Selling Mars

Although preoccupied with immediate issues, Fletcher and Fisk were aware that the Soviet Union was presenting an opportunity to direct policymakers’ atten­tion to Mars and space exploration generally. Whereas the Planetary Society stressed cooperation, NASA used the competition card.

NASA looked beyond Mars Observer to propose what it and its scientific advisors wanted—a rover and Mars Sample Return mission. Once the Soviets went to Phobos, they would likely launch such a mission to the Red Planet. NASA argued that the United States should compete. In late March, Briggs and the directors of JPL and Johnson Space Center (JSC) proposed the “Mars Rover and Sample Return” mission at a meeting with 200 representatives from industry in Houston, Texas. “This is a mission that has to happen,” said Briggs. “NASA is not exactly at the zenith of its activities at the moment,” he pointed out. “Nor is the planetary program.” “We either do it now or after the Soviets do it,” he continued. “NASA has got to get moving again.”

It was made clear that this particular mission had strong support from the scientific community and NASA in general. Aaron Cohen, the JSC director, declared, “If we want to be able to carry out tasks [involving astronauts] on the Moon or Mars, we must have a firm base in science. Lew Allen [the JPL Direc­tor] and I agree that by working together, we can learn much from this mission.” NASA gave a similar briefing to contractors a few days later in Pasadena, home ofJPL. JPL would be lead center in the project, with JSC assisting. Briggs again emphasized the competitiveness driver. He said that the Soviets were en­gaged in a similar mission and “that it is my responsibility to make sure the United States is in a position to do a mission with the same kind of complexity in the same time frame. So that really is the trigger on the timing.”23

NASA—and Mars advocates generally—seemed to be searching for any ratio­nale that would sell to get the agency moving again, after Challenger. Whether it was cooperation or competition did not matter, as long as the strategy was effective. The problem was not in the packaging. It was whether policymakers were in a buying mood for the product.

In August 1987, Ride’s report was published. Cooperation and competition gave way to “leadership.” Entitled Leadership and America’s Future in Space, Ride listed four possible long-range initiatives that would restore the United States to a position of leadership in space. Without stating priority among the four, Ride listed them as (1) Mission to Planet Earth—Earth satellites to monitor the global environment; (2) Exploration of the Solar System—essentially the robotic program recommended in 1983 by SSEC, as augmented in 1986, to include more ambitious endeavors; (3) Building an Outpost on the Moon; and (4) Humans to Mars. This last initiative overlapped with the second, as robotic flights to Mars were essential precursors. Ride wrote, “Robotic exploration of the planet would be the first phase [of humans to Mars] and would include the return of samples of Martian rock and soil.”

The problem, as Ride pointed out, was that while many space enthusiasts wanted to go beyond the shuttle and space station to bolder ventures, exist­ing programs would continue to dominate agency spending for the foreseeable future. Given realities, she noted, many observers believed that NASA could

not handle another major program.24 These ambitions and financial realities had to be reconciled somehow, she argued, for NASA needed strategic goals and direction.25

Fletcher responded to the Ride study in two ways. First, he established an Office of Exploration to provide a focus for sustained thinking and advocacy for exploration in general, with emphasis on human spaceflight. With Ride leaving NASA for an academic appointment, he placed John Aron, a veteran NASA official, in charge of the new office as an assistant administrator. In addition, on August io, he met with Vice President George H. W. Bush to brief him on NASA’s plans after Challenger recovery. In this meeting, he pointed out that the Soviet Union was surpassing the United States in certain technologies and program ambition. He said that the Soviets had an advantage in both robotic and human exploration of Mars. He advised that the United States needed to choose a long-term, post-space station goal to give the agency strategic focus, and that human spaceflight to Mars was the logical one.26

Fletcher also wanted to discuss NASA’s future with the president but was blocked in getting to Reagan. The word was that Reagan’s lieutenants felt that Fletcher should get space station spending under control before trying to per­suade the president to launch a Mars venture.27

In November-December 1987 the Planetary Society published and circu­lated what it called the Mars Declaration. Former NASA Administrators, Apollo – era officials, astronauts, Nobel laureates, actors, authors, politicians (including former president Jimmy Carter), university presidents, professors, activists, mu­sicians, and many other notables signed on. The Declaration echoed Sagan’s view that the two countries should go together to Mars, first robotically, and then with humans. The Declaration also noted that a Mars destination would give the space station greater purpose, as a step toward the Red Planet.28

When Reagan and Gorbachev met in a summit in December 1987, the two leaders discussed many common issues, and space collaboration was one area where partnership was deemed possible. Gorbachev spoke officially with Rea­gan and unofficially with others. He met with one group of Americans which included Sagan and Paul Newman, the actor, a member of the Planetary Soci­ety’s advisory board. Gorbachev specifically mentioned to this group his desire that the United States and the Soviet Union collaborate on Mars exploration.29

While conversations took place in Washington, D. C., NASA scientists and engineers were in Moscow conferring with Soviet counterparts about how to collaborate in view of the Soviet Union’s stated desire that Phobos initiate a sequence of missions to Mars. The Americans had Mars Observer approved, as well as ambitions for more missions. Beyond Phobos, to go up in 1988, the So­viets planned a mission in the mid-1990s (after the U. S. Mars Observer) which would go to Mars (rather than Phobos) and release balloons to study Mars’s at­mosphere. NASA entered into talks the Soviet Union initiated with the French as potential collaborators on this mission. If Mars Observer carried an antenna, it could receive data from Soviet balloons and transmit information back to Earth. The robotic programs of the two nations could thereby get collaboration on Mars started in a serious way.30

The Reagan budget came out in February 1988. NASA got a raise, but most of the new money went to the space station, which was suffering overruns, and a new space shuttle to replace Challenger. Money for Mars robotic flight re­mained tight.31 Reagan had considered a “Kennedy-style declaration” calling for a dramatic space venture, such as a Moon base or trip to Mars, but rejected such an initiative. Instead, the White House issued in February a national space policy that called for the United States “to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.”32 While these larger policy activities relating to NASA’s future went on, NASA implemented the one Mars project it had.