DONG FANG HONG 4

The Cox report had the desired effect of keeping China out of the world launcher market for seven years – and, conversely, denied China foreign earnings that might have funded other parts of its space program. In response, China eventually managed to break the ITAR blockade with Western customers and then searched further afield for new customers who also might legitimately evade American export

The DFH-4’s huge wing span, spot beams underneath. Courtesy: Paolo Ulivi.

controls. Its instrument was a new, much more advanced domestic communications satellite, the Dong Fang Hong 4, able to work in the new internet, high-speed data transmission and Direct Broadcasting to Home (DBH) markets. This was such a big project that it featured in the five-year plan, being approved by the government in 2001. The Dong Fang Hong 4 series was much heavier (5.1 tonnes), enabling it to carry between 22 and 52 transponders (in minimum configuration, 18 transponders at 36 MHz and four at 54 MHz) with high-capacity data links. To do this, it had solar wings a record 32 m across with an area of 62 m2, wider than some sporting fields, able to generate between 10.5 and 13 kW of electrical power. Its precision pointing was 0.06° in pitch and 0.2° in yaw, able to reach 45-cm dishes, with an operating period of up to 15 years.

China’s intention was that the satellite be designed, assembled, and tested in China, but with European countries contributing key components, so as to match the highest worldwide standards. Four companies submitted proposals, the winners being France’s leading telecommunications company, Thales Alenia. The aim of DFH-4 was to double the capacity of the DFH-3 and at least match the Western capacity of the Spacebus 3000 and Boeing 702. Dong Fang Hong 4 took five years to develop and the first DFH-4 was launched by the CZ-3B on 28th October 2006. This was Sinosat 2 (Xinnuo 2) for the Sinosat company, whose 22 transponders were to be located at 92.2°E, just west of Sumatra, to provide TV and broadband to small dishes in China and Taiwan.

Although designed for 15 years, the Chinese were deeply shocked to find that it failed in less than 15 hr. There was an electrical short circuit and the solar panels did not open. For 10 days, they used the limited communications with the spacecraft to struggle to open them. They finally gave up on 8th December. Sinosat 2 was allowed to drift off station to 70°E. In March 2008, the Chinese made another attempt at resuscitation, but it continued to drift, reaching 115°E by January 2009. It was finally decommissioned and taken out of orbit that July.

The failure of the DFH-4 on its first mission attracted considerable Western attention in media which normally ignored Chinese launchings, even their manned ones. The Aviation Week & Space Technology accurately described it as “the worst spacecraft failure in the history of the Chinese space program and a major setback” – but that was in a program in which on-orbit failures were rare. Investigators concluded that, although solar panels rely on individual hinges and it is not unknown for individual hinges to fail, a total deployment loss was unusual and most likely caused by a massive electrical or computer failure at that point or even earlier. The cost to China was estimated at between €150m and €400m – but would have been even more catastrophic if the first launch had been for a foreign customer. The setback, whilst unwelcome and attracting much adverse foreign news coverage, had only limited implications for other parts of the Chinese space program. It forced China to rely on other satellites for the upcoming Olympic Games. The original mission was quickly replaced by Sinosat 3 (Xinnuo 3, also called Zhongxing 5C), 125°E, on 31st May 2007, but this was an older DFH-3, a stop-gap while the DFH-4 was redesigned. After this was done, Sinosat 3 was relocated to 3°E, where it was leased by Eutelsat and renamed Eutelsat ЗА [4].

Despite the domestic failure, China still went out to win foreign DFH-4 contracts with Nigeria, Venezuela, and Pakistan. China offered not only to sell comsats to developing nations, but also to provide delivery to orbit and the loans to finance the whole enterprise. The first export was for Nigeria, where China had outbid 21 rivals in a competition, the Nigerians paying €250m. The satellite was to be positioned over 42°E and, for 15 years, bring communications to villages, broadcast television, and provide phone services, using 14 Ku-band transponders for southern and western Africa, C-band for central and southern Africa, and an L-band for navigation users. Not only did China build the satellite, but it also provided the loan to finance it and the training to operate it from Abuja tracking station.

Nigerian government officials, including President Olusegun Obasanjo, attended the televised night-time launch on 13th May 2007 in Xi Chang. The arrival of

The DFH-4 completed for testing.

Nigcomsat made Nigeria the leading African space communications user and promised a revenue of €50m a year. Disappointingly, it failed on 10th November 2008 when its solar power broke down after only 18 months. The following March, China agreed to replace it at its own expense (this apparently had been a condition of the contract). The replacement DFH-4 was duly launched on 19th December 2011, arrived on station a week later, completed its on-orbit tests in the first two months of the new year, and was formally handed over to Nigeria at a ceremony at the Obasanjo Space Centre in Abuja on 19th March 2012.

The second export was Venezsat, subsequently named the “Simon Bolivar”, launched on CZ-3B on 29th October 2008 for Venezuela, watched in Xi Chang by the country’s president, Hugo Chavez. Venezuela paid €200m for the satellite in 2005 after considering offers from Russia, Europe, and India. The Venezuelans required 14 transponders in the C-band and 14 in the Ku-band operating from 78°W, with coverage not only of the Americas, but also extending to Iberia. The builders were the Beijing Siangyu Space Technology Corporation, with special assistance from Thales Alenia for the power supply for €3.2m. A contract was subsequently agreed between China and Venezuela in April 2011 for an Earth and climate observation satellite (this may be called VRSS-1). A third successful export, Paksat 1R for Pakistan, reached orbit in August 2011 and was declared operational that November.

The success of the Venezuelan mission and the ultimate success of Nigcomsat encouraged other countries. In April 2010, Bolivia became the next to sign up for a DFH-4 comsat, called the Tupac Katari (named after the eighteenth-century leader
of resistance to Spain), designed to provide television and communications channels for literacy, education, health care, and social services as well as profit-making commercial services, with launch set for 2014. Financing came as €30m from the Bolivian government and €200m from the China Development Bank. The package included two years’ training in satellite operations for 74 engineers in China for 2012-14. Further orders then came in from Laos, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. China’s prices definitely undercut both Western and Russian prices: €20m for the CZ-2, €40m for the CZ-3A, €50m for the CZ-3C, €60m for the CZ-3B, and €40m for the CZ-4. Overall, China’s penetration of the world communications satellite launcher market was small, less than 10%, for Russia and Europe had an effective duopoly, but could well grow in the years ahead.

China broke into the international satellite market through a combination of self­interest, diplomacy, and business. Developing countries were interested to get satellites up, both for practical gains and as status symbols. Nigeria was the test case. Nigeria expected to pay off the satellite in seven years by leasing commercial bandwidth for television and banking services, while at the same time using it for social purposes, such as distance learning in remote rural areas, and for public service purposes, such as onhne access to government services and records and the remote monitoring of oil pipelines. Many Western companies avoided the competition for Nigcomsat because of their concerns about corruption, but China was undeterred and brought an accompanying financial package. The risks were outweighed by additional gains, such as oil deals, political connections, influence in Africa, and hard currency [5]. China is reported to be in negotiation for further launches for Belarus, Turkmenistan with Monaco, Columbia, and Congo, in each case using the CZ-3B, with discussions on Western or DFH-4 satellites.

After success abroad with the Dong Fang Hong 4, China started to deploy the satellite domestically. The first was Sinosat 6 (also cited as Xinnuo 6, Chinasat 6, and Zhongxing 6A), launched on 4th September 2010 on a CZ-3B from Xi Chang, a direct TV satellite located at 124°E and replacing the DFH-3 Sinosat 2. There was an unconfirmed report that it suffered a helium leak likely to reduce operational life from 15 years to 11.

The second domestic DFH-4 success was Sinosat 5 (also known as Xinnuo 5 or Zhongxing 10), launched on CZ-3B on 20th June 2011. All went smoothly, except that debris fell on a house downrange, causing a hole in the roof but thankfully no injuries. Its main function was to provide Direct Broadcast to Home services in Asia from 103.5°E and replace Zhongxing 5B but, in August, it moved to 110.5°E beside 5B. Table 5.6 lists the launches of the Dong Fang Hong 4 series.

Even as the DFH-4 was getting into service, China was planning its successor, the Dong Fang Hong 5. The DFH-5 is to weigh up to 7 tonnes, generate up to 20 kW of electricity, and will be launched by the CZ-5 heavy rocket. This is intended to break into the high end of the comsat market of high-data Ku-band transmission hitherto dominated by Loral, Boeing, Thales Alenia, and Astrium.

Table 5.6. Dong Fang Hong 4 series. 1 Sinosat 2/Xinnuo 2 28 Oct 2006 Failed immediately 2 Nigcomsat 13 May 2007 Failed after 18 months 3 Venezsat 29 Oct 2008 Also “Simon Bolivar” 4 Sinosat 6/Xinnuo 6/Zhongxing 6A 4 Sep 2010 Helium leak reported 5 Sinosat 5/Xinnuo 5/Zhongxing 10 20 June 2011 6 Paksat 1R 11 Aug 2011 7 Nigcomsat 1R 19 Dec 2011 Replacement All on CZ-3B from Xi Chang. See also Table 5.3 for DFH-4 CZ-3B missions under Feng Huo and Shentong.

CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS AND POLITICS

The communications satellite program was an important aspect of the moderniza­tion of China, bringing television, radio, telephone, banking, internet, newspapers, and educational programming to viewers, listeners, commerce, students, readers, and farmers in both dense urban and scattered rural communities. Communications satellites were a classic use of “leapfrog” technology, avoiding television masts and

Typical footprint of Chinese communications satellites

phone lines to go straight to the ubiquitous satellite dish. The modernization of China by satellite communications was very much the achievement of the overall technical director of the program, Sun Jiadong, born in 1929, a graduate of the Zhukovsky Institute of Air Force Engineering in Moscow and involved in the space and missile program from the 1950s. The satellites developed an ever-longer lifetime, from three years (DFH-2) to six years (DFH-2A) to eight years (DFH-3). Despite some spectacular failures reducing the average, most actually worked for longer than advertised.

Way back in the 1970s, the development of communications satellites, involving the mastery of hydrogen fuels, the 24-hr orbit, and demanding performance by satellites themselves, was a formidable technical challenge. Since then, China caught up with and matched the performance of American and European communications satellites, selectively bringing in European expertise to do so.

Little can the Chinese have imagined that they would be confronted by such international political obstacles in attempting to develop their communications satellite program. The events that followed make for an extraordinary study of

Bringing telecommunications to the villages: satellite dish on a rural kiosk.

intrigue, political lobbying, espionage, and partisan politics. The Chinese showed forbearance, persistence, and both technical and political resourcefulness in the face of the ever-tighter blockades set down by the Congress from the mid-1990s. After several years, they were rewarded by eventually breaking the stranglehold of ITAR so as to launch Western-built satellites and with satellite contracts with developing countries so as to launch the home-built Dong Fang Hong 4. As developing countries expand their telecommunications capabilities, this market can only be predicted to grow.