The Lefevre Mission in February 1971 and Its Aftermath

A European delegation led by Lefevre met again on February 10 and 11, 1971, at the State Department. They had prepared the ground with a lengthy let­ter sent the month before.13 They wanted, as the Belgian minister put it in his opening statement, to participate in post-Apollo in ways that “would facilitate mutual dependence,” “co-management,” in a “joint venture” in which the part­ners would have “equal rights” to information, even though Europe only con­tributed 10 percent of the budget.14 They sought associated benefits in terms of launcher availability and access to technology—Europe wanted to buy or build under license American launchers that could be launched from their new equato­rial base in Kourou, French Guiana. They also insisted that once the shuttle was built, or rather “jointly developed,” as they put it, it would be “available without restrictions to each of the partners for peaceful uses.” Lefevre reiterated that the Europeans sought access “to all the technology developed within the framework of the post-Apollo program, and not just that part of it which is necessary from [sic] executing the tasks accorded to Europe.”

These requests were strategic rather than realistic. A State Department brief­ing document emphasized again that “[t]he very marked asymmetry in the part­nership and the very advanced stage of US planning leave no alternative but to regard the post-Apollo program as a US program, not as a joint program.”15 As for the related request for technology sharing, the State Department emphasized that “[i]t is not possible in the world of commercial competition, congressional overview, and US industrial self-interest, to provide Europe full access to the commercial know-how developed in the post-Apollo program in return for a 10% contribution to that program.”16 As for launchers, the United States had no objection to Europe launching American rockets from foreign soil, or building Americans launchers abroad under license—but only if they respected “Intelsat – linked conditions” wherever they were launched.17 As NASA feared, U. Alexis Johnson’s new interpretation of those conditions was the biggest single blow to European hopes. And NASA was not alone. At a meeting of the senior staff of the National Security Council on the eve of the European visit, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger doubted whether the United States was being “reasonable” in refusing to give an “unequivocal commitment” to provide launch services for European communications satellites.18

Lefevre was incensed.19 Europe needed launchers “without political condi­tions,” he fumed; it could not participate in the post-Apollo program otherwise.

He reminded the State Department of its original interpretation of the Intelsat vote. He could not see why the United States was now demanding a positive finding in the Intelsat Assembly before it would agree to launch a regional European comsat. This new interpretation was against the spirit of cooperation that had prevailed until then.20 Resenting the insinuation that Europeans were behaving irresponsibly, Lefevre also pointed out that the Europeans were just as concerned as were the Americans to respect the definitive Intelsat agreements— but since the Assembly of Party’s recommendations were not legally binding, they could not stop a country or region launching a rival system even if the assembly made an adverse finding. In European eyes Johnson was reinterpreting a consultative recommendation as a binding determination. They were treating a relatively weak legal finding as a non-negotiable political constraint.

Johnson could not budge: his hands were tied by his commitment to Charyk. The meeting inevitably ended on a sour note on February 12. Lefevre “stated that the results of the discussion had been very disappointing,” and affirmed that “if the US position remains unchanged, Europe would have to have a negative view toward post-Apollo participation.”21 A stream of telegrams from embas­sies abroad confirmed Europeans’ puzzlement and anger. The member states of CETS, meeting on March 22, were unanimous in agreeing that the “proper interpretation” of Article XIV(d) was that enshrined in the “negative finding” (see table 5.1).22 One European speaker after the other, including those who were sensitive to the dilemmas faced by the United States, expressed their disap­pointment at the new turn of events.23 It was too much for Frutkin. Why was there so much criticism of the United States in this forum when it had done so much to promote international collaboration in space? Should one expect the leader in space technology to remedy the technological gap? How could one expect parity in technological exchange when the levels of contribution to a collaborative venture differed so greatly? Given the enormous benefits derived from collaboration over going it alone, could the Europeans not be “a little more relaxed about pressing for national advantage”?24