Delaying MSL’s Launch

Weiler and Griffin deeply wanted to launch MSL in 2009 and follow that up with MAVEN in 2013 and a possible rover capable of testing technology for collecting samples in 2016. Toward that end, they had wanted to hold to the 2009 schedule until the last moment possible for decision in January. JPL told headquarters, “Trust us.” But Weiler said, “Trust and verify.” In November, Weiler established an interim milestone that would have to be met in December. He did not want to take decision making to January—the point Griffin had set as the time to choose to go forward or not to do so.122

At JPL, in November, there was turmoil, as the laboratory struggled mightily to make the deadline. Elachi was like Griffin in deeply wanting to launch MSL in 2009, and he was holding out hope that JPL would come through. Gentry Lee and others had persisted in arguing that JPL could not make the deadline. The laboratory was working double shifts, pursuing technological solutions to various problems in parallel efforts, and spending money accordingly.123

Rob Manning was the chief engineer on MSL and emphasized that the atti­tude at JPL is such that when critics say “can’t do,” you show them “can do!” But Manning saw several problems with MSL in November which remained to be mitigated and probably could not be in the brief time left. Weiler sent Figueroa with a review team to JPL, and Manning was the bearer of bad news. Weiler and his advisors had established certain requirements that had to be met in Decem­ber. JPL would be unable to meet those requirements, it was increasingly clear. “We had hoped we would come up with some tricks to get us through. We ran out of tricks,” Manning recalled.124

The “bad news” went to Elachi and Weiler. Weiler knew what was happening through McCuistion. McCuistion advised Weiler to pull the plug. Telephone calls went back and forth. The principal parties agreed—Elachi, Weiler, and then the associate administrator, Scolese. A consensus view went to Griffin, who concurred.125 In pushing for a decision sooner than later, Weiler made what he regarded in hindsight as his “wisest decision” since returning to head SMD.126 He could have spent a very great deal of money pushing MSL to “the cliff,” and then would almost certainly have retreated to a delay decision, or even worse—pushed ahead. It was better to admit reality sooner than later and use the money for other needs. Ironically, Stern would have made the same decision—to delay—even sooner. But what Weiler did was build a coalition of support for the decision to take to Griffin.

On December 4, Griffin, Weiler, McCuistion, and Elachi held a joint press conference in NASA’s auditorium to announce the final decision. It was to delay MSL to 2011. That delay would add $400 million to MSL’s costs, pushing it to at least as much as $2.3 billion, and causing financial distress to other Mars and Sci­ence Directorate projects. The media reported that the four managers looked “grim-faced” as each spoke to reporters and gave views concerning the decision.127

Griffin said the major issue was with actuators, gears that would move MSL’s wheels on Mars. NASA could have continued to rush to solve the problems, and might even have succeeded on time, “but we’ve determined that trying for ’09 would require us to assume too much risk—more than I think is appropri­ate for a flagship mission like Mars Science Laboratory.” Griffin made it clear he regarded MSL as NASA’s top priority in the science program and one of NASA’s top priorities overall, right after the human spaceflight activities. Asked about the increase in costs, Griffin responded that the rise was a function of the technical challenges of MSL. “We know how to control costs—just build more of what you built the last time.”128

McCuistion commented on the technical issues, saying that NASA could not take a chance with the actuators. If they did not function properly, the $2-billion-plus vehicle would turn into “a metric ton of junk.” Elachi empha­sized how hard JPL had worked to make the deadline and how disappointed he personally was, but he agreed with the decision to delay. Weiler noted there would be “impacts” of the decision that would be negative, such as postponing other missions. However, he also cited a possible silver lining. It would help force NASA to move in a direction that made long-term sense for the next stage of the Mars program. He had met the day before, he said, with his ESA counterpart, David Southwood. Southwood had money and schedule problems with ESA’s top Mars priority, ExoMars, scheduled for 2016. Southwood needed to collaborate to help pay for this expensive rover mission. Thanks in part to the MSL overruns and delay, NASA also needed help with its Mars missions, beginning in 2016. Finding a way to work together on future missions, said Weiler, was a “no brainer.”129