Charging Ahead

If Stern was deterred by the negative reaction from the Mars constituency, he did not show it by his actions. Moreover, MSL continued to go up in costs, complicating his ardent managerial effort to keep expenses down. More and more, MSL became a test case for Stern and his campaign for reform and desire to reshape the Mars program.

He went to JPL and came back convinced it could not make the 2009 launch deadline without raising costs even more. He looked at the NAS National Re­search Council Decadal Survey published years before, which had called MSL a “moderate” mission of $650 million. How had it gotten so expensive? The answer for Stern was “duplicity” on the part of JPL and the Mars science com­munity. They had gotten away with an elaborate increase in instruments and sophisticated technology, and NASA’s review committees either had not seen the problems or had ignored them. “It was Christmas in the middle of the year,” Stern complained. He called MSL “a ticking time bomb” in terms of cost. He wanted to descope “profligate instruments.” He wanted to stop spending money on a crash basis to meet a deadline that he did not believe JPL could meet. By extending the deadline to the next launch window, 2011, he believed he could make changes in MSL that might control costs while also making it more rel­evant to MSR.93

Figueroa—who was implicitly a target of Stern’s charges about review com­mittee failure—opposed Stern in the debates about MSL within NASA. So did Garvin, who was outraged by Stern’s actions. These officials made the case that it was far too late in the development process of MSL to make radical design changes. Doing so would slow down the project even more and further raise costs. Moreover, they defended MSL against the charge that it had grown enormously from the $650 million Decadal Survey figure Stern used. MSL was not the Mars Smart Lander that was in the original Hubbard plan. Stern, they said, was comparing apples and oranges. Others entered the fray, including John Grotzinger, Caltech professor and chief scientist for MSL, who defended the project.94

The debate over MSL escalated to associate administrator (and general man­ager) Chris Scolese. Scolese conducted his own analysis and sided with Stern’s opponents. He agreed it was too late in the development stage for significant changes other than those absolutely necessary. Beyond technical issues were institutional commitments with JPL, industry, and the Mars science community which could not be disrupted.

The issue of whether to delay MSL from a launch in 2009 to 2011 went to Griffin for decision. Stern argued that JPL would not make the schedule and hence NASA should hold up expenditures to the laboratory sooner, rather than later. That saved money could then be spent more wisely. Delay, however, would cost money in the long run, too, and affect other projects, so the decision to postpone launch raised extremely tough issues either way. Griffin decided to keep going with the existing schedule. He told Stern, “Run for the cliff.” When Stern protested that JPL would not make it, Griffin responded, “Try!”95