The New "Solution" to the Launcher Problem: September 1971

On September 1, 1971, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson replied to the letter that he had received six months earlier from Theo Lefevre.60 He plunged directly into the launcher issue. The United States, said Johnson, had reviewed its position in an attempt to meet European concerns. He noted at once that that new position was “not conditioned on European participation in post – Apollo programs,” and he hoped that it would provide “a basis for confidence in Europe in the availability of U. S. launch assistance.” Johnson reaffirmed that, of course, American launch assistance would still only be for satellites that were for peaceful purposes and consistent with its obligations under relevant international agreements and arrangements. However, it would be available both from American territory, and “from foreign launch sites (by purchase of an appropriate U. S. launch vehicle).” As regards the interpretation of the thorny Article XIV(d) of the Intelsat agreements that had been signed on May 21, 1971, Johnson proposed three possible scenarios, presented in table 5.2.

Johnson went on to say that to avoid Europe investing heavily in a satellite system only to find that the United States would not launch it, the American

authorities would consult with the European Space Conference in advance of it embarking on any major program to evaluate its consistency with the Intelsat agreements. A concrete example of such a system had been suggested by the Europeans earlier in the year (the Eurosat system, see earlier). The United States judged that this system would do measurable, but not significant economic harm to Intelsat. If it were officially presented to the organization, “we would expect to support it in Intelsat.”

It is clear that the State Department had been persuaded that it should be as flexible as possible over the launcher question now that the definitive Intelsat agreements had been signed. Certainly, the cornerstone of US policy remained the same: that it would launch a separate communications satellite system if two-thirds of those voting in Intelsat agreed that that system did not do significant economic harm to the global system (and this whether or not the United States had been one of those voting in favor). What was new, however, was that now Johnson was prepared to take the Intelsat vote as a “finding” or “recommendation,” and not as a legally binding directive. In other words, if the requisite two-thirds majority was not obtained he was willing to consider launching a separate system. Such will­ingness was further nuanced depending on whether the United States had been in favor of the system or not. By accepting to launch absent a two-thirds positive finding on a system that the United States favored, Johnson was effectively willing to risk criticism of the American position in Intelsat to placate European fears. He was suggesting that the US authorities would take upon themselves the responsi­bility of demanding changes which, in the view of their their experts, would make the separate system acceptable, without having recourse again to Intelsat. This was a major reorientation indeed. It was also no longer conditional on European space agencies making a major commitment to post-Apollo participation: launcher policy was now completely distinct from whatever framework for US-European space collaboration was jointly adopted for the 1970s.