ДІРА and the Crew Size Issue

When technological advances in the railroad industry introduced the diesel locomotive to ren­der obsolete the steam locomotive, and with it the firemen who had been necessary to stoke the steam locomotive’s fireboxes, the unions successfully fought the railroads’ attempts to eliminate the firemen’s position. The firemen thenceforth sat in the engine with little or nothing to do and were paid their regular wage. The name given to this development was “feather-bedding,” and it effectively reduced the productivity gains that diesel technology had produced.

When the DC-9 and the Boeing 737 were introduced into the airline fleet in the 1960s, the FAA certified these new types for operation with two-pilot crews. ALPA adopted a hard stance against the FAA certification on the 737, and refused to fly the aircraft with a two-pilot crew. United was originally the largest purchaser of the 737, and to avoid a pilot strike during the regu­lated 1960s, United agreed to binding arbitration to resolve the issue notwithstanding the FAA certification. In spite of the FAA certification and the proven experience of other airlines, like Lufthansa and Piedmont, that were flying the 737 with two-pilot crews with spotless safety records, the arbitration panel surprisingly ruled that safety concerns mandated that the United 737s be oper­ated with three-pilot crews.

ALPA’s stance was now further hardened and extended to the upcoming new Boeing types, the 757 and 767. At ALPA’s National Convention in 1980, the delegates voted for a nationwide strike by March 1, 1981, if the crew-size issue on the new aircraft types was not resolved in favor of a three-pilot crew by that date. Such a strike would be a blatant viola­tion of the provisions of the RLA, as ALPA well knew, and as the strike date approached, ALPA pressed for the appointment of a Presidential Task Force to review the FAA’s prior certifica­tions. In July 1981, the Task Force reported its findings that safety concerns did not justify the use of three-pilot crews on the new types of air­craft under consideration.

Prior to the publication of the Task Force report, United had concluded that its short-haul routes serviced by the three-man crewed 737 would have to be discontinued or severely cut back as too costly, with significant pilot fur­loughs. Although United had reported a profit in

1978 of $296 million, the subsequent years of

1979 and 1980 resulted in losses of $235 million and $65 million, respectively. In a first-of-its – kind turnabout, ALPA under these circumstances reversed its position on the crew size issue and announced that it would accede to the findings of the Task Force. Reminiscent of the days of old, however, ALPA did extract a concession from United, namely, that the airline would agree never to form a startup, nonunion subsidiary like New York Air.