The Space Station and Mars

The planetary program, and thus the robotic Mars segment, had a reprieve. However, the big question remained: What about NASA as a whole? The future of Mars could not be separated from that of NASA as an agency. That depended most on the space station. Beggs had been trying to persuade Reagan to back a space station virtually since he became NASA’s leader. When the moment of decision arrived, Beggs played his Mars card, among other arguments.

In late 1983, Beggs gave the president many reasons to adopt the station. For example, a space station could open up manufacturing new materials in weightlessness. It could provide scientific research and display leadership vis­a-vis the Soviet Union, which already had a small space station in orbit. The Cold War context was a strong selling point, arguably the key one. But Reagan asked, “Why aren’t you going all the way to Mars?” “That is exactly where we are going, Mr. President,” replied Beggs.70

What Beggs meant was that the space station could serve as a staging base for expeditions to the planets and provide experience for astronauts in long – duration stays. Beggs knew he could not make Mars the major station selling point generally, but it was important as an enticement for Reagan. According to Keyworth, Reagan truly loved the space program.71 Reagan not only agreed but also announced his decision January 25, 1984, in his State of the Union address. Like Nixon with the shuttle decision in 1972, Reagan authorized thereby an engineering development program big enough and long-term enough to keep NASA viable as an independent agency. As before, human spaceflight would set boundaries for what was possible budgetarily for other NASA programs, includ­ing potential robotic Mars missions. But it was a much wider boundary with a station than without it.

However indirectly and amorphously, the decisions for human spaceflight and robotic Mars exploration science were linked. Once again, the robotic Mars exploration program could be sold indirectly as a precursor to human explora­tion, even though the space station would be in low-Earth orbit and not justified publicly in any significant degree with Mars. Keyworth, in straining to explain why he was now backing the space station when he had vehemently opposed it previously, said in early 1984 that the space station was not an end in itself. It was a way to achieve broader ends, and these included Mars exploration. Keyworth said he agreed with those larger goals.72

In the budget announced in February 1984, NASA had a new mission, the space station, and the go-ahead for a robotic return to Mars—a low-cost or- biter called the Mars Observer. The Mars community, especially the geolo­gists, rallied around Mars Observer.73 However, the “program line” NASA and SSEC proposed for a series of relatively modest observer missions had not been approved. Mars Observer was a single project. There was no guarantee there would be a successor.

Mars advocates did not get much of what they wanted, but they got a first step in the revival of robotic Mars exploration. On April 9, 1983, NASA pro­cessed the last Red Planet image from the only component of the Viking system still functioning, one lander. The last “extended mission” of Viking was finally petering out. In May, JPL scientists and engineers gathered around a screen that received Mars data and celebrated the project with a poignant final farewell. “There’s a lot of feeling. It’s like losing a close friend,” said George Gianopulos, Viking’s last project manager.74

Viking was officially over. The Viking 3 rover was abandoned as a proposal for the time being. NASA downsized its ambition as a scientific and political strategy for recovery. But Mars Observer provided hope for a Mars future.