A Second Failure: Mars Polar Lander

The next mission came quickly, in line with FBC principles and the require­ments of an accelerated program. Mars Polar Lander was scheduled to land December 3. Although relatively small, MPL carried quite an assortment of equipment: “a pair of basketball-sized probes designed to shoot separately into the planet’s surface, cameras, a weather station, a robotic digging arm, a mini­lab for analyzing soil samples, and the first microphone sent to another world.” Also riding on MPL were NASA’s reputation, schedule, and hopes for an early MSR.21

Goldin, Weiler, and other top officials joined senior JPL managers and the MPL technical team December 3 at JPL. They crowded around computers in a central control room and awaited the signal telling them MPL had landed safely. The atmosphere was tense. Because of the earlier setback, NASA needed a victory to assure itself, the media, the public, and politicians that the MCO accident was an aberration.

At 3:30 p. m. the signal was supposed to come, but there was silence. The NASA officials and technical team waited, “frozen as statues,” as the minutes ticked on. Twenty minutes passed, and finally one NASA manager suggested a “leg stretch.” There would be another window for communication a little later. There was hope yet.

The group convened again for an opportunity beginning at 5:24 p. m. Again, there was silence. The expressions on the faces of those straining to hear some­thing from Mars were grim. After several more minutes, the window closed. There was now little doubt that something had gone terribly wrong. The third opportunity began at 11:08 p. m. that evening and closed at 12:30 a. m. The result was the same as the first two tries.22

The vigil continued episodically over the next several days. Senior NASA officials went back to Washington. After two weeks of repeated attempts to communicate, the agency and JPL admitted that MCO had failed.23 The mis­sion cost $165 million, not much by space standards, but the cost represented the new standard of FBC. There would have to be another board of inquiry. And this one would have to take a very hard look at the FBC approach to space missions.

Goldin had always said that FBC assumed that a small number of missions would fail. With risk and boldness came failure. But most missions would suc­ceed, he predicted, and NASA would thereby push forward the space frontier. But here was a case of two failures in a row, and both had to do with Mars. Mars was special, of maximum visibility to the public. For many in the media and po­litical community, it personified space exploration. For Goldin and many other space advocates, it was the heart of NASA’s mission.

The year 1999 had begun so optimistically with a surge in the Mars program. It ended with the program immobilized.