Experts Meet and Work Packages Are Defined

In his letter to Lefevre Johnson suggested that a technical working group led by Charles W. (“Chuck”) Matthews, the deputy associate administrator in NASA’s Office of Manned Space Flight, should soon meet with Europeans to discuss both participation in the Space Transportation System and other possible modes of collaboration (as required by Kissinger). Fletcher was determined to focus the discussions on the orbiter, however. At a high-level meeting on October 6 he insisted that the “ensuing technical discussions [with the Europeans] should concentrate initially on defining tasks and working relationships for the space transportation system project, since time is catching up with us.” NASA would define the concepts and the configuration of the shuttle in the next two or three months, and select a prime contractor by spring 1972: it would be “imperative to know the extent of European participation by that time.”61 Thus Matthews’s objectives were clear when he came to Paris later in the month. The American delegation was to engage in “technical discussions aimed at a definition of candi­date areas for possible European participation in the space transportation system, viewed in the broader context of program requirements for the 1980s,” includ­ing payloads in which Europe may like to participate. Political, managerial, and contractor-to-contractor arrangements would be temporarily bracketed.62 After a successful meeting on October 22, 1971 with about 40 space officials it was agreed that a joint group of experts meet in Washington at the end of November to study detailed proposals from NASA.63

Charles Donlan, assistant director on the Space Shuttle Program, visited a number of European aerospace companies before the expert meeting to vali­date again the technological capability of major European aerospace contractors in Britain, France, and Germany (see figure 5.2). He ended his trip persuaded that European firms could carry out any part of the post-Apollo program that was contracted to them, and realized that they had more experience than their American counterparts in working in different languages across technical inter – faces.64 There was not going to be one-way flow of technology from the United States to Europe in the post-Apollo program.

The first “Technical Conference on US/European Cooperation in Future Space Programs” opened in Washington on November 30, 1971. Four main areas were identified and disaggregated into separate work packages where needed. These were the space shuttle itself, the space tug, orbital systems, which included Sortie Cans, Pallets, and RAMs, and general technology development (which will not be dealt with here). It was assumed that the shuttle would have an American prime contractor, so here the work packages had to reflect elements that could be subcontracted. The tug was different, in that if Europe under­took the project the US role would probably be limited to minor contributions such as furnishing some components and providing data on shuttle interfaces. Various scenarios of US-European collaboration were foreseen for the orbital systems and for technology development.65

The discussions were held in the context of an ongoing battle between NASA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over the agen­cy’s budget for FY1973, and the configuration of the shuttle that could be afforded. Indeed as late as September 1971 Low and Fletcher seriously considered whether they should forgo a shuttle altogether for something less expensive like a reusable glider.66 By November, however, the Europeans were assured that the most attractive design for the shuttle that was emerging fea­tured a delta-wing orbiter with an external hydrogen/oxygen tank fueling its main engines along with two reusable boosters to provide sufficient thrust for lift-off. The fuel system for the boosters was still under discussion but would be settled when the call for proposals for shuttle development was
issued in spring 1972. The selection of candidate work packages for collabo­ration was thus restricted to the orbiter and its main engines. The orbiter was disaggregated into separate parts (see figure 5.5), and a corresponding list of work packages was drawn up; this excluded components already devel­oped in the Apollo program, which would be transferred to the shuttle. This list fell into four main areas—airframe, propulsion, instrumentation, and aerodynamic testing—for which a total of 14 individual work packages were identified “along with their general description, schedule and approximate costs.” They were essentially illustrative, and ranged from small elements that could be accomplished by a single firm to larger elements that would engage a European consortium.

The airframe attracted most attention. It was believed to “provide an oppor­tunity for European participation because of the ability to identify areas that have relatively simple interfaces and therefore would prove to be more straight-for­ward to manage and integrate into the total vehicle.”67 The nine work packages discussed here were tail assembly ($20-30 million), main wing ($65-75 mil­lion), elevon ($20-25 million), center fuselage, forward and aft ($100-125 mil­lion), cargo bay door ($30-40 million), radiator ($10-15 million), landing

MANUFACTURING MAJOR ASSEMBLY
MODULE BREAKDOWN

Figure 5.5 Disaggregated orbiter, showing subsystems that were potential candidates for collaborative projects, as proposed by McDonnell Douglas.

Source: Presentation made by the firm on May 7, 1971, attached to memo from Sh (Sam Hubbard) dated May 19, 1971. Record Group NASA 255, Box 17, Folder VI. D.3, WNRC. Permission: NASA.

gear and door ($20-30 million), nose section ($3-5 million), and ejection seat ($10-12 million).

The tail assembly package consisted of the orbiter fin and rudder/speedbrake (see figure 5.6), and could easily be integrated into the vehicle by the prime contractor. NASA was careful to exclude from possible consideration the leading edge and thermal system. Sharing technology here risked upgrading European capabilities in domains with a commercial impact, for example, high performance aircraft. The pattern was repeated with the offer for technological collaboration with the main wing, which was somewhat more difficult to integrate than the tail. Like the tail, the wing had a beam and rib arrangement with an aluminum skin. Again the work package on offer included the design, fabrication, testing, and certification of the primary structure. Yet as with the tail, the leading edge and thermal protection system installation was excluded.

Four propulsion packages were identified: the orbital maneuvering sys­tem (OMS) pods ($40-50 million), the reaction control system pods, the air-breathing engine pods ($20-30 million), and the auxiliary power unit. This list deliberately excluded engines because of the criticality of integration and the considerable development experience already available in the United States.

Not much detail was provided on the instrumentation work packages, where it was thought that Europe might be able to contribute $20-30 million. NASA officials were wary of encouraging close technological collaboration here because

Figure 5.6 Disaggregated orbiter vertical tail.

Source: Technology Transfer in the Post Apollo Program. NASA HQ MF71-6399, 7-27-71, Record Group NASA 255, Box 14 Folder II. H, WNRC. Permission: NASA.

of the “multiple interfaces involved and the critical interdependency with other systems.” Subcontracting out parts of the instrumentation would “prove too costly and difficult to integrate and manage.”68 Table 5.3 summarizes the work packages on the orbiter that NASA thought might be suitable for international cooperation.

The second major element in the post-Apollo package was the space tug, which would transfer payloads from the shuttle’s low-earth orbit to higher orbits, most notably the geostationary orbit (see figure 5.1). As we saw earlier, at this time the tug was a central feature of the shuttle system and “a key element of the system economics.”69 In April 1970 the European Space Conference voted 500,000 MU (1 MU or monetary unit, was about $1) for pre-Phase A studies (i. e., con­ceptual studies) of the tug, and early in 1971 two lead European contractors, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics (HSD) and Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), presented their findings to NASA. Further impetus toward European engage­ment in the tug came toward the end of 1970, when NASA decided that it could not afford to develop the tug concurrently with the shuttle, and began to look at the possibility of using existing Agena and Centaur upper stages in its stead as a stopgap measure. In February 1971 another 400,000 MU were allocated to HSD and MBB to further study the tug in the light of changes to the shuttle configuration. They presented the results of their new studies in Huntsville, Houston, and Washington, DC, in October.70 Thus, when the experts met on November 30, 1971, considerable progress had already been made in Europe on the definition of a tug.

The experts meeting in November strongly endorsed this work. They were persuaded that the tug was “a logical area for European participation in the post-Apollo activities since it is an easily ‘separable’ item with a relatively clean set of interfaces. In addition,” the Report on the meeting went on, it provided “significant technology challenges in a number of areas and represents a key element of the Space Transportation System.”71 Encouraged, on January 5, 1972, ELDO issued requests for proposals for two Phase A space tug studies costing $1.4 million. Additional funds would be sought later that month for what Causse told NASA was Europe’s “main area of interest” in post-Apollo.72

Table 5.3 Work packages on the orbiter proposed to Western Europe for collaboration in November 1971

1. Tail assembly (fin, perhaps rudder/speedbrake) NOT leading edge and thermal protection

2. Main wing NOT leading edge and thermal protection

3. Elevon

4. Central fuselage, fore and aft

5. Cargo bay door

6. Radiator

7. Landing gear and door

8. Nose section

9. Ejection seat

10-13. Propulsion (without engines)

14. Instrumentation (difficult to integrate)

TOTAL COST ~ $400 million

The Europeans liked the tug. NASA now estimated that it be would be needed on 40-50 percent of the foreseen 60-odd annual shuttle flights. If each reusable tug could be used ten times, this implied a production rate of three-five new tugs annually over a ten-year period. This was a rate of industrial production higher than that foreseen for the anticipated European rocket program. A reusable tug, in particular, was also technologically challenging. As one European report put it, it represented “a new type of space vehicle partaking both of the launcher, by its propulsion and structure, and also to a great extent of the satellite, by reason of its launching in the orbiter, its life in orbit and its intelligent systems (atti­tude control, rendezvous, docking).”73 For Europe the tug prefigured the kind of space vehicle that would be common after the 1980s. It also gave Europeans direct access to the heart of NASA’s space flight planning and operations.

The variety of orbiting systems under discussion exploited various possible uses of the shuttle as a platform for short observations and experiments in space. This idea evolved as the funding for a possible space station was pushed into the 1980s. It was inspired by the use of a converted Convair 990 airplane as an airborne laboratory that scientists were using to make astronomical experiments and earth observations. If an aircraft cargo bay could be transformed into a useful scientific platform for space research, why not use the shuttle in a similar way?74 On one variation, called a Sortie Can or Sortie Module, a shirt-sleeve experimental environment was lodged in the Shuttle’s cargo bay and connected to the orbiter crew compartment by an access tunnel. It could be combined with various external pallets attached to the back end of the Sortie Module (and could also be replaced entirely by such pallets). The pallets would only be humanly accessible by EVA (extravehicular activity) and could serve as platforms for large instruments such as telescopes. In a second variation, called a RAM (Research and Application Module), the entire module would be tailored to a specific dis­cipline or human activity, such as materials science and space manufacturing.75 When the experts met on November 30, 1971, NASA had not committed itself to going further than Phase B studies (Definition) of a RAM, and was think­ing of beginning an in-house Phase B study of a Sortie Can six months hence. Both were candidates for European participation, being reasonably autonomous systems that could be used by both parties. NASA also stressed that in the field of payloads to be carried by these systems, all areas were open for European cooperation. It was concluded that Europe should start at once on a Phase A study on the sortie can and pallet, in close cooperation with NASA, so as to be up to speed when NASA began its in-house Phase B effort in about May 1972. Steps would also be taken to define jointly a candidate experiment program for European researchers on the two systems.

The position of the European delegates to the Washington meeting was an unenviable one. The European space program had been dealt a serious blow between the exploratory meeting with NASA in October and the more exten­sive gathering to define work packages at the end of November. On November 5, 1971, the much-awaited F11 test flight of the Europa II rocket failed catastrophically when the rocket exploded three minutes after lift-off.76 ELDO immediately established a committee of enquiry, and requested American participation in the seven working groups set up to investigate the accident: Frutkin responded positively, if somewhat gingerly.77 With their technological

and managerial confidence shattered, the attraction of working closely with the United States in a post-Apollo program, no matter what the cost, had an increas­ing appeal in European capitals.