Pushing for Mars

In 1959, Pickering received orders from headquarters to give priority to a lunar impact mission, Project Ranger. Pickering, however, wanted to give priority to planetary research. His long-term goal was to have his laboratory lead a mission involving an “interplanetary vehicle, which could give an answer to the question of life on Mars.”12 This was, in his view, the big question. He wanted JPL to “leapfrog” the Moon. He also thought that Glennan’s measured, step-by-step approach would not produce “leadership” in space technology against the Soviet Union.

Pickering was 48 in 1958 when NASA got started. Born in New Zealand, Pickering had a physics PhD from Caltech and long-term association with JPL. He was named director in 1954. After Sputnik, Pickering led JPL in working with von Braun’s army team and the University of Iowa’s James van Allen to help launch America’s first successful satellite, Vanguard, on January 31, 1958. While he wanted JPL to be a part of NASA and was pleased when the redeployment from DOD to the space agency took place, he prized his institution’s autonomy. He was very conscious that JPL was connected to Caltech and thus “different,” more independent than NASA’s other field centers, they all being civil service laboratories. No one said it on record, but JPL also perceived itself as “better” because of its university connection. From NASA’s perspective, JPL was a feder­ally funded research and development center that worked for NASA. Moreover, NASA paid Caltech a handsome overhead fee for JPL’s services. It expected JPL to be a loyal member of the NASA family.

Glennan was annoyed with the lack of responsiveness on the part of JPL (and Caltech) generally to NASA policies. The relatively mild-mannered Newell was more than annoyed since he had to deal closely with JPL and was caught between Silverstein and Pickering, two men with strong personalities. For Silverstein, JPL might not be a civil service lab, but it was a contractor and as such should bend to headquarters’ direction. Pickering stoutly defended JPL’s independence. Pickering, Newell wrote, was “as stubborn as Silverstein was domineering.”13 Add to this tension the fact that the president of Caltech, Lee Dubridge, believed that his university was in charge ofJPL, and not NASA. Throughout 1959, meetings between headquarters and JPL took place, with Silverstein pushing the Moon as a priority and Pickering emphasizing the plan­ets. In December, the associate administrator, Richard Horner, wrote Pickering firmly insisting that while JPL had planetary missions as well as lunar work, it was the Moon that the agency wanted stressed. Silverstein followed up this guidance with additional direction as to what he expected of JPL.

When Newell and others from headquarters went to JPL the following week, they were confronted by Pickering, who again made it clear that he disagreed with the priorities of headquarters. Eventually, the two sides agreed to com­municate more closely and find compromises. JPL went along with the lunar emphasis of Washington but got resources from headquarters for exploratory work on planetary programs—Venus first, because it was closest to Earth, then Mars. Pickering was not interested in “competitiveness.” His word was “leader­ship.” He was convinced that America’s best chance of getting the lead in space was an all-out effort “to proceed at once to the planets.”14

NASA supplied funds for “expanding JPL’s facilities and equipment and for increasing the staffing,” as Pickering requested. However, the issue of in-house versus external work divided NASA and JPL. NASA policy (Glennan) empha­sized contracting, and JPL (Pickering) wanted to maximize intramural work and technical control by his laboratory. The issues of headquarters’ authority and JPL’s responsiveness continued to cause tensions throughout the Glennan era. They only got worse under the next administrator.15

Nevertheless, NASA knew it needed JPL for expertise, as JPL knew it needed NASA, its prime sponsor, for resources. Partners in conflict, they found uneasy accommodation. NASA decided priorities, and it favored the Moon. JPL man­aged and performed technical work, and it favored the planets. Pickering was the prime advocate for robotic Mars missions and was not shy about pushing his views on NASA decision makers, such as Newell and Glennan.