Forcing Technology

The problem for Fletcher was that the existing Viking project truly presented a number of unprecedented technical challenges to NASA. These issues made implementation extremely daunting as the Viking team got fully under way in the early 1970s. NASA officials were grateful for having until 1975 to resolve them. They realized that the previous 1973 deadline was too close. However, even 1975 looked demanding in 1972. No one fretted more than James Mar­tin, the project manager. “I am worried about the fact that Viking has a fixed launch window,” he said. “It opens August 11, 1975 and closes about the 20th of September. And the window will close whether we launch anything or not.” If NASA missed it, the agency could not launch again to Mars for more than another two years. This narrow launch window meant that all decisions related to Viking had an urgency that could not be avoided. It caused Martin to drive the project’s team of scientists, engineers, and contractors ceaselessly.5 Naugle established his own team of engineers to help him oversee Martin. To avoid offending Martin, he had the group report to Martin first. However, members of the team had the right to go all the way up to Fletcher if they saw an issue not being addressed.6

Among the technology development issues, none were more important or perplexing than developing the lander and life detection hardware. Much of the hardware development pressed the state of the art. Some issues seemed to go beyond. Martin initiated a list of “Top 10 Problems” as a management tool to concentrate energy and focus. Some problems were solved quickly, but others stayed on his list for virtually the entire time before launch.7

The prime contractor was Martin Marietta, but there were a myriad of sub­contractors. Some of these performed well—on time and within cost. Others did not. One was fired early in the project because it could not do the work it was assigned and claimed that it was not feasible. NASA found another firm that said it could meet the requirements.8 Even among those who clearly tried, there were challenges that were wholly novel.

The ones that proved most complicated related to Viking’s distinctive mis­sion—to find life. There were two basic instruments, one being the automated biology laboratory and the other one called the Gas Chromatograph Mass Spec­trometer (GCMS). Initially, the biology lab contained four experiments selected by NASA through a competitive process. In March 1972, it became necessary to eliminate one of the experiments, a difficult decision that reflected on not only the nature of the experiments but the size, weight, and cost requirements of the biology laboratory.9 Naugle, drawing on independent scientific advice, had to make the unpopular decision. The decision proved even more unfortunate when the scientist whose research was removed, Wolf Vishniac, died in Antarc­tica while trying to prove that his approach would work.10

But Naugle had no choice. The laboratory could be “no bigger than a gallon milk carton” and had to weigh “no more than 30 pounds.” It had to be this small to fit aboard the 1300-pound Viking spacecraft, itself an unprecedented techni­cal system.11 The biology lab would have the equivalent of “three rooms of in­struments on Earth, plus the people to work them.” The lab would have 40,000 parts, including 22,000 transistors. There were tiny ovens where soils would be heated and ampoules of water and nutrients which would have to be broken by remote control at just the right time to mix with Martian soils inside the box. Bottles of radioactive gases, Geiger counters, and three chromatographs would be placed in the laboratory. There would even be a xenon lamp to duplicate sunlight inside the laboratory to be used in a photosynthesis test.12

Failures in the biology unit required major redesign in the September – December 1973 period. Martin established a task force to evaluate progress in early 1974. The task force, concerned that the contractor responsible for the lab, TRW, could not make the launch date window, recommended simplifying the project by dropping more experiments. TRW disagreed, and NASA decided to persevere, keeping the three it had. By September, TRW was still behind schedule, but catching up.13

Meanwhile, the GCMS proved almost as difficult a system to engineer. It had to isolate and identify organic molecules in Martian soil down to five parts per million. Doing that required virtually inventing a new technology. Then there were also many computer issues that came up again and again.14 Everything was complicated by the fact that what landed on Mars had to go through a severe “decontamination” process so NASA did not bring microscopic life to Mars.

NASA decided that the urgency of the deadline required unusual manage­ment measures. If Martin needed help in pushing contractors, higher-ups be­came involved. Naugle and Cortright made trips to pressure contractors. In some instances, Fletcher himself had meetings with CEOs of particular contrac­tors, “setting off an alarm in the front office” to impress on them the seriousness of delays.15 Fletcher was especially forceful in getting topside attention from the computer contractor, Honeywell. He insisted that Honeywell put its best talent on the Viking project. Many contractors, especially those associated with the “Top 10 Problems,” had to work overtime, even seven days a week, to ac­celerate progress. NASA personnel associated with Viking customarily worked 60-hour weeks. Viking was by far the most complex robotic mission NASA had undertaken to date. It was in some ways proving more technically difficult than Apollo because NASA knew so much less about Mars than the Moon.

Why did NASA push so hard? A. Thomas Young, Martin’s deputy, explained years later: “You don’t go to Mars that often. You do push things to do it… people who get involved in this business are. . . pushing the envelope and trying to get a little bit more here and a little bit more there. I think that’s why you’re willing to invest ten years for something that might blow up. Because if it really does work, it’s been extraordinary.”16