options for Dordain were narrowing, and there was a distinct possibility ESA would have to abort the 2016 ExoMars launch.

But what about 2018? This was the priority for the United States and also ESA. The 2016 mission was supposed to facilitate it. In the first week of Octo­ber, Bolden and Dordain met during the International Astronautical Congress in Cape Town, South Africa.61 Bolden told Dordain that NASA wanted to keep the partnership going, but its budget situation was still too uncertain for him to make commitments.62

NASA was living with a continuing resolution most of the year as the presi­dent and Congress staggered toward compromises in late 2011. Moreover, Con­gress had established a “Super Committee” to hammer out extensive budget cuts to reduce the deficit on a long-term basis. The Super Committee failed, however, and draconian cuts across the board would kick in in 2013, unless Congress acted to avert them before then. No one could predict what would ensue. Congress did provide NASA with a budget in November, as well as lan­guage that backed “flagship-class missions” that could be implemented with “international partners.” However, the Obama administration was silent on a commitment to such a mission. Desperate, Dordain asked Russia to join the U. S.-European alliance to keep the 2016 mission alive. The 2018 mission was still planned, and Bolden was hoping all would be well eventually, but Dordain confessed he was becoming a “doubting Thomas.”63