Post-Apollo Collaboration and High Politics

Europe’s insistence that post-Apollo collaboration was tied to “guaranteed” launcher availability meant that little progress could be made at the techni­cal level until the political problems were resolved. On February 24 the State Department briefed all pertinent embassies regarding the debates that had been held with the Lefevre delegation two weeks before and the uproar that it had provoked. It insisted that the “distortions” and “misunderstandings” that had occurred in the European press should be countered by stressing the important new concessions that the United States had made. They were willing to con­sider supporting regional European telecom systems. They would define the specifications of the system that the United States could support in Intelsat, with particular reference to the proposed Eurosat system that had been suggested for the 1990s by the Europeans themselves. They guaranteed that Europeans would not only have preferential access to the shuttle, but could acquire one for use at their own launch suites for launching their own payloads.28 None of this satisfied Lefevre. He stressed once again that the whole launcher question was tied to Europe’s wish to engage in a long-term telecommunications satellite pro­gram, and needed assurances that launchers would be available before deciding to abandon autonomous access to space. The “final decision power” vested in the United States by the new terms for launching comsats made it impossible for Europe—in Lefevre’s view—to embark on any “medium or long-term program­ming of our space activities.”29

Frutkin was determined that NASA’s views should be heard through the diplomatic cacophony. He spelt them out to Herman Pollack in the State Department and to Robert Behr on the staff of the National Security Council. He insisted that a bold step was needed to undo the damage done by Johnson’s reversal of the United States’ position in Intelsat. Nothing less could insure a 10 percent/$1 billion European commitment to post-Apollo, which would be at the expense of Europe developing an indigenous launcher and make them dependent on the United States for access to space.30 He noted that a recent agreement brokered with Japan by the State Department offered launch sup­port for comsats subject to Japan itself deciding whether they satisfied Intelsat’s conditions: there was no additional override clause linking US launcher avail­ability with Intelsat recommendations. Europe could not be treated differently. If it was, he told Behr, NASA and the United States would lose credibility as partners in international collaborative projects in science and technology. The agency would not be able to carry out the “personal and repeated directive of the President” to engage foreign partners in the post-Apollo venture. And Europe would be backed into “an independent launcher development program which would proliferate missile technology and win Europe total independence with respect to Intelsat initiatives.” Behr added a further argument in a memo to Kissinger of March 4, 1971: “Many large US firms have discovered that their international business depends upon the existence of foreign capabilities and skills to which they can relate.” For them even a 10 percent participation in the STS program would build the kind of “framework” that would narrow the technological gap and facilitate transnational and transatlantic collaboration at the level of the firm.31

Pollack agreed with Frutkin that the United States would have to make American launchers available to the Europeans for their own use, but insisted that Washington should decide whether or not the payload would do significant economic harm to Intelsat.32 Behr included in his memo for Kissinger the argu­ments against a strong European presence in post-Apollo and against a relax­ation of the US line in Intelsat. At the top of the list was Tom Whitehead’s claim that “we are giving the Europeans too much technology for too little return,” and that they were demanding a “disproportionately large share of program management responsibilities.” He noted that the savings to the United States would be considerably less than $1 billion because of the increased managerial complexity. And he suggested that any concessions to Europe would alienate Third World countries in Intelsat, who might feel that once again the industrial powers were arranging concession among themselves that were denied to the less-developed world. “There was no need for you to get involved in this hassle at the moment,” Behr assured Kissinger. But he did suggest that the national security adviser meet with the president’s science advisor, Ed David, to discuss “whether it is in the interest of the U. S. to continue the development of the space shuttle/station and, if so, to what extent do we wish to engage foreign participation?”33 His comment serves as a reminder that no firm decision had yet been taken on whether to proceed with the shuttle at all, let alone with a European contribution at it.

In fact momentum was growing to exclude Europe from the post-Apollo program. On February 22, 1971, Ed David met the president along with White House staffers Peter Flanigan and John Ehrlichman—but no one from the State Department. David informed Kissinger about a month later that the meet­ing had concluded that “a joint effort with the Europeans is not in our best interests.”34 He mentioned that this seemed to be Nixon’s view too. The presi­dent’s science adviser listed five reasons against European participation. Topping the list was “substantial high technology transfer” in return for a 10 percent contribution that was of dubious value anyway, since it would be offset by the increased costs of a cooperative program, and by the United States probably having to “undertake back-up programs for those elements or systems being developed abroad.” Management would be complicated by the need to satisfy partners. Collaboration would strengthen Europe’s capacity to compete “for our own commercial exploitation of our satellite technology.” And, finally, the “proposed arrangements [would] lock us into the shuttle program, depriving us of the flexibility to tailor the program to our evolving needs.” Kissinger was not prepared to take these remarks at face value: as he cautioned Ed David, “[O]ne should not attempt to deduce Presidential decisions from casual conversation.” The upshot was that all agreed it was necessary to continue discussions with the Europeans but to “to slow the pace,” not to soften the US position on launchers, and to produce a “technical cost/benefit analysis of the various alternative ways of cooperating in space with Europe”35 in case it was needed to exclude them from post-Apollo.

Toward the end of April another high-level attempt was made to explain the European view in Washington, this time by a German delegation led by the min­ister of education and science, Hans Leussink. The Germans had been strong supporters of post-Apollo participation from the outset. As Behr told Kissinger, the reaction in Bonn to the “failed” Lefevre mission in February had been one of surprise and shock, “by what they universally described as the ‘hard line’ taken by the US” at the meeting. “They expressed fear that it will be impossible for Europe to participate in the post-Apollo program and dismay that Europe will find it necessary to develop an independent launcher capability which would be wasteful and also a divisive element in US-European cooperation.” 36 In short, Bonn felt that it was being forced by Washington to support a program in Europe that it did not like at the expense of a collaborative venture with the United States that it had always sought.

Leussink met with Low, Frutkin, and others at NASA on April 21. Low repeated the offer that Europe do the tug that would be required for “the major­ity of the shuttle missions,” and contribute, on a subcontracting basis, “some portion of the shuttle air frame.” As regards launcher availability, Low empha­sized that he understood the concerns expressed abroad and hoped “that we can work out our problems on this subject in the near future.”37

The next day Leussink met with Ed David.38 He insisted that if post-Apollo cooperation failed it would undermine the drive to European integration. He emphasized that Germany was willing to collaborate on any reasonable venture—shuttle, tug, or space station module—but that it needed launch assur­ances (failing which it would be “forced, with other European countries, into development of Europa III, leaving no money for post-Apollo cooperation”). Leussink also pointed out that he would be quite satisfied if the Europeans— like Japan—could buy American boosters or build them under license abroad.

The internal divisions within the administration emerged full-blown at a spe­cial meeting on post-Apollo cooperation held immediately after Leussink’s visit. It took place in the White House Situation Room on April 23, 1971.39 The meeting was chaired by Kissinger, and attended by White House staffers Peter Flanigan and Tom Whitehead, the new NASA administrator, James Fletcher, and his assistant, George Low, Edward David and Norman Neureiter from the Office of Science and Technology, and Robert Behr from the National Security Council.

Kissinger explained what was at issue: “[W]hether a program of co-operation with the Europeans is desirable. If the President wishes to have a program of some substance,” he went on, “the US will have to provide launch services to the Europeans. If he decides against a program of co-operation, we will hold to a hard line on the provision of such services.” Flanigan was particularly outspo­ken, objecting to the dangers of technology transfer and charging that NASA was advocating a program that was “nothing like what the President wants.” Flanigan claimed that for Nixon “a symbolic gesture like flying a European astronaut in space” would suffice. Whitehead supported him, arguing that what really mattered for the president was cooperative ventures that resulted in a net foreign policy benefit for the United States: the “grandiose program” being pursued by NASA was likely to have the opposite effect.

Kissinger, on balance, showed more sympathy for NASA than for David, Flanigan, and Whitehead. He was more sensitive than they to the foreign policy aspects of post-Apollo cooperation. He disliked the presumption by the White House staffers that they had privileged access to the president’s wishes. And he implied that the debate was being driven by muddled preconceptions rather than by reasoned argument. NASA was asked to provide within two weeks, in coopera­tion with David’s office, a paper “(1) defining technology transfer and analyzing its implications and (2) describing the various possibilities for space cooperation with the Europeans in addition to the shuttle.” Kissinger told Behr that a reply from the State Department to Lefevre would have to wait until this paper had been prepared and evaluated, and a program direction had been selected by the president.40