Evaluation: Money Issues

In 1974, technological development continued and progress was painstakingly made. One reason for the progress was that NASA was pouring more money into Viking. If NASA could not get funds from OMB/White House and Con­gress, it reprogrammed funds from other accounts. The result was that Viking’s budget escalated and Congress grew restive over what it called overruns. Under congressional pressure, top NASA officials evaluated the project. Viking was up to $930 million in cost. Given other expenses, Viking was well into the billion – dollar class of major projects. NASA had to postpone other new starts to pay for Viking.23

In March, Fletcher appointed Rocco Petrone, director of the Marshall Space

Flight Center, NASA associate administrator (“general manager”), the number three position in the agency. He replaced Newell, who had retired in late 1973. Petrone had a reputation for being a hard-nosed and tough manager. Fletcher appointed Naugle to be Petrone’s deputy. Noel Hinners, a 38-year-old NASA geochemist who had headed lunar programs, took Naugle’s position as associate administrator for space science and applications. Low, the deputy administrator, also wanted to replace Martin as project manager, not because of anything he had done wrong, but because Low felt “a fresh look” could “clean up the prob­lems, and provide new impetus to the project.” Naugle and Cortright argued vehemently against what they believed would be a major disruption in Viking. Low pulled back.24

Petrone announced he would enforce cost discipline in regard to Viking. NASA had little choice but to do so. In August, Congress specifically warned NASA to stop reprogramming funds from other missions to rescue Viking and scheduled hearings on Viking for November to underline its concern.25 Never­theless, Hinners got a call from Cortright. “I need $30 million more for Viking,” he said. Hinners refused. A half hour later, he received a call from Low, who said, “Give him the money, Viking is important. [We] can’t afford to have it fail. It is a priority.” Hinners dipped into his reserves without taking it from other programs.26

With congressional hearings approaching, Petrone and Hinners established budget caps for Viking, and Petrone stated that any deviation from the caps would require his personal approval. Viking managers would have to document attempts to find economies within the project budget before asking headquar­ters for any additional money. Petrone himself had a reserve set aside for emer­gencies, but he emphasized he would keep close control of it where Viking was concerned. He required Hinners to supply him “with weekly status reports on project costs and manpower levels for Martin Marietta, JPL, TRW, and Honey­well throughout the winter of 1974.” Petrone not only followed the numbers but specifically directed Martin Marietta, the prime contractor, to work harder. To save money, Petrone and Hinners killed a backup Viking 3 system that was being built as a contingency in case either of the two Vikings ran into trouble, along with various other organizational adjustments.27

Hence, when congressional hearings by the House subcommittee oversee­ing space science took place in November, Petrone and other NASA officials could claim strong action to control costs. Petrone declared he “drew the line” on Viking costs, and Langley and other managers would have to answer to him

if they wanted to cross that line. A congressional staffer told the media after the hearings that NASA had to be careful about cost escalation. “The space program,” he said, “is sort of a national luxury—like a mink coat for your wife. It’s a nice thing to do if you can afford it.”28