Fleet

Airlines reduced the number of aircraft in their fleets by retirement, sale, or simply parking the airplanes. Especially targeted were less fuel – efficient and maintenance-intensive aircraft. The overall U. S. fleet was over 5,600 airplanes in 2000, but by 2003 there were only 4,479, a 20 percent reduction. Orders on new aircraft were reduced, down by over 100 airplanes at the end of 2002 as compared with the end of the second quarter of 2001. (See Figures 35-15 through 35-16 and Table 35-2.) At the end of 2006, the fleet still comprised only 4,339 aircraft.

Restructuring

At the end of 2002, only two major airlines ended up in the black. Southwest reported
profits of $241 million, and JetBlue reported $55 million. The remainder of all major U. S. air­lines reported substantial losses: American, $3.5 billion; United, $3.33 billion; Delta, $1.3 billion; Northwest, $766 million; Continental, $451 mil­lion; U. S. Airways, $1.66 billion. The combined losses of the industry exceeded $10 billion. It was no coincidence that the profitable airlines were the “no frills” low-cost carriers, and the unprofitable ones were the legacy airlines.

Traditionally, the legacy airlines’ largest cost of doing business has been wages and benefits of the rank and file employee, almost all of whom are represented by labor unions. The terms of union contracts control both wages and work rules, nei­ther of which can be unilaterally changed by air­line management. Yet, these were exactly what the airlines needed to change before any significant or long-lasting recovery could be expected. This was especially true since the cost of fuel, which has traditionally been the airlines’ second highest cost of doing business, continued to spiral upward.10

Beginning in 2002, the legacy airlines again resorted to the Bankruptcy Code as their last hope of survival. As the decade progressed, some critics said that Chapter 11 was becoming a man­agement tool, but the fact is that restructuring

Fleet

6/30/01

12/31/01

6/30/02

12/31/02

Change

B727

480

333

259

224

(256)

MD80

631

573

561

554

(77)

DC10

133

111

96

72

(61)

DC9

311

274

272

268

(43)

DC8

118

80

78

77

(41)

F100

114

96

74

74

(40)

B717

28

43

13

13

(15)

L1011

20

15

13

13

(7)

B747

174

174

170

168

(6)

B737

1,296

1,277

1,303

1,294

(2)

A330

9

9

9

9

MD90

16

16

16

16

A310

41

43

46

45

4

A321

19

23

28

28

9

MD10

12

12

16

22

10

MD11

51

53

56

62

11

A300

89

94

101

104

15

B777

110

119

129

129

19

B767

333

344

359

363

30

B757

579

600

615

623

44

A319

158

177

196

210

52

A320

228

251

267

284

56

TOTAL

4,950

4,717

4,677

4,652

(298)

FIGURE 35-15 Airline fleet by type.

of the type that had to be done could only be accomplished in reorganization in a bankruptcy court. Before it was over, every legacy airline would enter Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

The air carrier industry briefly returned to profitability in 2006. By then airline employment

had declined to 544,540, down from a high of

680,0 in the year 2000. Airline capacity, mea­sured in available seat miles, had been reduced by more than 25 percent by aircraft retirements. But profitability since then has been elusive. Next we will take a look at the airlines in bankruptcy,

etc

and how mergers have shaped the industry. But to put things in perspective, we need to briefly review how the airlines got to this point.