The Lefevre Mission in September 1970

In July 1970 the European Space Conference took a major step forward in what came to be known as the first package deal.75 At the core of this deal lay the decision to reorient ESRO’s mission away from scientific satellites toward appli­cations, with top priority being given to a communications and an aeronauti­cal satellite. ELDO would continue to work on the completion of the Europa II launcher. Belgium, France, and West Germany, along with the Netherlands (to the end of 1971 only) were also willing to go it alone and to embark on the development of a more powerful launcher, Europa III.76 The delegates also agreed to establish a working group that would draft a convention establishing a single European space agency, similar to NASA. Collaboration with the United States was not neglected. Not only did the ESC commit itself to an immedi­ate start on the project definition phase of an aeronautical satellite (Aerosat) in cooperation with NASA, it also wanted “all possibilities” for European partici­pation in the post-Apollo program to be studied by a working group of ESRO and ELDO officials in consultation with NASA. It voted $2.5 million through June 1971 for studies of the space tug.

The American authorities were heartened by these developments. The Europeans would gain technical, managerial, and industrial benefits, would be able to “avoid investment in the development of redundant European launch capabilities,” and would be given additional assurances regarding American launchers and launch services.77 For the United States, a major European con­tribution could be of substantial domestic value. It would bring in financial resources and technology, and enhance the use of the systems, so strengthening the justification for developing them. It would improve NASA’s political hand as it battled for its budgets. As George Low wrote in a memo intended to “empha­size [his] own enthusiastic and strong support” for “wide and meaningful coop­eration in the post-Apollo program”—if successful, such a project would “have a strong influence on support for our post-Apollo program objectives both in Congress and within the Executive Branch.”78 It would also provide a template for further partnerships of this type, and contribute to the North Atlantic alli­ance. On the down side, a joint project would be more complex to manage, for “although the Europeans will be heavily dependent on us, we will become dependent in some measure on them.” But only in some measure: this was not a level playing field, as emphasized in a position paper prepared for the State Department:

In view of the preponderance of U. S. resources and effort which will be put into the development of these systems and the far greater use which the U. S. will have for them, when operational, this collaboration with the Europeans would be very asymmetrical [. . . ]. There will be no credible basis on which this collaboration could be viewed as an equal partnership. The responsibility and control will neces­sarily be American.79

The challenge then was to give the Europeans a meaningful stake in a pro­gram in which the balance of power was tilted heavily toward their partner.

On September 16-17, 1970, a delegation led by the Belgian minister of state in charge of scientific policy and planning, Theo Lefevre, was hosted by the Department of State in Washington, DC. Lefevre headed the mission in his capacity as chairman of the ESC. He was assisted by J. F. Denisse, the president of the French national space agency, and Lord Bessborough, the United Kingdom’s minister of state in the Ministry of Technology. Causse and Dinkespiler were among the very few scientists and engineers present. The American delegation was headed U. Alexis Johnson for the State Department. The other principal members were George Low in his capacity as acting NASA administrator, Edward David, the science advisor to the president, William Anders, the executive sec­retary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and John Morse, deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO Affairs. Senior staff mem­bers from these various arms of the administration attended as advisors, includ­ing Arnold Frutkin and Dale Myers, NASA’s associate administrator for Manned Space Flight. This was then a discussion at a very high level of a “preliminary and exploratory character,” to sound out the “political, financial and other implica­tions of an eventual European participation” in the post Apollo program.

The meeting moved beyond the usual formalities and exchanges of views and tried to make concrete progress on fundamental matters of policy.80 During the opening session on September 16 the members of the American delegation made brief statements expressing their enthusiasm for European participation in post-Apollo, while taking care to add that the program had not yet been officially adopted. They indicated possible areas where the Europeans may like to cooperate, from building a discrete element of the orbiter to participating in an integrated system. They remarked that the collaboration would be guided by no exchange of funds and management integrity. A number of other items that were of concern to Europeans—access to information and facilities and participation in decision-making—were addressed. However, the burning issue, and the one almost immediately raised by Lefevre, concerned the availability of launchers. Europe, Lefevre said, did not have the financial means to maintain an independent capability in satellites and launchers and to participate in the post-Apollo program. Faced with this dilemma, it had to have US launchers available “without political conditions, and on a commercial basis.” There was a preliminary exchange of views on these issues the next morning.81 Two weeks later, on October 2, 1970, the US undersecretary of state officially replied to Lefevre. His 14-page letter carefully described the administration’s thoughts on three key European concerns: acquisition of launch services and launch vehicles, the extent of European involvement in decision-making, and European access to US information and facilities.

Johnson reassured the Europeans that they would have a role in decision­making and management commensurate with the extent of their participation. They would be consulted in the development of the shuttle and the space station whenever matters arose of “significant, mutual concern to both parties.” There would be an “extensive role” for Europe in the management of those areas in which its contractors were involved, even if they worked under an American prime. Europe would also have to be “a partner in reaching any decisions which have a measurable impact upon European costs or European tasks.” As regards the use of either the shuttle or the space station, “we would expect Europe to take part in mission planning and experimental programs in generous propor­tion to their use.” That said, given the preponderance in the United States’ con­tribution to both development and use, “overall responsibility for management of the post-Apollo program would necessarily rest with the U. S.”82

As for access to information and facilities, Johnson noted that the aim was to make optimum use of resources and skills on both sides of the Atlantic. In doing so one had to distinguish between general and detailed access to technical data and facilities. All countries would have general access, meaning access through visits and published information, to all technology and facilities in the over­all development of the program. Detailed access—meaning “access to design, development, and production data to the level of commercial know-how”— would be allowed to participating countries “commensurate with the measure and character of their participation.”83 It would be released by the United States or by Europe “on a need-to-know basis necessary for the accomplishment of their specific tasks under the agreed collaboration,” and in phase with their progress with those tasks.84 Access to technological know-how was thus tied directly to the extent of investment and participation, and was not a generalized right that could be acquired with a minimum of effort by the foreign partner. As Frutkin put it in a briefing document, Europe can “determine the extent of its access to commercial know-how in the program by increasing its contribution, and through it the number of interfaces it will be involved in, and through its requirements for such information.”85

Sensitive information, classified or unclassified, was not directly dealt with in the meeting on September 16-17, but the State Department had prepared itself for the question if it arose. Only individuals or teams clearly identified as requir­ing it would be granted access to this knowledge, it would be restricted to the location where the work was done, and it could not be transferred or applied in strategic military weapons systems. If by chance guidance or reentry technology was involved Europeans could only be allowed access to such knowledge “if it could be clearly demonstrated that (1) better technology and know-how exists in the prospective contributing country or, (2) in the case of only equivalent technology and know-how, there are over-riding reasons to seek foreign par­ticipation in these areas, and (3) neither the U. S. technology nor end products resulting from it would be transferred to any third party.”86 In sum, if there was little to lose the need for international collaboration could trump national security, but only under the strictest need-to-know regime and with appropriate safeguards.

The launcher policy described by Johnson was effectively that agreed between NASA and the State Department in July (see earlier).87 It was conditional on Europe making a substantial contribution to the program, meaning “at least 10%” of its estimated cost of some $10 billion over ten years. This share could be met by contributing significant new technology to the system, or by developing a major system or subsystem, or by a combination of these. If the Europeans were willing to make this 10 percent-plus financial engagement, the United States “would no longer determine the availability of launch services for European payloads on a unilateral case-by-case basis”: American and European interests would be on an “equal footing” with regards to the supply of launchers “for pos­sible commercially competitive purposes.” This “blanket assurance” to launch had to be “consistent with relevant international agreements,” however: the United States would respect the decisions of the Intelsat Assembly of Parties. In particular, unless two-thirds of the Intelsat member states voted that a proposed separate system did do significant economic harm to the global system (a “nega­tive finding”), the United States would launch for Europe.

Johnson did not want to provide substantive criteria for “significant economic harm,” as requested by the Europeans. The Intelsat negotiations were drawing to a close, major concessions had been made, and this was no time to reopen the debate on the highly contested Article XIV of the definitive agreements. However, he did stress that the United States “would provide the requested launcher facilities [. . .] even if it had voted against the project.”88 On the other hand, if there was a negative finding, the United States would still “consider their position, without saying that under no circumstances could they provide launchers”89 In short Johnson assured the Europeans, however significant eco­nomic harm was defined, the United States would not apply “the principle of being consistent with Intelsat arrangements” “in a narrow way.”90

The general philosophy underlying Washington’s position is clear. It was no longer trying to “help” a weaker ally, as in the 1960s. Europeans had a finan­cial, technological, and industrial contribution to make to post-Apollo. Once they had decided what they wanted to do, the United States would determine how best to meet their requirements, consistent with Washington’s desire to foster international collaboration and to protect its national interests broadly defined. Of course the relationship would, of necessity, be dominated by the United States. The asymmetries in contributions of all kinds were evident, “Nor will it be in our interest to attempt to enhance the benefits for the Europeans artificially.”91 Thus time and again when the Europeans sought to be treated as “equal partners”—in decision-making, in access to technology, in negotia­tions with third countries—they were reminded of their subordinate position. Europe’s ability to influence events would be proportional to their share in the program and restricted to the areas in which they were directly engaged.

The position on launchers followed the general pattern: greater US flexibility was tied to substantial European participation. The State Department made it clear that, if that participation was forthcoming, the United States had no inten­tion of using its power in Intelsat to indiscriminately protect American interests. The willingness to interpret voting majorities in terms of a negative finding, which favored the petitioner, was indicative of this flexibility.

Of course, there were still areas of uncertainty. How binding on the United States was a “negative finding”? How did one measure “significant economic harm”? Johnson recognized Europe’s fears of being held hostage to American launch policy if they did not retain independent access to space. He was willing to give near-blanket assurances of launcher availability: after all, there was a differ­ence between launching foreign payloads “subject to case-by-case determination on the one hand and, on the other, offering an assured, on-going commitment to do so for all European space projects (so long as they are for peaceful purposes and consistent with international agreements.)”92 However, he was extremely reluctant to commit the United States to launch European telecommunications satellites “unconditionally,” and in defiance of a “negative finding” by two-thirds of the appropriate Intelsat organ—a situation that, he thought, was most unlikely to arise anyway.

While the US authorities played down the difference between the two par­ties, the Europeans tended to emphasize them. Lefevre insisted that an adverse recommendation in Intelsat was not legally binding, and that Europe could legitimately defy it if it had its own launcher. Europeans also wanted to inter­pret “economic harm” so widely that they could reconcile their commitment to Intelsat with “projects which could be competitive with Intelsat rules without jeopardizing its existence.” Johnson was emphatic that the credibility of the United States as an international actor demanded that it respect the decisions taken by Intelsat (even if it had voted against them). Europe could not be treated differently to any other petitioner. The United States, Johnson wrote to Lefevre on October 2, 1970, “would adhere to the language and intent of article XIV, and would expect other countries to do the same.”93