Pressuring Griffin

As he prepared for his Senate confirmation hearings, Griffin was lobbied by scientists who disagreed intensely with the priorities he inherited from O’Keefe. A total of 17 scientists signed a “manifesto” they delivered to Griffin, and some of them personally spoke to him. “The balance between the two modes of explo­ration, human and robotic, is now threatened,” the manifesto declared. It was not just the balance between human and robotic exploration that worried these scientists. They were concerned also about the balance between Mars and non – Mars robotic science. They called the concept of “exploration” O’Keefe used too narrow. “Should other forms of space exploration be cancelled or curtailed to make this new, but limited, exploration vision possible? We think and hope not,” said the paper.

Among the 17 signers of the petition was Fisk, who was converting the chair­manship of the National Academy of Sciences Space Studies Board into a posi­tion for leadership in opposition to the O’Keefe priorities. Al Diaz, who had the NASA job Fisk once possessed, called the Moon-Mars science orientation a re­sult of “strategic” decision making. Fisk called that kind of thinking bad strategy and warned, “There is a firestorm coming.”2 Griffin tried to put the concerned scientific community at ease at his confirmation hearings on April 12: “We as a nation can clearly afford well-executed, vigorous programs in both robotic and human space exploration as well as aeronautics,” he stated. However, Griffin was also clear about his priorities, which were to return the still-grounded shut­tle to flight, finish the space station, and begin building the technical systems (called “Constellation”) that would take America back to the Moon by 2020. He especially declared his intent to accelerate the transition from the space shuttle to its successor. He regarded the four-year gap he inherited as too long and a challenge he wanted to remedy.3

Griffin was easily confirmed and in office by April 14. In taking command, he was aware of an understanding reached between Bush and the Office of Manage­ment and Budget during the hiatus between February (O’Keefe’s leaving) and April (his arrival) at NASA. This would cut NASA’s five-year projected budget by $2.9 billion as its contribution to deficit reduction during Bush’s second term. Griffin knew that budget games were played constantly in Washington, and he thought he could reverse this move. He believed that Bush was serious about supporting NASA and his vision, and that he could counter OMB. With the original budget projected in 2004, he felt he could deliver a program that could get the Moon-Mars vision off to a sound start while also supporting science and other NASA programs. He wanted “balance” in NASA and said, “There is no inherent conflict between manned and unmanned space programs, save that deliberately promulgated by those seeking to play a difficult and ugly zero-sum game.” But one former NASA Administrator, who was quoted without attribu­tion by Science magazine, predicted, “He’s going to have to choose sides; he can’t make everyone happy.”4