Coordination and Control of. High-Tech Research and Development

When we mean to build, we first survey the plot, then draw the model; and when we see the figure of the house, then we must rate the cost of the erection: which if we find outweights ability, what do we then but draw anew the model in fewer offices, or at last desist to build at all?

— William Shakespeare, King Henry IV, Part 2, Act 1, Scene 3

Systems management was a typical product of the Cold War, consisting of organizational structures and processes reflecting the interests and expertise of the social groups that created it. Facing intense pressure to deliver state – of-the-art technologies on tight schedules, military officers, managers, scien­tists, and engineers contributed their respective types of expertise and vied for control of the development process. Competition and cooperation both flourished in the pressure cooker of the early Cold War, but ultimately these groups formed a coherent process for the development of large-scale tech­nologies.

A common thread was the emphasis on systems. To Bernard Schriever and other air force officers, the ‘‘systems approach’’ meant unifying the research and development (R&D) command structure, to unite in one organization what the air force had traditionally accomplished in separate organizations. To engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), the systems approach meant accounting for operations and logistics in a missile’s design. To RAND analysts, the systems approach meant applying mathematical techniques to a larger set of technologies and organizations than previously considered. In each case, ‘‘systems’’ implied an expansion of capabilities, authority, and con­cepts beyond what was traditional.

Each social group developed means of communication and control to en­hance its effectiveness and authority. Managers and military officers devel­oped communication procedures that funneled information to a central point and disseminated decisions and authority from that point. Less obviously, working groups of scientists and engineers also channeled information and authority, but in their case to their own working groups. Based upon the needs of the Cold War, each group used systems rhetoric to gain authority, then designed “procedural systems’’ to keep it.

Scientists and engineers first developed systems analysis and systems engi­neering to analyze and coordinate the development of large-scale technolo­gies. Organizing through ad hoc committees typical of academia, these tech­nically competent individuals maintained power through the informality of their communication, which seemed unique to each problem and project. Standardization did not seem possible, and technical experts wanted to keep it that way.

Those in control of the project funding and goals thought otherwise. Mili­tary officers and managers sought ways to control the seemingly uncontrol­lable R&D process and ultimately found a solution in configuration man­agement, which linked managerial hierarchies with technical committees. Through the configuration control board (CCB), managers used the ‘‘power of the purse,’’ requiring scientists and engineers to give cost and schedule esti­mates with each design change. This gave them a proxy measurement to assess technical progress and hence assess the scientists and engineers as well.

Changes were inevitable in complex ballistic missile and spacecraft designs. Their novelty meant that technical and managerial teams learned as they went. Much of this learning came through failure, when missiles exploded and spacecraft failed far from Earth. Because many, if not most, problems en­countered were interface problems traceable to communication problems, or manufacturing defects traceable to simple errors in repetitive processes, orga­nizational means were primary in eradicating these errors. Systems manage­ment significantly improved missile and spacecraft reliability.

The Cold War provided the context and motivation for military and civil­ian authorities to fund scientists and engineers to develop complex, hetero­geneous weapons systems. In short, scientists and engineers working on Cold

War military projects created technical coordination processes that managers and military officers appropriated and modified to control R&D. Just as scien­tific management enabled managers and engineers to coordinate and control factory workers in the first decades of the twentieth century, systems man­agement enabled military officers and civilian managers to coordinate and control scientists and engineers.