Social Gains through Systems Management

Systems management became the standard for space and missile technolo­gies because it promoted the goals of the groups involved. Scientists received credit for conceiving novel technologies. Military officers gained control over radical new weapons and their associated organizations. Engineers earned re­spect by creating reliable technologies. Managers gained by controlling orga­nizations within a predictable (but hopefully large) budget.

In the 1950s scientists formed an alliance with the military to rapidly cre­ate novel weapons. Officers desired quick weapon deployment, while scien­tists provided the novelty. Within systems management, the role of scientists became standardized. They were to perform systems analyses at the begin­ning of programs to determine technological feasibility and whether to de­velop a particular mission or weapon. Scientists also used their quantitative skills to assess the reliability of the new technologies as engineers developed them, acting as credible second sources of information. Managers and mili­tary officers frequently used scientists in this capacity, as Ramo-Wooldridge and Aerospace did for the air force against the contractors.

Military officers also gained influence through systems management. Here it is important to distinguish between technical officers and operational offi­cers. The latter led troops into battle and throughout the long history of the military held the reins of power. Technical officers became more important in the 1950s and 1960s. Before the 1950s, air force technical officers lamented their poor career possibilities. With the creation of Air Research and Develop­ment Command (ARDC) in 1950 and Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) in 1961, technical officers won for themselves career paths separate from those of their operational brethren. Systems management became the formal set of procedures that allowed them to maintain a military career in technical R&D. Technical officers gained a stable career path and significant power.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, NASA was run by engineers and for engi­neers. Although engineers no longer had free rein after that time, NASA re­mained an engineering organization. So too were ARDC, AFSC, and their laboratories and contractors. Aerospace engineering, and particularly the space program, were the glamour jobs of engineering during this period, with interesting tasks, substantial authority and funding, and excellent opportuni­ties for promotion into managerial or technical positions. Systems manage­ment ensured a large role for engineers throughout the design process and kept alive the engineering working groups that allowed engineers to main­tain substantial authority. Engineers developed the testing techniques that ensured that their products operated, and hence they guaranteed their own credibility and success. These testing techniques too became part of systems management. Engineers benefited from the creation of systems engineering, which gave the chief systems engineer nearly as much authority as the project manager, who more often than not was also an engineer by training and ex­perience.

Management credibility and authority stem from control of a large orga­nization with funding to match. The power of the purse was the manager’s primary weapon, but in the 1950s managers had not yet learned how to use it to control the scientists and engineers. As long as scientists and engineers cre­ated novel technologies and funding was plentiful, they could and did claim that they could not predict costs or schedules. Until the technologies reached testing, where failures appeared, managers could not successfully challenge that claim. However, technical failure gave managers the wedge they needed to gain control.

As tasks and projects repeated, managers used past history to predict costs and hold scientists and engineers to estimates based on prior history. Stan­dardizing systems management made costs and schedules more predictable and allowed managers to distinguish between ‘‘normal’’ cost and schedule patterns and ‘‘abnormal’’ patterns that signaled technical or organizational problems. Project managers used this information to control projects and pre­dict outcomes without being completely dependent on technical experts.

Executive managers wanted to know about the current status of projects and about possible new projects. To determine if new projects should be funded, executive managers created ‘‘breakpoints’’ at which they could inter­vene to continue, modify, or cancel a project. Phased planning implemented these breakpoints and ensured that only limited resources would go toward new projects before executive managers had their say.

From a social viewpoint, each of the four professional groups gained im­portant career niches from the institution of systems management. This helps to explain why it has proven to be a stable method in the aerospace indus­try. However, this leaves unanswered whether systems management actually made costs predictable or novel products dependable. In the end, none of the social factors would matter if the end products ultimately failed.