NASA’s Approach to Technology Transfer with Europe

It took much longer than anticipated to prepare the reports called for by Kissinger at the end of April. Both were eventually available in June, and evolved further as the meeting with Kissinger was postponed time and again: it was eventually held on or around August 9.

NASA’s report on “Alternatives to Post-Apollo Participation” identified various areas where collaboration might be possible, and discussed the costs and benefits of each: flying a foreign astronaut to Skylab, a joint Air Traffic Control preoperational system, a joint experimental applications technology sat­ellite (ATS). However it effectively dismissed these as significant alternatives to post-Apollo.41 Indeed the original report was so one-sided that Herman Pollack summarily rejected it as “essentially a contentious paper reciting the dire con­sequences that would follow from backing out of the post-Apollo proposals. It denied that there are any suitable alternatives.”42 A revised version took a slightly more balanced approach but drew very similar conclusions. In short, as far as NASA was concerned, there was no way the United States could now deny the Europeans participation in post-Apollo, no alternative that could compensate for the drastic foreign policy setbacks of such action

The paper on “Technology Transfer in the Post-Apollo Program” expanded on the text produced the year before. It also went through two versions, a detailed one in anticipation of a meeting with Kissinger on June 8, and a punchier alterna­tive prepared when the meeting was postponed to the end of the month, before being postponed again.43 The core of the argument was developed at a meet­ing on May 5 with senior personnel in the Office of Science and Technology, including Ed David, and with input again from representatives of the American aerospace industry, notably MacDonnell Douglas, North American Rockwell, Grumman Aerospace, and General Electric.44

As we saw in chapter 4, NASA’s case against its critics was intended to turn on its head the charge that the agency was ready to give away American aerospace technology at ten cents on the dollar. Thus

The thrust of foreign participation in such a post-Apollo program will be to con­tribute to the US effort rather than set up a flow from us. Such a direction of flow

will be further supported by our practice of a policy already fully communicated to potential European participants, namely, our commitment to select projects for European development only where the capacity is already substantial in Europe.

That capacity was described by US firms already collaborating abroad. Grumman Aerospace wrote that the French firm Marcel Dassault was “one of the most capable manufacturers of high performance aircraft in Europe,” and “should be able to con­tribute any portion of the Shuttle prime structure that France might undertake,” except perhaps the main cryogenic tankage. Their work with Grumman on metallic and polyimide thermal protection materials and design should put them in a posi­tion to be able to manufacture some portion of the Thermal Protection Subsystem (TPS) that was “so crucial to the shuttle’s cross-range capacity.” Grumman also claimed that the German firm Dornier was “well capable of handling structural sub-assemblies” for the shuttle, and had excellent research and test facilities that could be used during the development of the shuttle.45 North American Rockwell was contracting with the British Aircraft Corporation for shuttle phase B participa­tion in “structural elements, aerodynamics, flight test instrumentation, and data handling.”46 The McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation, for its part, was actively pursuing international collaboration with ERNO in Germany, Hawker Siddeley in Britain, and SNIAS (Societe nationale industrielle aerospatiale) in France.47

It was noted that Europe could also make major contributions to the tug and the RAM. In summer 1971 Messerschmitt – Bolkow-Blohm gave a final presentation to ELDO and NASA of its pre-Phase A study of the tug, as did Hawker Siddeley Dynamics leading a group of ten European companies.48 The Convair Division of the General Dynamics Corporation, which had been selected to perform a Phase B RAM study, was subcontracting parts of the work out to MATRA in France (sys­tems design and analysis, guidance, and control), ERNO in Germany (material sci­ence and manufacturing in space), SAAB in Sweden (phased array, data processing, image compensation), and Selenia in Italy (bulk data handling, millimeter wave communication system, etc.).49 In sum, even if Europe’s ability still had to be tested in practice, its capacity to make major contributions to significant parts of the post – Apollo program was not in doubt, at least not to US aerospace corporations.

On the basis of their experience US aerospace firms were convinced of the quality of the work done in European industry, and were not particularly con­cerned that significant technology would be leaked to them. On the contrary since Europe’s contribution was limited to 10 percent, they repeated that “the US should come out further ahead of Europe than when we started.” In fact, the industrialists’ experience suggested that what Europeans lacked above all was not technology but “general management and systems engineering know­how.” Though they would acquire some insight into this through post-Apollo collaboration, “the American companies consider that such know-how would be directly applicable in Europe in only very limited ways.” The risks were more than outweighed by the benefits of a European presence, which, the companies argued, would “stabilize” the American program, and “avoid a stimulation of independent and competing programs in Europe.”

NASA backed these claims with a more detailed analysis of the nature and scope of technology transfer in the four areas it had identified. It again took the vertical tail of the shuttle to be typical of an area where Europe might be included in the orbiter program, to the advantage of both partners (e. g., by the provision of test data for the supersonic plane, Concorde). Special materials were the most advanced technologies here: titanium for the main structure, carbon/carbon for the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the orbiter, which could reach tempera­tures as high as 20000F. NASA’s study indicated that only the latter posed any risks of advanced technology transfer. Accordingly the agency suggested that this part could be separated out from the rest of the tail and manufactured entirely in the United States before being integrated into the tail on either side of the Atlantic

As before, the tug, which would be constructed by a European prime con­tractor, was broken down into two major elements, the propulsion module and the avionics module.50 This chapter stressed again that much of the propulsion system—the main engine, cryogenic propellant insulation to permit long-term storage, and so on—posed novel challenges to the Europeans and would undoubt­edly advance their technological base, though not with NASA’s direct help. By contrast, the avionics module called for a different approach. The Europeans only had limited experience and know-how in areas such as navigation and guidance (see chapter 4). This was not seen as a major impediment, however. It could be argued that it was in NASA’s interest to provide certain elements to make possible a larger foreign participation, and the flow of technology could be controlled if US firms could provide the subsystem components the Europeans needed as integrated technological units. In particularly sensitive cases they could simply supply a “black-box” for integration by the European prime.51

At the end of July NASA prepared an extensive presentation summing up its findings on the nature of technology transfer in the post-Apollo program.52 Some of the 50-odd viewgraphs, for the shuttle orbiter tail and wing, and the space tug, are presented in figures 5.2-5.4. NASA stressed the depth of technological capacity in the European aerospace industry, much of it due to the development of military aircraft and Concorde. It also drew attention to the positive attitude of US industry to collaboration (figures 5.2 and 5.3). The overall conclusions bring together in one image NASA’s and US industry’s arguments intended to allay fears that post-Apollo collaboration with Europe would lead to significant technology transfer (figure 5.4).

Frutkin’s (and US industry’s) efforts to reassure the higher echelons of the administration that there was no serious danger of significant technological leak­age to Europe were to little avail. The State Department was not persuaded. Hermann Pollack was delighted that NASA’s report did “not substantiate those who in the February 22 meeting with the President argued against the post – Apollo cooperation program on the grounds of unwarranted or uncompensated technological transfer.” All the same he felt that the technology transfer issue was still not definitively settled.53

NASA’s arguments did not satisfy Ed David either. Writing to Kissinger in late July, the president’s science adviser remarked that even though “the NASA study (concurred in by Jim Fletcher) suggests that the technology transfer ques­tion as well as management complications are not of significant proportions, my personal concerns on these points have not yet been answered to my full satisfaction, nor can they be answered until there is a better understanding of the potential European contribution.”5 4 He agreed to continue technical discussions with the Europeans but only to define more clearly “without any

ITEM	COMPANY	PROJECT
LARGE DELTA WING	ВАС	CONCORDE
DESIGN, FABRICATION, TESTING	SNIAS	CONCORDE
	HSA	VULCAN AIRBUS
SUPER ALLOY STRUCTURES CAPABILITY	SNIAS	VERAS
	DASSAULT	MYSTERE
TITANIUM AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE MANUFACTURING	HSA ВАС	TRIDENT HARRIER A300 CONCORDE
	ERNO	EUROPA 11
	MBB	F-4
	SNIAS	CONCORDE
	DASSAULT	MYSTERE

Figure 5.2 European experience in shuttle-related wing & tail structural hardware.

Source: Technology Transfer in the Post Apollo Program. NASA HQ MF71-6399, 7-27-71, Record Group NASA 255, Box 14 Folder II. H, WNRC. Permission: NASA.

• EUROPEAN AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY IS GOOD

• U. S. FIRMS WOULD NOT BE DISADVANTAGED BY POST-APOLLO TECHNOLOGY FLOW

• EUROPEANS NEED AND DESIRE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE

• U. S. FIRMS BELIEVE SUCH TRANSFER HAS LIMITED APPLICABILITY

• EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION WOULD REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT U. S. MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION

• THIS COULD REDUCE THE MONETARY VALUE OF EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION

• MAJOR EUROPEAN GAIN WOULD COME FROM PERFORMANCE OF TASKS

• U. S. WILL GAIN PROPORTIONALLY MORE

• EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION WILL HELP STABILIZE THE POST-APOLLO PROGRAM

Figure 5.3 US industry views on post-Apollo cooperation.

Source: Technology Transfer in the Post Apollo Program. NASA HQ MF71-6399, 7-27-71, Record Group NASA 255, Box 14 Folder II. H, WNRC. Permission: NASA.

precommitment, the potential interests and contributions of both sides.” They should be undertaken recognizing that “we are not committed to agree to for­eign participation [but only] to give positive consideration to foreign interest in participation,” be it from Europe or from Japan.55

Figure 5.4 Summary evaluation of European participation in post-Apollo.

Source: Technology Transfer in the Post Apollo Program. NASA HQ MF71-6399, 7-27-71, Record Group NASA 255, Box 14 Folder II. H, WNRC. Permission: NASA.

One strong argument remained to tilt the balance: foreign policy. NASA administrator Jim Fletcher told U. Alexis Johnson in May that, in his view, “the decision as to whether to engage the Europeans in the Post Apollo pro­gram rests essentially on foreign policy considerations.”56 Pollock rehearsed the argument again for Johnson two days later.57 The program would strengthen ties with Europe, which were still “the cornerstone of our efforts to build a peaceful world.” The region’s industrial, economic, and technological strength were critical to the existing balance of power and closer ties in advanced indus­try and technology would consolidate the Atlantic Alliance. Space programs in particular were ripe for “meaningful cooperation,” and would “offer highly visible and dramatic symbols of the fruits of partnership.” On the other hand, without post-Apollo cooperation, “Europe’s program will be organized around France, and we would have little input and little influence on such a program.” Failure to work together in space might also impact Western European decisions in other high-tech sectors—such as the development of “breeder” reactors and uranium enrichment facilities. In short for Pollack, as he put it to Undersecretary Johnson, the decisions now being taken on both sides of the Atlantic as regards the future framework for advances in high technology would “have a profound, long-term effect on Europe and on its relations with the USA,” and “successful multi-national cooperation in post-Apollo [would] improve our ability to influ­ence Europe’s decisions in these other fields.”

Early in August 1971, then, there was general agreement between Fletcher, Johnson, David, and Flanigan that the United States should continue the technical discussions with Europe, making it absolutely clear that this did not commit either party to participation of any kind in the post-Apollo program. Kissinger accepted this position. On August 18, 1971, he wrote to Secretary
of State Rogers to tell him that Nixon had confirmed “his support for contin­ued pursuit of opportunities for international space cooperation in general, and specifically with the Europeans.”58 He asked the State Department to prepare a reply to Lefevre that suggested that technical discussions be continued with a view to defining “possible cooperative relationships between Europe and the U. S. in the program of STS development.” He was emphatic that no commit­ment of any kind should be made that might later impede “an independent deci­sion by the U. S. on the desirability or schedule of STS development.” With the future of the STS and of Europe’s participation in it thus left open, Kissinger asked that the scope of the discussions be extended to include “an exchange of views with the Europeans regarding the content of space activities” in the post – Apollo era, as well as to consider “other potential areas for cooperation in space exploration, operations and launches.” This also meant, of course, that from now on “U. S. launch assurances for European payload will not be contingent upon European participation in a joint STS program, but will be treated sepa­rately to the degree possible.” The results of these technical discussions were to be made available to the president by January 15, 1972.

As it happens, the week before Kissinger wrote this memo to Secretary of State Rogers the president had seemingly taken a major step forward as regards the content of the post-Apollo program. In a famous memorandum to Nixon dated August 12, 1971, the deputy director of the OMB, Caspar Weinberger, had proposed that NASA’s annual budget be stabilized at $3.3-3.4 billion, and that it should make provision for a shuttle. The American people and the world needed to be reassured, Weinberger wrote, that the United States was not “giv­ing up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superior­ity.” Jobs also had to be protected in an aerospace industry made vulnerable by the wind-down of the Vietnam War. Nixon scrawled “I agree with Cap” on this memo.59 But this position was not yet formal, and in any event was not com­municated to the Europeans.