Aging Technology and Changing Objectives

Without any staff members except for those supplied by the national govern­ments, and with technical problems more complex than originally thought, ELDO’s Preparatory Group moved the project, now known as Europa I, slowly forward between 1961 and 1964. Although the first and second Blue Streak launches in 1964 succeeded, delays and technical difficulties led to sub­stantial cost escalation, from the 198 Million Accounting Units (MAU)21 origi­nally budgeted (the equivalent of £70 million) to 400 MAU at the end of 1964.22

Commercial communication satellites soon troubled ELDO executives and national representatives. Americans tested their commercial viability with the Early Bird satellite in 1965 and controlled the market through Intelsat, the international consortium for satellite telecommunications. Europeans wanted to break the American stranglehold. In 1964, the ELDO Secretariat reported that an upgraded Europa I launcher could place 20-40 kilograms of equip­ment in polar orbit and that a more powerful ELDO B rocket could place a 1,000-kilogram communications satellite in geostationary orbit in the 1970s. The next year, French officials proposed that ELDO scrap Europa I and in­stead immediately begin work on ELDO B. Other delegates vetoed this as too risky but agreed to reconsider it later.23

Spurred by massive overruns that they disproportionately funded, the Brit­ish reversed their strong support of ELDO in April 1966. They now believed that Europa I would be obsolete and its commercial potential limited and stated that they would neither participate in rocket upgrades nor contribute beyond existing commitments. Under pressure from the other delegations, the British agreed in June 1966 to remain in ELDO, but only if the organization re­duced the British contribution. In July, delegates agreed to this but also voted to fund an equatorial base, inertial guidance improvements, and the Europa II rocket, which could launch up to 150 kilograms into geostationary orbit. The new cost was 626 MAU, more than three times initial ELDO estimates. Britain would not contribute to any costs above the agreed 626 MAU level.

Technical problems soon pushed costs past the limit. In February 1968, after two failures of the French second stage, the British invoked ELDO’s new procedures for projected cost overruns. Two months later, the British announced that they would make no further contributions to ELDO. Italian delegates, angered by the refusal of France and Germany to include them in the bilateral Symphonie communications satellite, and also by their inability to recoup ELDO contracts for their own space industry, refused to agree to a French-German ‘‘austerity plan’’ that would have cut Italian portions of the program. After yet another rocket failure in November 1968, this time of the German third stage, delegates from France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands agreed to make up the shortfall in British and Italian contribu­tions to complete a scaled-back program. Italy finally agreed to rejoin, but Britain would supply its first stage for only two more test flights. After that Britain would be through with ELDO. The remaining partners agreed to fund studies for a first stage replacement.24

NASA International Programs chief Arnold Frutkin noted the “half­hearted and mutually-suspicious character of participation by its [ELDO’s] members.’’ European governments held together only insofar as the United States resisted European commercial interests. With Europeans united in their suspicions that the Americans intended to monopolize communication satel­lites, Frutkin believed, ‘‘US offers in space and other fields of technology will continue to be regarded with extreme and often irrational suspicion until the comsat issue is resolved.’’ In sending mixed signals, American leaders helped keep ELDO alive.25

Changing technological objectives contributed to ELDO’s problems. With­out firm objectives at the start, ELDO and French studies showed that ELDO needed a more powerful launch vehicle to place communications satellites into orbit. The French, who viewed ELDO as an essential part of their drive for independence from the United States, were willing to pay the price. So too were the Germans, who subsidized their own reentrance into rocketry. The Belgians and Dutch believed they needed to go along with their power­ful neighbors. As long as ELDO guaranteed the Italians technically interesting tasks, Italian leaders would contribute. However, the British had little to gain in that the first stage was operational. Convinced of American willingness to launch European satellites, British leaders believed it more important to fund applications satellites than launchers. These differences might have been over­come if ELDO’s rockets had proved successful.