The Soviet Phobos Shot

In July, the Phobos mission was ready to go. There would be two probes sent, one July 7, the other July 12. There was great expectation and attention paid to the flight in the United States. The Soviet Union had not tried to go to Mars since 1973, and it had failed then. Success potentially meant initiation of a more robust Mars program in both the Soviet Union and the United States, with col­laboration a central, political purpose.

Science magazine spoke of “Mars Mania,” highlighting the enthusiasm and expectation that were building. American dignitaries went to the Soviet Union to watch the Phobos launch, and U. S. scientists prepared to participate in re­search Phobos made possible. In return, NASA had agreed that Soviet scientists could participate in Mars Observer research. NASA and JPL worked to incor­porate the Mars balloon relay system into Mars Observer development.38

The launch for Phobos was spectacular, and the various Western dignitar­ies who attended were impressed. Sagdeev, who had spearheaded the mission, called previous attempts with small bodies like Phobos a “quick kiss.” This was going to be a prolonged dalliance, he said.39 But relatively early into what was a seven-month flight, on August 31, problems arose on the Phobos 1 space­craft. Flight controllers in the Soviet Union sent Phobos 1 a radio command that “lacked a single character.” This error confused “its navigation system” and moved “its solar panels out of alignment with the sun.” Without adequate power, Phobos і ran into severe difficulty.

A “forlorn” Sagdeev was photographed behind a model of the Phobos space­craft at the U. S. ambassador’s residence in Moscow. It was September 9, and he had to announce that Phobos і seemed doomed, tumbling out of control mil­lions of miles from Earth. By November, it would be officially ruled a failure.40 The Soviets and their allies still hoped for the success of Phobos 2. It reached Mars on January 29, 1989. Tass proudly announced that the planet Mars “has acquired one more satellite which will bring mankind closer to unraveling the mysteries of the planet.”41 It did return useful data on Mars and Phobos briefly. However, in late March, as it neared the long-anticipated Phobos rendezvous, it ceased to function.

The Phobos failure damaged the Soviet Mars program. The repercussions were dreadful for Mars advocates in the United States. At least for the moment, the dream shared across nations of a Mars Together initiative was on hold. An angry Sagdeev lashed out at engineer-managers who had had final control over technical design. Computer backups might have saved the mission, he com­plained, but were not available. “I hope that, in the future, space technology producers will have their absolute freedom restricted so that the world scientific community, as the end user of the technology, can have a say in decision making on spacecraft design.” That remark brought a retort from Roald Kremnev, as

ranking Phobos engineer, reminding Sagdeev that “space technology designers have to comply with a set of restrictions relating to the funds and the weight and size of the spacecraft, etc.” Scientists cannot expect to have their own way, he countered.42

The disappointment was deep not only in the Soviet Union but also in America. The Planetary Society and U. S. scientists associated with Phobos had banked on success of at least one of the two probes. They viewed Phobos not as a Soviet mission, but as a mission that “transcended” national borders and could lead to a regeneration of Mars flights in the United States.43 Scientists in the United States and the Soviet Union were linked in what they hoped would be a sequence of ever more challenging Mars missions. The Planetary Society saw Phobos as part of an overarching strategy to rekindle public interest in space, build bridges of peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, and pressure NASA to be more Mars oriented. Now, Mars exploration depended on what happened to the next flight in line, Mars Observer, in America. Also, Mars exploration depended on the man Fletcher had briefed on Mars policy following the Ride report, George H. W. Bush, elected president in November.