Regulating People, Regulating Technologies

As we take these steps together to renew our strength at home, we cannot turn away from our obligation to renew our leadership abroad.

This is a promising moment. . . Russia’s strategic nuclear missiles soon will no lon­ger be pointed at the United States nor will we point ours at them. Instead of building weapons in space, Russian scientists will help us to build the international space station.

—President Clinton, 1994 State of the Union Address87

Critics and proponents alike recognized that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission agreements were intended to liberalize trade structures, introduce new regimes of environmental monitoring and protection, and preserve the institutions and infra­structure in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States in exchange for compliance with American standards of demobilization and technology con­trol regimes. Policymakers anticipated that capital—in the form of increased trade flows among American and Russian firms, as well as direct payments from NASA to the Russian government, would not only preserve existing infrastructures in Russia, but contain dual-use technologies and know-how.

Many doubted that taxpayer dollars could reasonably be expected to divert flows of weapons knowledge. One source remarked: “[Officials involved in con­trolling the spread of weapons see the [ISS] plan as a way to give Russian indus­trialists incentives to adhere to Western nonproliferation rules. The two Russian companies with the biggest stake in a joint space station, Energia and Krunichev also build military spacecraft and missile parts.”88

Referring to whether or not the Russians had a right to sell liquid booster technologies to India, another observed, “The space-station deal, for example, was both a reward to Russia’s aerospace industry for not selling sensitive rocket technology to India and a chance for the US to enlist Russian scientists about [sic] the effort to control the future spread of dangerous weapons.” The authors explained, “Washington’s decision to deal in the Russians on the orbiting space station is the cornerstone of an ambitious. . . strategy for binding Russia to the US and Western style reforms by building links with its military, scientific, and industrial elites.”89

Thus, this exception to the “clean interface” mode of cooperation raised a number of difficult quandaries for program officials regarding the relationships of private enterprise, the state, science, and the tenets of free market capitalism. The Gore-Chernomyrdin talks provided Clinton administration officials with an opportunity to shape policy in Russia in a number of fields. It was not merely the floundering Soviet state that the American government sought to regulate—it was the engineers who may defect, scientists who may market technical knowl­edge, or industrialists who may withdraw from weapons compliance. In 1993 Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey observed that delays in pay, deteriorating work conditions, and uncertain futures were “apparently spur­ring Russian specialists to seek emigration despite official restrictions on such travel.”90 Such fears led to a number of public and private relief efforts, intended to preserve and contain the former Soviet military-industrial complex.

NASA officials displayed a similar philosophy when dealing with Ukraine, linking participation on the International Space Station with compliance to Missile Technology Control Regimes. In May 1994, Administrator Goldin met with Ukrainian deputy prime minister and director general of the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU) Vladimir Gorbulin. In his premeeting briefing, he was informed that, in March, Gorbulin had “pressed the issue of Ukrainian par­ticipation in the Space Station.” The brief continued, pointing out that Russia “has indicated its desire to employ the Ukrainian Zenit [launch vehicle] to support the Station.” However, “these launchers are being coordinated directly between Ukraine and Russia.” The report stated that, in an apparent effort to secure a more direct NASA partnership, Gorbulin also discussed the use of Ukrainian guidance, control and navigation for the FGB, as well as other ISS components.91

This was not the first time Ukraine had courted NASA. In June 1993 Deputy Prime Minister Shmarov had met with a number of NASA officials, wanting in part to use the former strategic missiles SS -24 and SS -19 as well as the Zenit launch vehicle and AN-225 aircraft for “national economic purposes.” Covering all his bases, Shmarov also informed NASA that Ukraine had produced 65-75 percent of the earth sensing satellites flown by the Soviet Union and that as of the sum­mer of 1993, the company had been broadening its work with satellites in the international arena. It had plans to work with Intelsat, Inmarsat, Eutelsat, and

COSPAS-SARSAT. In addition to this, the country supported joint programs in space geodesy and global climate change research. Ultimately, the report advised: “Mr Shmarov may want to develop a role for Ukraine in the. . . Space Station relationship. If he broaches the subject, you should be non-committal and reply that we have no objection if Ukraine also talks to Russia.”92

Would NASA dismiss Shmarov and Gorbulin entirely? Not likely. Due to National Security Council’s Rose Gottemoeller’s “particular interest” in Shmarov and the “delicate” nature of negotiations surrounding nuclear warhead dismantlement, Goldin was advised to bide his time and yet “NOT” encourage the possibility of direct NASA-Ukraine coordination in space.93 The report con­cluded by stating that, although Ukraine had “significant launch capabilities, including the Zenit and Cyclone launchers until Ukraine becomes a signa­

tory to the MTCR and other international treaties, the US Government does not wish to pursue this.”94