Mars Smart Lander Becomes Mars Science Laboratory

On April 7, the first mission in the new program, Odyssey, was successfully launched. It began its long journey to Mars as the Bush budget details became known. In a speech he gave before the National Press Club a few days after the Odyssey launch, Hubbard alluded to the White House support for Mars exploration. He said the additional funds promised were assurance that future missions had resources they needed to succeed. He noted that the budget would make sure the 2005 mission, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, “has the full set of science instruments that we’ve been talking about,” and would allow NASA even to begin developing technologies for MSR.

He said NASA would in 2007 launch its first scout mission conceived by the scientific community and industry. In 2009, NASA planned to launch an­other sophisticated orbiter, possibly with international partners. This mission was present for the first time as a result of favorable budget trends, Hubbard declared. Indeed, he said that MSR might be possible in a 2011 launch.5

Garvin, meanwhile, wasted no time in taking advantage of what he saw as a window of opportunity for a Mars initiative. He was a man whose office answer­ing machine extolled, “Have a great Mars day!” Garvin matched Goldin in his zeal for the Red Planet. As soon as he was sure that OMB and the White House supported the Mars program, he moved to clarify scientific and engineering re­

quirements for the Mars Smart Lander. He did so by organizing a Science Defi­nition Team. NASA was not going to have two MSLs. But maybe the one MSL NASA could send to Mars would be even more capable than what Hubbard and his team had originally conceived. What was implicit in the thinking of Garvin and other Mars enthusiasts was how to move forward more rapidly toward MSR. In discussions with OMB and Mars scientists, Garvin found agreement that Mars Smart Lander was especially important in developing technologies for MSR. If MSR was an end, then each mission leading to it had to be justified as means. Each mission had to build on a predecessor and show real progress. That was the quid pro quo between NASA and OMB in garnering White House backing for its long-term program.

While Garvin maneuvered in Washington, as well as with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Mars science community, Hubbard held discussions with possible international partners, especially Russia. These did not lead very far.6 Tired but elated, Hubbard decided it was time for him to leave the nation’s capital. Satisfied that the new Mars program was off to the best start possible with a good funding prognosis, Hubbard on April 19 announced he was step­ping down as headquarters Mars director. He and his wife, he said, wanted to return to California and Ames. He said he had promised Goldin and Weiler a year to fix the Mars program, and that year was up. Weiler praised Hubbard effusively and said he had taken on “mission impossible” and converted it into “mission accomplished.” Orlando Figueroa, a veteran NASA manager, would succeed Hubbard.7

Figueroa inherited a Mars program moving quickly, with significant change under way where Mars Smart Lander was concerned. There was growing con­sensus among Mars advocates that Mars Smart Lander could and should be augmented. The original emphasis of Mars Smart Lander, as the name implied, was precision landing. It was seen initially as a technology pathfinder.8 In the first half of 2001, and later into the summer and fall, it became increasingly clear that the Bush White House was supportive of robotic Mars exploration. In this political context, the Mars Smart Lander gradually morphed into the Mars Sci­ence Laboratory. Garvin provided leadership within headquarters for the change of emphasis, but the shift reflected widespread support at JPL and in the Mars science community for augmenting the science laboratory—that is, rover—com­ponent of the mission. As the orientation of the device altered, so did its name.

What evolved was the sense that MSL should be substantially more capable in performing science than Pathfinder and the two rovers that would be launched

in 2003. One way MSL could be significantly better would be if it were nuclear powered. The 2003 Mars Exploration Rovers (MER)—known as Spirit and Op­portunity—would be solar powered. That limited their range and capacity to work at night. A nuclear-powered rover would not have that limit and could do so much more, so much longer, planners reasoned.

Garvin and his associates took their case to Weiler. They argued the merits of a nuclear-powered rover. Weiler had been a scientific leader of the Hubble proj­ect. He was a telescope man. The Mars advocates called MSL an “observatory on wheels.” Weiler saw the merits of nuclear technology. He agreed.9 And so did OMB and the Bush White House. Sean O’Keefe, the politically appointed deputy director of OMB, Isakowitz’s boss, had been secretary of the navy under the first Bush. He had seen the value of nuclear propulsion for ships. A nuclear proponent, he now also saw the value of nuclear propulsion for spacecraft.