MSL’s “Cameron” Camera

While planning for a joint flagship mission, NASA also had to implement its existing flagship, MSL. MSL’s centerpiece was the rover, and the rover now had a name, Curiosity. NASA’s hope was that that name, chosen on the basis of a national competition, would become as familiar as Spirit and Opportunity.

In late March, NASA reluctantly decided that the special 3-D camera being built for MSL would not be ready in time for the November-December MSL launch window. This camera was being developed by Malin Space Science Sys­tems of San Diego. Malin, a longtime Mars enthusiast and contractor, had been joined by James Cameron, whose space science fiction film Avatar had been a blockbuster success. Cameron was himself an advocate of Mars exploration and was serving NASA as a public engagement coinvestigator with Malin on MSL.40

The camera had been descoped in the Stern period and been reestablished subsequently by Weiler. NASA Administrator Bolden had himself provided ad­ditional resources from his own reserve fund to try to speed the development of the camera. For Bolden, Mars was an agency priority, and Mars exploration was one of two science missions to which he gave significant personal attention (the other was the James Webb Space Telescope, a project whose cost overrun was a major headache for the Administrator).41 But NASA could not make up the lost time from the 2007 descope.42 This camera (which some called the “Cameron” Camera) provided exceptional imaging capability that would bring the public along as a rider on MSL. There were other cameras on MSL which would help in this respect, just not as dramatically as the Cameron Camera. But the dead­line for launch was getting closer, and time precluded waiting for the camera to be fully ready. The total MSL package had to come together.43

Bilateral Talks Continue

Throughout April, the joint working group between NASA and ESA labored to find ways to merge the two programs. Southwood retired, as scheduled, and passed his ESA science leadership torch to Alvaro Gimenez in May. Gimenez regarded the joint effort as a “hot potato,” but he agreed with Southwood’s analysis of the situation NASA and ESA faced: “As for Mars, the fact is that neither of us can realize the ambitious goals of Mars exploration on our own. We are, I think, linked in this.”44

NASA was telling ESA in May it would contribute $1.2 billion to the revised 2018 mission, plus an estimated $300 million in launch costs—or $1.5 billion. This was $700 million below what it had projected when Weiler and Southwood had begun discussions and assumed two separate spacecraft. In considering the 2016 and 2018 missions as one ExoMars program, ESA had authorized 1 billion euros (U. S. $1.4 billion). The top official of ESA, Jean-Jacques Dordain, was personally steering the merger through key ESA governing boards.

In selling the revised (but still formative) program to the boards (and na­tions), Dordain promised to hold to the approved 1 billion euro ceiling and protect the 2018 mission from cost overruns by the 2016 mission. He had ESA take the unusual step of waiving almost all of its usual management fees—a $50 million saving—as a show of commitment to the project and holding the line on costs. Dordain’s big problem was that he had to get at least a tentative agree­ment to the concept of a NASA-ESA merged program from his ESA masters to restart payment to contractors on ExoMars 2016. Because of 2016 launch windows, he felt that work had to recommence July i.45

Dordain wanted a formal assurance from his counterpart, Bolden, that NASA would provide promised funds for the 2018 mission. This assurance would help him persuade his superiors to provide authorization for the July i, 2016, mission restart. International collaboration, wonderful in theory, was cumbersome in practice. But on May 26-27, Dordain got from ESA’s policy body, the Human Spaceflight and Operations Directorate, agreement to the general outlines of the NASA-ESA program. He would now go to the Industrial Policy Commit­tee for financial approval in June. One body provided policy legitimacy, the other money. He needed both affirmations.46 The verbal promise of U. S. re­sources helped leverage decisions with ESA to some extent. He awaited a letter from Bolden which he could show the Industrial Policy Committee to close the arrangement.