The Lessons of SEI

“The story of the dreams and the unbuilt spaceships for flights to
Mars should be recorded so that in the future people can examine
past ideas of space travel just as we can examine the unconsummated
ideas of Leonardo da Vinci by reading his notebooks. Years from now
people should be able to decide for themselves whether they want to
go to Mars or if they prefer to stay earthbound. But let us not destroy
the dream, simply because we do not wish to pursue it ourselves. ”

NASA Historian Edward Ezell, 1979

During the agenda setting and alternative generation processes for SEI, key policy entrepreneurs did not adequately heed the lessons of the past—particularly those learned from the unsuccessful attempt to place Mars exploration on the gov­ernment agenda during post-Apollo planning. At that time, the Space Task Group and NASA failed to account for contemporary fiscal and political constraints. This led to the STG endorsement of a Mars exploration approach that required doubling the space agency’s annual budget. This was contrary to President Nixon’s philoso­phy and the budgetary environment, which resulted in the eventual failure of the initiative to reach the government agenda. In 1989, exploration of the Moon and Mars gained vital support from President Bush as his administration sought to pro­vide direction to a directionless agency. The policy process that the Space Council nominally directed, however, failed to provide adequate guidance regarding the con­straints confronting adoption of the initiative. As a result, NASA’s 90-Day Study was significantly at variance with what Congress judged to be in the long-term interest of the nation. Current policy makers are facing similar issues.[356] Future policy makers will surely face them as new policy windows open, providing opportunities to shape the national space program. Understanding the lessons of SEI provides a chance to avoid sharing SEI’s fate.

One of the primary causes of SEI’s failure was a lack of clear policy guidance from the White House. This deficiency began in early spring 1989, when announcing a robust human exploration initiative was first contemplated by the Bush adminis­tration. While Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht clearly believed such an undertaking would provide NASA with needed direction, the administration did not have well developed substantive ideas for future programs. Consequently, the Space Council relied heavily on the space agency to provide the details necessary to make an informed decision regarding the technical feasibility of human exploration beyond Earth orbit. The problem, however, was that adequate instructions were not provided regarding the key constraints that should guide the development of a programmatic approach. As a result, the Ad Hoc Working Group assembled a scenario for human exploration, based largely on existing technology, which would have cost an estimated $400 to $500 billion. Regardless of the potential problems represented by this cost profile, the White House decided to go ahead with the announcement of SEI—probably assuming that cheaper alternatives could be found for the initiative.

On 20 July 1989, during his speech announcing SEI, President Bush directed the Space Council to assess technical approaches and budgetary resources required to carry out the initiative. After the address, however, the Council largely abdi­cated this authority to NASA. This took the form of the 90-Day Study. Given the outcome of the initial alternative generation process (e. g., selection of a technical approach that would require more than doubling the agency’s budget), the decision to allow NASA to control the post-announcement alternative generation process was clearly a mistake. The decision not to include other actors within the space policy community ultimately presented serious problems. This outcome could have been avoided if a presidential decision directive with a detailed strategy for imple­menting SEI had been released concurrently with the presidents speech. Instead, this guidance was not provided for nearly eight months. The inability of the Coun­cil staff to draft such a directive, given the short period of time available, presents a compelling explanation for why NASA was allowed to generate the 90-Day Study in virtual isolation with scant direction from the White House.

From the start, the Space Council should have more firmly controlled devel­opment of SEI. Given the administration’s goals, after President Bush announced the initiative the Council should have commenced technical studies conducted by NASA and outside actors (e. g., government contractors, universities, think tanks, and national laboratories) based on detailed written guidance. This type of coor­dinated alternative generation process would have engendered the kind of “clean sheet” thinking the White House desired. Instead, the space agency followed a more expedient path and developed reference approaches based on past studies. Although the Space Council had verbally asked NASA to supply a variety of technical options and cost profiles, the top NASA leadership either misunderstood or ignored those requests. By the time the 90-Day Study was released, it was probably too late to regain control of the initiative. Congress already associated SEI with $500 bil­lion budgetary requirements. Without any other studies initiated to provide real alternatives, the Council could not present a compelling argument that cheaper options existed. By the time the National Research Council and Synthesis Group were brought in to provide this perspective, the damage had already been done. Similarly, the presidential directives released in spring 1990 arrived too late to save the initiative.

Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the failure of SEI was that NASA needs competition for ideas from other space policy community actors. Since the post-Apollo deceleration, NASA has not proven itself capable of present­ing White House policy makers with a robust suite of policy alternatives for large human spaceflight programs. From the earliest stages, the Space Council relied too much on the space agency to develop alternative approaches for SEI. There were a number of warning signs that should have led the council staff to bring other governmental and nongovernmental actors into the process. The most troubling of these was the initial $400 billion price tag introduced by the Ad Hoc Working Group. Given existing political and budgetary constraints, it is beyond explanation why the administration didn’t seek out cheaper options before announcing the ini­tiative. Instead, Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht were apparently satisfied with NASA’s conclusion that the initiative was technically feasible. They chose not to focus on the staggering price tag at that point. Regardless, the political infeasi­bility of the required cost profile clearly demonstrated the need to include other actors in the subsequent alternative generation process. Additional warning signs that the alternative generation process had gone awry emerged even before NASA began assembling the 90-Day Study. The most obvious example was the conversa­tion between Mark Albrecht and Aaron Cohen, when it became clear the two actors had fundamentally different definitions of alternatives. Throughout that period, the Space Council staff became increasingly alarmed by the lack of technical details being provided by NASA. Despite these growing concerns, however, the adminis­tration maintained its “wait and see” approach. By the time the 90-Day Study was released, it proved impossible to turn back the clock.

Responsibility for the ultimate demise of SEI should not all land at the White House doorstep. NASA missteps shared equally in its failure. Although it was directed to develop multiple options with different cost profiles, NASA presented only one expensive reference approach. To check the “alternatives” box, the agency simply provided slightly varied mission timelines and potential destinations. Even without clear written guidance from the administration, Admiral Truly and NASA’s senior leadership should have recognized that existing budgetary constraints neces­sitated consideration of alternatives that could be implemented with modest resources. Instead, a plan was developed that never had any hope of gaining con­gressional support. An examination of the 90-Day Study reveals several factors that virtually guaranteed this outcome. First, the TSG selected an aggressive develop­ment sequence that called for emplacement, consolidation, and operations phases. While this may have been a logical strategy for maintaining permanent human presence beyond Earth orbit, it was not politically feasible. Second, making the ulti­mate objective of both Moon and Mars exploration the establishment of permanent outposts dramatically increased the expense of the initiative. Cheaper stand-alone missions should have been included. Third, making the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs central to the system architecture drove costs up dramatically. It also alienated potential supporters on Capitol Hill. Dick Malow said later he would have been “more positive if NASA had taken Space Station off the plate and focused on going to Mars. The budget envelope that would have opened up would have been sufficient to get the initiative going. I never felt space station was critical to going to Mars, never made any sense to me, if anything it may even have been a detractor.”[357] Fourth, innovative in-space propulsion technologies were not given serious consideration. The basic chemical propulsion designs selected could have been supplemented with other options ranging from electric propulsion to solar sails to nuclear propulsion. Finally, additional strategic approaches should have been included. There was no shortage of architectural approaches available. In the end, the TSG’s failure to consider a wide-variety of alternatives crippled SEI and exposed NASA to wide-ranging criticism. Although the Space Council attempted to find other options, the odds were already stacked against the initiative. In the end, the failure of the Space Council to coordinate a competition of ideas from the outset doomed the initiative.

Even before he won the presidency, George Bush acknowledged that any new human spaceflight program would be significantly constrained by the federal budget. During the transition, the NASA Transition Team recommended the establishment of an agency priority-setting mechanism to take into account these concerns regard­ing the budget deficit. On his first day in office, President Bush told Congress his top agenda item was deficit reduction. Throughout its early months in office, the administration made clear that any decision regarding human spaceflight programs beyond Earth orbit would be made taking into account the limited resources avail­able. In April 1989, when Vice President Quayle and Mark Albrecht met with Rich­ard Darman and Bob Grady from OMB, it was agreed that any new initiative could not have a major budgetary impact. This body of evidence reveals that the Bush administration knew it would not gain congressional support for expensive explora­tion projects. It is equally clear, however, that NASA did not understand, or chose to ignore, this political reality. This is the primary reason why written guidance regard­ing the formulation of alternatives with favorable cost profiles was needed.

Drawing on the Apollo paradigm, NASA leaders believed President Bush’s endorsement of a bold human spaceflight initiative was an opportunity to obtain a large funding increase. This was made clear when the AHWG developed a strategic architecture that would have required more than doubling the agency’s budget. This was exactly what the administration did not want, yet Vice President Quayle and the Space Council perplexingly endorsed the review and proceeded with plans to announce SEI. Instead, given its desire to keep the space agency’s budget in check, the administration should have taken one of two actions. First, it could have post­poned the announcement of the initiative on the 20th anniversary of Apollo 11 and sought out less expensive options. Second, it could have announced SEI and imme­diately commenced a competition of ideas to determine what other alternatives were available. Rather than take control of the policy making process, the Space Council abdicated its authority to NASA. Admiral Truly, in turn, believed there was a right way and a wrong way of doing things, and the right way didn’t include considering resource constraints. Preparing plans for SEI based on this fundamental principle proved to be an enormous political miscalculation.

Admiral Truly’s approach to SEI was not without precedent. Something similar happened during post-Apollo planning. During that period, NASA advocated an aggressive human spaceflight program based on Vice President Agnews support for Mars exploration. President Nixon and Congress were not won over. Rather than learn from this disappointment, the agency followed essentially the same course 20 years later. An examination of the record suggests the agency never seriously considered using President Bush’s backing to gain support for modest budgetary increases that could fund a more limited human exploration program, which would not necessarily eliminate Mars missions. Thus, NASA missed a historic opportunity to right itself two decades after the post-Apollo deceleration. Instead, it proposed a highly expensive reference approach that would require doubling the agency budget because there was no inclination to cancel on-going programs. SEPs resultant demise badly damaged the American space program.

The failure to adequately consult Congress was one of the biggest mistakes made by the Bush administration before announcing SEI. Considering both houses were controlled by the opposition party, and given the existing budgetary crisis, this should have been a crucial part of the policy making process. Congress and congres­sional staffers are among the most critical actors in any policy community. Despite this fact, the administration did not involve legislators in SEPs agenda setting pro­cess. Instead, the Space Council and NASA simply ‘informed’ key members and staffers, instead of consulting’ them regarding the initiative’s substance or political feasibility. Furthermore, there was no attempt made to build a coalition of support­ers for human exploration beyond Earth orbit. This explains why SEI never had any true champions on Capitol Hill, even among constituencies usually supportive of the space program. This procedural flaw was compounded when the Space Council and NASA continued to operate without seeking advice from Congress as alterna­tives were being generated. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 90-Day Study was pronounced ‘dead-on-arrival’ when it reached Capitol Hill. Without Congressional buy-in, it was impossible to garner support for SEI after the report was released. The Space Council made continual efforts to prove the program could be implemented with fewer resources. The space summit held in May 1990 was indicative of this struggle, but did not sway any Congressional supporters to come to the fore. By the time the Hubble flaw and Space Shuttle leaks were revealed, it was too late to save SEI. It is unclear whether broad-based support would have been forthcoming even if attempts had been made to build a coalition of congressional supporters, but the failure to make the effort clearly contributed to the ultimate failure of the initiative.

The philosophical disconnect between Admiral Truly and the Space Council was one of the most significant secondary causes of SEI’s demise. After taking office, the Bush White House did not take early steps to find a new NASA Administrator. Although the administration knew James Fletcher was departing, there was no ini­tial rush to find his replacement. Thus, the eventual decision to appoint Truly was made very rapidly. As a result, there was little time to make sure that his vision for the agency’s future matched President Bush and Vice President Quayle’s. Over the course of the subsequent three years, it became increasingly clear Truly’s priorities were at odds with the Space Council’s. In fact, Truly actively fought the Council’s efforts to take control of space policy making within the federal government. In the end, this led to his firing and the hiring of Dan Goldin. SEI’s outcome demonstrates how important it is for the president and NASA administrator to be on the same page when trying to gain approval for a major human spaceflight initiative.

In the absence of a true crisis environment, rapid decision making to meet arbi­trary deadlines has not proven to be terribly successfully within the American space program. The determination to announce SEI on the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing was a perfect example. Although many within the space policy commu­nity recommended that NASA embark on an extended evaluation of future options, a decision to approve SEI was made in less than four months. As a result, President George Bush announced an initiative that had not been thoroughly examined with regard to its fiscal and political feasibility. In retrospect, it is unclear what necessi­tated this rushed process. After the speech, this perceived need for speed carried over to the 90-Day Study. An examination of the historical record does not reveal any clear rationale for conducting the study in three months, except to include fund­ing for SEI in the fiscal year 1991 budget request. Regardless, the result was that the TSG did not have time to adequately evaluate a range of strategic architectures with different cost profiles. The NRC study team that reviewed the report criticized this quick turnaround as the proximate cause for the lack of real alternatives. This outcome virtually eliminated any chance for SEI’s approval.

During the second half of the 20th century, there were a number of seminal moments in American space policy. These included the creation of NASA, President Kennedy’s Moon decision, and the Space Shuttle and Space Station decisions. Due to its influence on the space program’s future course, SEI rightfully belongs on this list. It is an anomaly in some respects because it was a failed initiative. Combined with the Hubble Space Telescope flaw and Space Shuttle fuel leaks, its demise led to significant changes at NASA. Perhaps the most important was the appointment of Dan Goldin, the most change-oriented administrator since James Webb.[358] The most important change he wrought was forcing NASA to face budgetary reality and focus on evolutionary advancement. This arguably wouldn’t have happened absent the extraordinary budgetary requirements of NASA’s SEI reference approach and the eventual downfall of the initiative.

The demise of SEI was a classic example of a defective decision-making process. The decision to conduct the agenda setting process in secret made it difficult to gen­erate support within Congress or the space policy community. The Space Councils inability to provide high-level policy guidance, combined with NASA’s failure to independently consider critical fiscal constraints, derailed the initiative before it really got started. Finally, the failure of the Space Council to initiate a competi­tion of ideas after President Bush’s announcement speech removed any possibility of gaining congressional support after the devastating release of the 90-Day Study. It is far from obvious that the failure of SEI was predetermined given the existing budgetary crisis facing the nation in 1989. What is clear, however, is that its failure was ensured because options that may have been politically feasible were not con­sidered during a deeply flawed policy process. While this had the benefit of forcing some level of change within NASA, it also badly damaged the agency’s reputation as a world-class technical organization. To ensure the success of future efforts to send humans to Mars, current and future policy makers must learn the lessons of SEI. This alone is why its history is so fundamental to understanding what is required to gain support for large human spaceflight initiatives.

[1] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 July 1989, Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing [http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/] (accessed 18 May 2002).

[2] Dwayne A. Day, “Doomed to Fail: The Birth and Death of the Space Exploration Initiative,” Spaceflight (March 1995), pp. 79-83; John Pike, “But what is the True Rationale for Human Spaceflight?,” Space Policy (August 1994), pp. 217-222.

[3]John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995).

[4] Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Polities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 3-24.

[5] Wayne Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis (Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995), pp. 193-207.

1:1 Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,” Administrative Science Quarterly (March 1972), pp. 1-25; Parsons, Public Policy, pp. 192-193.

[7] John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), pp. 86-89.

[8] Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 3-24.

5 Ibid., pp. 39-55.

[10] William Sheehan, The Planet Mars: A History of Observation and Discover (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1996), pp. 1-8; John Noble Wilford, Mars Beckons: The Mysteries, the Challenges, the Expectations of Our Next Great Adventure in Space (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 3-17.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Sheehan, The Planet Mars, pp. 9-15; Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 3-17.

[14] Sheehan, The Planet Mars, pp. 16-22; Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 3-17.

[15] Sheehan, The Planet Mars, pp. 23-30.

[16] Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 23-24.

[17] William Graves Hoyt, Lowell and Mars (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), p. 12.

[18] Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 24-30.

1!> Ibid.

[20] H. G. Wells, War of the Worlds (1898; reprint, New York: Tor, 1986).

[21] Edgar Rice Burroughs, A Princess of Mars (1917; reprint, New York: Ballantine Books, 1990).

[22] Robert Heinlein, Red Planet (New York: Ballantine Books, 1949).

[23] Ray Bradbury, The Martian Chronicles (New York: Doubleday, 1950).

[24] One of the two most prestigious awards for accomplishments in science fiction—the other is the Nebula Award.

[25] Robert Heinlein, Double Star (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956).

[26] Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 53-56.

[27] A myth developed by flight engineers after earlier missions to Mars failed, which lives on today.

[28] Including a magnetometer and a trapped-radiation detector.

[29] Sheehan, The Planet Mars, chapter 11.

[30] About every 26 months, Mars and Earth reach a position in their respective orbits that offers the best trajectory between the two planets. During this time period, the Mariner missions were launched to take advantage of these launch windows.

[31] Wilford, Mars Beckonsy pp. 60-61.

[32] Sheehan, The Planet Mars, chapter 12.

[33] Wilford, Mars Beckons, pp. 86-90.

[34] Some astrobiologists believe that the Viking Lander’s Labeled Release (LR) experiment proved that primitive life does exist on present-day Mars. The LR experiment dropped liquid nutrients onto a sample of Martian soil, then measured the gases that were released by the mixture. If Martian bacteria had consumed the nutrients and had begun to multiply, certain gases would have been released. When the LR experiment was conducted on both Viking Landers, some of the gases emitted seemed to suggest that microbes were ingesting the released nutrients. But, overall, the results were ambiguous. Many in the scientific community believe that the LR results can be explained non-biologically. One such explanation is that the LR experiment showed the surface of Mars to contain oxides. When the nutrients mixed with the oxides, a chemical reaction, not a biological one, occurred. Moreover, these oxides would actually prevent life from forming on the Martian surface. This remains an open debate within the scientific community, although the prevailing belief is that the Viking LR readings did not provide evidence of life on Mars. [Staff Writer, “The Viking Files,” Astrobiology Magazine (29 May 2003)]

and the American Imagination (Washington, DC: Smithsonian

[36] German engineer who played a prominent role in all aspects of rocketry and space exploration, first in Germany (he led the V-2 rocket program) and, after World War II, in the United States. After working for the U. S. Army, von Braun became Director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center and the chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle. He began developing ideas for Mars exploration as early as 1947, while working at White Sands.

[37] Wernher von Braun, The Mars Project (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Erik Bergaust, Wernher von Braun (Washington, DC: National Space Institute, 1976), pp. 153-159; David S. Portree, Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 1950-2000 (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 2001), pp. 1-4.

[38] John Kingdon defines “softening up” as a process to pave the way in preparation for opening a policy window. In this process, the policy entrepreneur must ask who must be softened up: the general public, some specialized public, or the policy community itself. Among the means of softening up or educating is conducting and releasing studies or reports relating to the policy, which was the method chosen by von Braun (and others) during the 1950s. [John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), pp. 127-131.]

[39] Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 1-4; Bergaust, Wernher von Braun, pp. 53-59; Wernher von Braun with Cornelius Ryan, “Can We Get to Mars?” Colliers, 30 April 1954, in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 195-200; Willy Ley and Wernher von Braun, The Exploration of Mars (New York: Viking Press, 1956).

[40] Mike Wright, “The Disney-Von Braun Collaboration and Its Influence on Space Exploration” in Selected Papers fi-om the 1993 Southern Humanities Conference, ed. Daniel Schenker, Craig Hanks, and Susan Kray (Huntsville, AL: Southern Humanities Press, 1993).

[41] McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, pp. 29-82.

[42] Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 5-6.

[43] Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 6-8; David S. F. Portree, “The Road to Mars… Is Paved With Good Inventions,” Air & Space, February/March 2000, pp. 67-71.

[44] Portree, Humans to Mars, pp. 11-22; Portree, The Road to Mars, pp. 67-71.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Charles Townes, et al., “Report of the Task Force on Space,” 8 January 1969, in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 499-512.

[48] In fact, Agnew had little influence within the Nixon White House; his strong support for an ambitious post-Apollo program was potentially a liability for NASA, not an asset.

[49] Joan Hoff, “The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the US Space Program in the 1970s,” in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. Roger D. Launius and Howard McCurdy (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), pp. 92-132.

[50] Richard Nixon, “Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Administrator, NASA, and the Science Advisor,” 13 February 1969, in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 512-513.

[51] NASA History Division, Compilation of Historical Polling Data, Excel spreadsheet provided to author.

[52] Hoff, “The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the US Space Program in the 1970s,” pp. 92-132.

15 John M. Logsdon, “The Policy Process and Large-Scale Space Efforts,” Space Humanization Series (1979): pp. 65-79.

[54] Ibid.

[55] John M. Logsdon, “The Evolution of US Space Policy and Plans,” in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon, et al. (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 383-386.

[56] Space Task Group, “The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future,” September 1969, in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, ed. Logsdon et al (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1995, NASA SP-4407, Volume 1), pp. 522-525.

[57] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 250-253.

[58] Hoff, “The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the US Space Program in the 1970s,” pp. 93-95.

[59] Logsdon, “The Policy Process and Large-Scale Space Efforts,” pp. 74-75.

[60] The process of modifying a planet, moon, or other body to a more habitable atmosphere, temperature or ecology.

[61] Alcestis R. Oberg, “The Grass Roots of the Mars Conference,” in The Case for Mars, ed. Penelope Boston (San Diego, CA: American Astro nautical Society, 1984), pp. ix-xii; Robert Zubrin and Richard Wagner, The Case for Mars: The Plan to Settle the Red Planet and Why We Must (New York: The Free Press, 1996), pp. 70-74; Amy Reeves, “Space Oddities: Local Members of the Mars Underground Have Come Up for Air,” The Sun, 25 August 1999.

[62] Ibid.

23 Ibid.

80 Penelope J. Boston, et al., “Conference Summary,” in The Case for Man, ed. Penelope Boston (San Diego, CA: American Astronautical Society, 1984), pp. xiii-xxi.

[65] Ibid.

Ibid.

[67] John M. Logsdon, “The Evolution of US Space Policy and Plans,” p. 392.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Francis Scobee, Michael Smith, Judith Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, Ronald McNair, Gregory Jarvis, and Christa McAulliffe.

[70] National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier: An Exciting Vision of Our Next Fifty Years in Space (New York: Bantam Books, 1986).

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

33 Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] John Noble Wilford, Mars Beckons: The Mysteries, the Challenges, the Expectations of Our Next Great Adventure in Space (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), pp. 145-150.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Sally Ride, Leadership and Americas Future in Space: A Report to the Administrator, (Washington, DC: NASA, 1987).

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Howard E. McCurdy, The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, March 1992); Lyn Ragsdale, “Politics Not Science: The US Space Program in the Reagan and Bush Years,” in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), p. 161.

[81] Office of Exploration, Beyond Earth’s Boundaries: Питан Exploration of the Solar System in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: NASA, 1988); John Aaron, “NASA Press Conference Prepared Statement,” 19 December 1988.

[82] National Security Council, “National Security Decision Directive Number 42: National Space Policy,” 4 July 1982.

45 National Security Council, “Presidential Directive on National Space Policy,” 11 February 1988.

[84] Howard McCurdy interview via electronic-mail, 16 April 1999; John Logsdon interview via electronic-mail, 18 April 1999; Marcia Smith interview via electronic-mail, 19 April 1999.

[85] James Michener, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U. S. Civilian Space Policy: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, 96th Cong., 1st session, 1979.

[86] John Robert Greene, The Presidency of George Bush (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press,

2000), pp. 11-26.

11bid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] George Bush, “Remarks for the Space Shuttle Challenger Dedication,” 21 March 1987, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[90] Although Vice President Bush had no formal role in space policy making, he had been involved in this issue area in the months after the Challenger accident. One can also conjecture that the briefing

was intended to gain support for NASA programs from the likely Republican nominee in the following year’s presidential election.

[91] James Fletcher, “Briefing for the Vice President of the United States,” 10 August 1987, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[92] Ibid.

5 George Bush, “Excerpts of Remarks at George C. Marshall Space Flight Center,” 29 October 1987, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[94] George Bush, “Excerpts of Remarks at Redding, California,” 3 October 1988, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[95] James P. Pfiffner, “The Bush Transition: Symbols and Substance,” in Presidential Transitions: The Reagan to Bush Experience, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 62-72.

[96] Robert M. White and Frank Press to George Bush, December 1988, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering, Toward a New Era in Space: Realigning Policies to New Realities (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988).

[97] Ibid.; NASA Transition Office Contact Team, “Briefing Report to the NASA Administrator – Designate,” 20 January 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[98] NASA Transition Office Contact Team, “Briefing Report to the NASA Administrator-Designate,” 20 January 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[99] In 1988, Congress included language in NASA budget authorization that required the President to establish a National Space Council. The President was required to submit by 1 March 1989 a report that outlined the composition and functions of the Council, which was to employ not more then seven persons (including an executive secretary appointed by the President).

[100] NASA Transition Office Contact Team, “Briefing Report to the NASA Administrator-Designate,” 20 January 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[101] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 9 February 1989, Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 2002.)

[102] Senator Jake Garn to President George Bush, 16 February 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

15 Former Texas Sen. John Tower was tapped by President Bush to become defense secretary, but the nomination quickly ran into trouble as opponents questioned Tower’s business dealings with defense contractors. The confirmation hearings also brought Tower’s personal life squarely into the public eye, with some critics alleging he drank excessively. At one point, Tower pledged to quit drinking entirely if confirmed, but his appointment was rejected 53-47 by the Senate in March 1993.

[104] Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), p. 239.

[105] Sharen Shaw Johnson, “Capital Line,” USA Today, sec. 6A,3 March 1989.

[106] Stephan Kohashi interview via electronic mail, Washington, DC, 16 November 2004.

’ Kathy Sawyer, “Concern Rises Over Space Council’s Direction,” The Washington Post (9 March 1989): A23.

[108] Eliot Marshall, “An Arbitrator for Space Policy,” Science (10 March 1989): p. 1283.

[109] Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Dwayne A. Day, “Doomed to Fail: The Birth and Death of the Space Exploration Initiative,” Spaceflight (March 1995): pp. 79-83; “National Space Council Director Named, Report Sent to Congress,” Aerospace Daily (3 March 1989); Sawyer, “Concern Rises Over Space Council’s Direction,” A23; Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 179.

[110] Letter, James C. Fletcher to President George Bush, 9 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Memorandum, Joseph Hagin to Brent Scowcroft, 3 April 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[111] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 16 March 1989, Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by the Forum Club in Houston, Texas, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 19 August 2003.)

[112] Eight days later this theme was confirmed when the White House hosted the crew of STS-28,

which had successfully landed the shuttle Discovery the previous week at Edwards Air Force Base in California—the primary task of the mission had been the deployment of Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-4 (TDRS-4). In congratulating the crew, President Bush stated that “the story of Discovery is as… timeless as our history… it says that to Americans—nothing lies beyond our reach.” In his brief remarks, the President reaffirmed his commitment to the shuttle program, space science, and construction of the Space Station Freedom. He did not, however, mention human exploration beyond Earth orbit as one of the goals of his administration. [Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 24 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

25 John H. McElroy and Brent Scowcroft, A More Effective Civil Space Program (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989).

[114] Mark Albrecht interview, tape recording, Arlington, VA, 3 July 2003; “Quayle Puts Damper on Manned Mars/Moon Mission Prospects,” Defense Daily, 5 April 1989, pp. 22-3; Quayle, Standing Firm, pp. 177-190.AQ4

[115] Quayle, Standing Firm, pp. 177-190; Albrecht interview.

[116] Ibid.; Frank J. Murray, “Putting Man on Mars May be Bush’s Goal”, Washington Times, 20 July 1989, sec. A1; Howard McCurdy, The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Man (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1992), pp. 4-13; Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 181.

[117] Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 181.

[118] Albrecht interview.

[119] Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 12 April 1989, Bush Presidential Records, Bush Presidential Library; Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 181; Albrecht interview; Kathy Sawyer, “Bush Taps Truly to Head NASA: Former Astronaut Popular on Hill,” The Washington Post (13 April 1989).

[120] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 January 1989, Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Richard Hatrison Truly To Be Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 2002.)

[121] Richard Malow interview via tape recording, Washington, DC, 25 October 2004.

[122] Kohashi interview.

[123] Kathy Sawyer, “Bush Taps Truly to Head NASA: Former Astronaut Popular on Hill,” The Washington Post, 13 April 1989; Warren E. Leary, “Bush Chooses Former Astronaut to Head NASA, in a First,” The New York Times, 13 April 1989.

[124] On 23 June, the U. S. Senate confirmed the nomination of Admiral Truly. Along with the confirmation vote, the Senate passed S. 1180, legislation that would allow him to retain his status, rank, and grade as a retired military officer and guaranteeing his retirement benefits from his Navy service after he retired from civilian life. The bill also provided that Admiral Truly, as the NASA Administrator, shall be “subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative… ” if he were not a retired Navy officer. Six days later, OMB Director Darman sent a memorandum to President Bush recommending that the latter authorize the appointment of Admiral Truly and sign S. 1180—the next day James Cicconi of the Office of Personnel approved that recommendation and sent the bill to President Bush for his signature, which was affixed in the normal course of business before the deadline of 10 July 1989. [Memorandum, Richard Darman to President Bush, 29 June 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

[125] On 15 March, the Office of the Vice President had submitted to OMB Director Richard Darman a proposed Executive Order for establishing the National Space Council. The draft executive order stated that the goal of the space council was to "provide a coordinated process for developing a national

space program and for overseeing the implementation of national space policy and related activities______ ”

The Vice President, who would act as the primary space policy advisor to the President, would chair the council. The remaining members of the body would be the: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Transportation, OMB Director, White House Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence, and the NASA Administrator. Upon the request of the Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Presidential Science Advisor, and heads of other executive departments and agencies could also be called upon to participate in meetings. The executive order also provided for the creation of the Vice Presidents Space Policy Advisory Board. This committee would be composed of private citizens appointed to advise the Vice President on national space policy issues. Vice Presidential Counselor Diane Weinstein wrote Darman that “given the urgent need for the Council to begin exercising its critical responsibilities as soon as possible…[the] Vice President recommends that the President sign the enclosed proposed Executive Order establishing the National Space Council.” A week later, Darman received a memorandum from Bonnie Newman, Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, concurring with the OMB Directors recommendation to provide funding to the National Space Council under the auspices of Public Law 100-440, which provided budget resources to the Executive Office of the President for “Unanticipated Needs.” Darman forwarded the memorandum to President Bush recommending an allocation of $181,000, which would allow the Space Council to begin operations in fiscal year 1989. [Letter with an attached draft Executive Order, Diane Weinstein to Richard Darman, 15 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Memorandum, J. Bonnie Newman to Richard G. Darman, 22 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Memorandum, Richard G. Darman to President George Bush, 23 March 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

[126] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 21 April 1989, Remarks on Signing the Executive Order Establishing the National Space Council, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 2002).

4:1 The actual executive order had been amended somewhat since its original submittal to OMB the previous month. There were two additions made to the full membership of the council—the Secretary

of the Treasury and the President’s Science Advisor. The functions of the council were also fine tuned, and were listed in the final order as follows:

A. The Council shall advise and assist the President on national space policy and strategy…

B. The Council is directed to:

[128] Review United States Government space policy, including long-range goals, and develop a strategy for national space activities;

2. Develop recommendations for the President on space policy and space-related issues;

3. Monitor and coordinate implementation of the objectives of the Presidents national space policy by executive departments and agencies; and

4. Foster close coordination, cooperation, and technology and information exchange among the civil, national security, and commercial space sectors…

C. The creation and operation of the Council shall not interfere with existing lines of authority and responsibilities in the departments and agencies.

The rest of the document was substantively the same as the draft order—including provisions detailing: the responsibilities of the chairman, the national space policy planning process, the establishment of the Vice Presidents Space Policy Advisory Board, and the requirement to “submit an annual report setting forth its assessment of and recommendations for the space policy and strategy of the United States Government.” [Executive Order Establishing the National Space Council, 21 April 1989, Bush Presidential Records, Bush Presidential Library.]

44 One could argue that Admiral Truly was not actually a committed policy entrepreneur for human spaceflight beyond Earth orbit, and that in fact he worked against the program. Regardless, he became one of the key players in the SEI process and was heavily involved in assembling the administration plan and trying to sell it on Capitol Hill. It seems that this qualifies him as a policy entrepreneur for the purposes of this manuscript.

[129] McCurdy, The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars, pp. 12-13; Albrecht interview; Frank Martin interview by Howard E. McCurdy, in The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1992).

[130] Ibid.

[131] Douglas O’Handley interview via electronic mail, Morgan Hill, CA, 22 November 2004.

[132] Aaron Cohen interview via electronic mail, College Station, Texas, 9 December 2004.

45 Martin interview.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Frank Martin interview by Howard E. McCurdy, in The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1992); Mark Craig, interview by Howard E. McCurdy, in The Decision to Send Humans Back to the Moon and on to Mars (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 1992).

[136] O’Handley interview.

[137] Ibid.; Mark Craig, “A Scenario For Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars,” presented to Admiral Richard Truly on 13 June 1989.

[138] Shuttle-C was a 1980s proposal to use the Shuttle s infrastructure to create a heavy launch vehicle. This vehicle would have used the Space Shuttle s solid rocket boosters, external tank, and main engines. Instead of a crew-carrying orbiter, however, it would have used an expendable cargo carrier.

[139] Craig, “A Scenario For Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars.”

[140] O’Handley interview.

[141] Ibid.

[142] O’Handley interview.

[143] This budget estimate had been calculated by OMB cost analyst Norine Noonan, in consultation with NASA.

[144] Martin interview; Craig interview.

[145] Martin interview.

[146] O’Handley interview.

Martin interview.

[148] NASA, “Civil Space Exploration Initiative,” presented to Vice President Dan Quayle on 15 June 1989.

[149] Ibid.; Craig interview; Albrecht interview.

[150] Martin interview.

[151] Craig interview.

[152] O’Handley interview.

65 Ibid.

[154] Bob Davis, “Quiet Clout: How a House Staffer Wields Great Power Over Policy Decisions,” The Wall Street Journal (30 June 1989), p. 1.

[155] Ibid.

[156] Malow interview.

[157] Martin interview.

4 Kohashi interview.

[159] Martin interview.

[160] Malow interview.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Martin interview.

[163] Albrecht interview; Karen Hosier, “Bush Unveils Moon, Mars Plans But Withholds Specifics,” The Baltimore Sun, 21 July 1989-

[164] Ibid.

[165] Quayle, Standing Firm, pp. 177-190.

[166] Craig Covault, “Manned Lunar Base, Mars Initiative Raised in Secret White House Review,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 July 1989), pp. 24-26; Michael Mecham, “House Panel Proposes $1-Billion Cut for NASA,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 July 1989), p. 26.

[167] Public Papers ofthe Presidents of the United States, 20 July 1989, Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 18 May 2002.)

[168] Press Briefing, Admiral Richard H. Truly, 20 July 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[169] Ibid.

88 Ibid.

[171] Residence Event Task Sheet, Barbecue to Commemorate the 20 th Anniversary of the Landing on the Moon, 7 July 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Menu, Barbecue Lunch: 20th Anniversary of the First Moon Walk, 20 July 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[172] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 July 1989, Remarks at a White House Barbecue on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landings http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 6 June 2002.)

[173] Bernard Weinraub, “President Call for Mars Mission and a Moon Base,” The New York Times, 21 July 1989, sec. A1.

[174] Ibid.

[175] David C. Morrison, “To Shoot the Moon, and Mars Beyond,” Government Executive (September 1989), pp. 12-22.

[176] Weinraub, “President Call for Mars Mission and a Moon Base.”

[177] Ibid.; Karen Hosier, “Bush Unveils Moon, Mars Plans But Withholds Specifics,” The Baltimore Sun, 21 July 1989.

[178] Morrison, “To Shoot the Moon, and Mars Beyond.”

[179] Roy Harris Jr., “Firms Rejoice Over Reborn U. S. Space Program,” The Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1989.

[180] O’Handley interview.

[181] Cohen interview.

[182] O’Handley interview.

[183] Morrison, “To Shoot the Moon, and Mars Beyond.”

[184] Albrecht interview; Cohen interview.

[185] Albrecht interview.

[186] Martin interview.

[187] James Fisher and Andrew Lawler, “NASA, Space Council Split Over Moon-Mars Report,” Space News (11 December 1989), p. 10.

[188] Ibid.

[189] Press Release 89-126, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 27 July 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[190] Wendell Mendell interview via electronic-mail, 15 September 2003.

15 Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), p. 240.

[192] Albrecht interview.

[193] Cohen interview.

[194] Mark Craig interview via electronic-mail, 12 September 2003.

[195] Martin interview.

[196] O’Handley interview.

[197] Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly, p. 240.

[198] Malow interview.

[199] O’Handley interview.

[200] Ibid.

23 Ibid.

70 Craig interview, 12 September 2003; Cohen interview, 9 December 2004.

[203] Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 20 November 1989, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Historical Archives, 2-2 to 2-5; NASA Administrator Richard Truly to Vice President Dan Quayle, 5 September 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Craig interview, 12 September 2003; O’Handley interview.

[204] O’Handley interview.

[205] Ibid.

[206] On 2 November, President Bush signed National Space Policy Directive 1—a slight revision of the policy issued by the Reagan Administration 20 months earlier. The expansion of human presence and activity “beyond Earth orbit into the solar system” remained one of the nations primary goals in space. Considering the administrations desire to have SEI provide a long-term direction for the American space program, however, the document didn’t place a great deal of emphasis on the new initiative. Within the section dealing directly with civil space policy, human exploration was relegated to the bottom of a list of stated objectives for NASA—with Earth science, space science, technology development, and space applications at the top of the list. Even when addressing human exploration more specifically, the policy highlighted completion of Space Station Freedom and downplayed human missions beyond Earth orbit. Finally, the directive provided no specific guidance with regard to implementing the Moon-Mars initiative. [National Space Policy Directive 1, National Space Council, 2 November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 16 November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library ]

[207] It was not officially released until 20 November 1989.

[208] Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 20 November 1989, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Historical Archives, cover letter.

[209] Ibid., Preface.

[210] Ibid., section 3, The Human Exploration Initiative.

[211] Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The Human Exploration Initiative.

[212] Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The Human Exploration Initiative.

[213] For cargo flights, an integrated configuration of two excursion vehicles is launched. Upon approach to Mars, the two vehicles separate and enter Mars orbit using aero-brakes. The first cargo flight in the Mars outpost mission sequence delivers the habitat facility to the outpost site.

[214] Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The

Human Exploration Initiative.

[216] The Advanced Launch System (ALS) emerged in the mid-1980s as the rocket that would be used to deploy the space-based elements of the Strategic Defense Initiative program. However, by late 1989, it had become increasingly apparent that the requirements for the ALS program had largely disappeared. The initial phase of SDI would be deployed using existing Titan 4 and Atlas 2 rockets, and the launch requirements for subsequent phases of SDI deployment were too vague to require immediate development of ALS.

[217] Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, section 3, The Human Exploration Initiative.

[218] Ibid.

[219] Ibid., section 4, Reference Approaches.

[220] Ibid., Cost Summary.

[221] Ibid.

[222] Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly> p. 241.

[223] Albrecht interview.

[224] Warren E. Leary, “Plans for Space Are Realistic, Official Says,” New York Times (17 December 2003).

[225] O’Handley interview.

5:1 Cohen interview.

[227] Ibid.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Talking Points, NASA Moon/Mars Database Report, National Space Council, 14 November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Albrecht interview.

[230] Ibid.

[231] Albrecht interview.

55 Kathy Sawyer, “Quayle to Give NASA Competition on Ideas for Space Exploration,” The Washington Post (17 November 1989).

[233] Ibid.

[234] O’Handley interview.

[235] Senior Administration Official interview via electronic-mail, 5 November 2003.

James Fisher and Andrew Lawler, “NASA, Space Council Split Over Moon-Mars Report,” Space News (11 December 1989), p. 10.

[237] On 4 December, Vice President Quayle sent a letter to Dr. Frank Press, Chairman of the National Research Council (NRC), officially requesting that his organization conduct a review of the 90-Day Study. Quayle requested that the NRC consider alternative approaches, or a range of options, for human exploration of the solar system. He included a list of questions that he hoped the NRC would address in its review, focusing on whether the 90-Day Study addressed the widest range of technically credible approaches for implementing SEI. The letter concluded by requesting that the NRC complete the review by the end of February 1990. [ Vice President Quayle to Dr. Frank Press, 4 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

[238] Albrecht interview.

[239] Malow interview.

87 Ibid.

[241] Kohashi interview.

65 Admiral Richard Truly to Richard G. Darman, 27 November 1989, Library of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chief Financial Officer.

[243] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Budget Estimates: Fiscal Year 1991, Volume 1,” Library of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chief Financial Officer.

[244] Albrecht interview.

[245] Schedule Proposal, Mark Albrecht to CeCe Kramer, 9 November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Memorandum, Mark Albrecht, 30 November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Andrew Lawler, “Panel: Rationale Missing for Moon-Mars Proposal,” Space News (11 December 1989); Brad Mitchell to Andy Card, 4 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[246] Ibid.

[247] Kathy Sawyer, “En Route to Space Goal, Groups Diverge: Friction Between NASA and Quayle s National Council Erupts in “Mars Wars,”’ The Washington Post (11 December 1989).

[248] James Fisher and Andrew Lawler, “NASA, Space Council Split Over Moon-Mars Report,” Space News (11 December 1989).

[249] Simon P. Worden to the National Space Council, “Strategic Planning for the Space Exploration Initiative: The How, What, and When?” 14 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[250] Courtney Stadd to Brad Mitchell, Ed McNally, and Joe Heizer, “Space Exploration Initiative,” 18 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[251] Vice President Quayle to Admiral Richard Truly 19 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

75 Press Release 89-185, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 21 December 1989, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; William J. Broad, “NASA Losing 30- Year Monopoly In Planning for Moon and Mars,” The New York Times (15 January 1990).

[253] Admiral Truly did not formally reply to the White House direction until 31 January 1990. In a letter to Vice President Quayle, he provided details of a process for soliciting outside strategic approaches for SEI implementation. This process would include the release of a NASA Research Announcement. The space agency would specifically seek inputs from professional societies (including the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics—AIAA) and other federal agencies. The plan also envisioned a national conference that would be jointly sponsored by NASA and AIAA. All of these efforts would be coordinated through a newly created Office of Aeronautics, Exploration, and Technology. [Admiral Richard Truly to Vice President Quayle, 31 January 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.]

[254]A few years later, NASA Administrator Dan Goldin, who would become the second administrator appointed by the Bush administration, made “faster, better, cheaper” the mantra of NASA. The concept emerged earlier, however, as the administration was trying to “infuse that kind of SDI mentality” into the SEI alternative generation process. [Albrecht interview]

[255] Talking Points, Meeting with Republican Members of House Science Committee, National Space Council, 22 January 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[256] White House Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the United States of American, Fiscal Year 1991,” 29 January 1990, pp. 49-82.

[257] “NASA Budget Press Conference: Statement of Richard H. Truly, NASA Administrator,” NASA News (29 January 1990); John Noble Wilford, “Budget for the Space Agency Sets Broader Course in Exploration,” The New York Times (2 February 1990), p. 19.

[258] Ibid.

[259] Committee on Human Exploration of Space, Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA’s 90- Day Study and Alternatives (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990); Press Release, National Research Council, 1 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[260] Ibid.

[261] Albrecht interview.

88 O’Handley interview.

[263] John Robert Greene, The Presidency of George Bush (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), pp. 89-106.

[264] Albrecht interview.

[265] Mark Albrecht to National Space Council, 16 January 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Mark Albrecht to National Space Council, 2 February 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[266] Presidential Decision on the Space Exploration Initiative, National Space Council, 21 February 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 8 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; “Cold Water on Mars, The Economist (10 March 1990), pp. 94-95; “Bush Calls for Two Proposals for Missions to Moon, Mars,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (12 March 1990), pp. 18- 19; Memorandum, Mark Albrecht to Ed Rogers, 13 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[267] Albrecht interview.

[268] Malow interview.

[269] “Bush Seen Cooperating with Soviets on Moon-Mars Project,” Dow Jones News Service (18 January 1990).

[270] “International Cooperation in the President’s Space Exploration Initiative,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 30 March 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

5 William J. Broad, “Bush Open to Space Voyages with Soviet Union,” The New York Times (3 April 1990), sec. C2; Craig Covault, “White House Approves Soviet Talks on Moon/Mars Exploration Initiative,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (9 April 1990), p. 24; James R. Asker, “NRCWarns U. S. Against Joint Missions to Mars With Soviets,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (23 April 1990).

[272] House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, “Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1991,” in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Htmdred First Congress, Second Session: Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies—Part IV: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 50-57; pp. 136-143.

[273] Andrew Lawler, “Space Summit Set for May: Bush, Quayle Invite Members of Congress to Talk Space,” Space News (23 April 1990), p. 1.

[274] Mark Albrecht to Fred Mcclure, 16 April 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Jim Cicconi to President Bush, 30 April 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[275] In 1986, Senator Matsunaga wrote The Mars Project, Journey Beyond the Cold War, an unabashed call for a wide-variety of joint space missions with the Soviet Union and other nations. Matsunaga was one of the U. S. Senate’s most outspoken proponents of outer space development.

[276] The congressional participants included: Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS), Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR), Senator John Danforth (R-MO), Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Senator Jake Garn (R-UT), Senator Howell Heflin (D-AL), House Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA), House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO), House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Representative Silvio Conte (R-MA), Representative Robert Traxler (D-MI), Representative Bill Green (R-NY), Representative Robert Roe (D-NJ), and Representative Robert Walker (R-PA).

[277] The White House participants included: Chief of Staff John Sununu, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Jim Cicconi, Communications Director David Demarest, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, NSC Executive Secretary Mark Albrecht, and Chief of Staff to the Vice President Bill Kristol.

[278] Talking Points for the President, Congressional Leadership Meeting on Space, 27 April 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[279] Ibid.; Albrecht interview.

[280] Senior Congressional Aide interview via electronic mail, Washington, DC, 15 December 2004.

[281] Albrecht interview.

[282] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 11 May 1990, Remarks at the Texas Acrl University Commencement Ceremony in Kingsville, Texas, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 2 January 2003).

[283] Janet Cawley, “Bush Goal: Man on Mars by 2020,” The Chicago Tribune (12 May 1990); James Gerstenzang, “Bush Sets 2019 for Mars Landing,” The Philadelphia Inquirer (12 May 1990).

[284] John Noble Wilford, “Bush Sets Target For Mars Landing: He Seeks to Send Astronauts to Planet by Year 2020,” The New York Times (12 May 1990).

[285] Kathy Sawyer, “Bush Urges Mars Landing By 2019: Democrats Point to Money Problems,” The Washington Post (12 May 1990).

[286] Malow interview.

[287] O’Handley interview.

[288] Editorial Board, “Empty Rhetoric Fuels Mars Talk,” The Statesman Journal (16 May 1990).

[289] Нешу Gay, “Reaching For Stars, Er, Mars,” The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (24 May 1990), sec. A15.

[290] Maria S. Barth to President George Bush, 24 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[291] Mark Albrecht to Vice President Dan Quayle, “Meeting with Lt. General Tom Stafford,” 31 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Fact Sheet, “Space

Exploration Initiative Outreach Program,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 31 May 1990, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Historical Archives; “Chronology of the President’s Space Exploration Initiative,” National Space Council, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[292] J – Sebastian Sinisi, “Forum Delegates Confident,” Denver Post (11 June 1990), sec.4B.

[293] James Gerstenzang, “Bush Denounces NASA Fund Cuts,” The Los Angeles Times (21 June 1990),

p. 28.

[294] Briefing, “White House Briefings on the Space Exploration Initiative,” 8 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Charles Bacarisse and Sihan Siv to Fred McClure, “Briefing for Key Congressional Staff on NASA’s Space Exploration Initiative,” 10 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Charles Bacarisse to Bob Grady, “Briefings for Key Constituent Groups on the Space Exploration Initiative,” 5 June 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Charles Bacarisse and Sichan Siv to Cece Kramer, 23 May 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[295] “Tour of Hubble Space Telescope Orbital Verification Engineering Control Center,” Ede Holiday, 20 June 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[296] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 June 1990, The President’s News Conference in Huntsville, Alabama, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu/papers/ (accessed 2 January 2003).

– Mark Albrecht to Jim Cicconi, “Background Materials, June 20 Marshall Space Flight Center Event,” 19 June 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

>b Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 20 June 1990, Remarks to Employees of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, http://bushlibrary. tamu. edu /papers/ (accessed 2 January 2003).

[299] Earlier in the week, Roll Call had dedicated an entire issue to the space program, with opposing views expressed on SEI from Senator Jake Garn (pro) and Senator AI Gore (con).

[300] A radio actuality is a group of sound bites sent out to radio stations to be used in news reports.

35 “Moon/Mars Initiative,” 19 June 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[302] O’Handley interview.

[303] Warren E. Leary, “Hubble Telescope Loses Large Part of Optical Ability: Most Complex

Instrument in Space is Crippled by Flaw in a Mirror,” The New York Times (27 June 1990), sec. Al; Bob Davis, “NASA Finds Hubble Mirror is Defective,” The Wall Street Journal (28 June 1990).

[304] Joyce Price, “Chief Calls NASA Funding ‘Crucial for U. S. Survival,” The Washington Times (3 July 1990).

[305] John Burgess, “Can U. S. Get Things Right Anymore? Hubble Telescope, Space Shuttle Problems Raise Questions About American Technology,” The Washington Post (3 July 1990).

[306] Malow interview.

[307] U. S. House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Report 101-556: Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1991,” 26 June 1990; U. S. House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “H. R. 5158,” 26 June 1990.

[308] Dan Morgan, “Panel Boosts NASA Funds 17 Percent: Moon-Mars Mission Cut $300 Million, Higher-Priority Items Backed,” The Washington Post (27 June 1990), sec. AA.

[309] James W. Brosnan, “Senate Panel Cuts Funds for Mars Trip From NASA Budget,” The Commercial Appeal (28 June 1990), sec. A12.

[310] Albrecht interview.

[311] Quayle, Standing Firm, p. 184.

[312] Mark Albrecht to Vice President Quayle, “Meeting on Air Force II with Space Experts”, 10 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Mark Albrecht to Vice President Quayle, 13 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Press Release, The White House, Office of the Vice President, 16 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; “White House Considers Inquiry Into NASA: Spokesman Says Panel May Redirect Agency,” The Washington Post (15 July 1990); Press Release, The White House, Office of the Vice President, 25 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Mark Albrecht to Arnold Kanter, 25 July 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[313] U. S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Report 101-474: Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1991,” 26 September 1990; David Rogers, “Senate Panel Cuts Most New Funding for NASA Project,” The Wall Street Journal (14 September 1990), sec. A16; Helen Dewar, “Budget Vote Disappoints Space Backers,” The Washington Post (26 September 1990), sec. A10.

[314] U. S. House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Report 101-900: Making Appropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and for Sundry Independent Agencies, Commissions, Corporations, and Offices for Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991, and for Other Purposes,” 18 October 1990.

[315] Ibid.; ‘High Hopes Plunge Under an Onslaught of Budget Cuts,” The Associated Press (23 December 1990); Malow interview.

[316] Kohashi interview.

[317] U. S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2d sess., “Public Law 101-611,” 16 November 1990.

[318] David S. Broder and Bob Woodward, “When the Vice President is Chairman: Debating Direction of Space Programs,” The Washington Post (9 January 1992), sec. A16.

[319] Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US. Space Program (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990); Mark Albrecht to Vice President Quayle, 7 December 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[320] See note above.

[321] Talking Points, “Augustine Committee Press Conference,” 10 December 1990, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[322] Quayle, Standing Firm, pp. 185-186.

[323] Albrecht interview.

[324] Malow interview.

[325] Mark Carreau, “Panel Wants to Phase Out Space Shuttle: White House Backs Changes That Will Transform NASA,” The Houston Chronicle (11 December 1990), p. 1.

[326] Robert C. Cowen, “Manned Space Programs Ger Message: Throttle Back,” Christian Science Monitor (19 December 1990), p. 1.

[327] America at the Threshold: America’s Space Exploration Initiative, Report of the Synthesis Group on Americans Space Exploration Initiative,” May 1991; David S. E Portree, Romance to Reality: Moon and Man Plans, available from members. aol. com/dsportreeVHl l. htm (accessed 10 February 2003).

[328] Warren E. Leary, “Panel Says Much Research is Needed Now to Reach Mars by 2014,” The New York Times (12 June 1991), p. 25; Kathy Sawyer, “Build Nuclear-Powered Rocket for Mars Mission, Panel Urges; Experts’ Report Offers NASA ‘New Approaches,’” The Washington Post (12 June 1991), sec. A2; Edwin Chen, “U. S. Mars Visit by 2014, Station on Moon Urged: Presidential Panel Unveils a Controversial Program that Includes Nuclear-Powered Rockets,” The Los Angeles Times (12 June 1991), p. 1; Paul Hoversten, “Panel Proposes Paths to Moon, Mars,” Gannet News Service (11 June 1991).

[329] Bryan Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), pp. 239-243.

[330] Ibid.

6? Richard H. Truly to President George Bush, 10 February 1992, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; President George Bush to Richard H. Truly, 12 February 1992, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Kathy Sawyer, “Truly Fired as NASA Chief, Apparently at Quayle Behest: Ex-Astronaut Feuded With Space Council,” The Washington Post (13 February 1992), sec. Al; William J. Broad, “NASA Chief Quits in Policy Conflict,” The New York Times (13 February 1992), sec. Al; Craig Covault, “White House to Restructure Space Program: Truly Fired,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (17 February 1992), p. 18.

[332] Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir, pp. 243-245; W. Henry Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA (Arlington, VA: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 2001), pp. 14-15; Albrecht interview.

[333] Ibid.

[334] Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Mir, pp.243-245; Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA, pp. 14-15; Kathy Sawyer, “NASA Nominee Praised at Confirmation Hearing: Committee Members Warn Goldin About Likely Budgetary, Political Problems Ahead,” The Washington Post (28 March 1992), sec. A6; Ede Holiday to President George Bush, “Swearing-in Ceremony for NASA Administrator Dan S. Goldin”, 1 April 1992, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

[335] Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA, p. 17.

[336] Panetta had been trying to cancel the station program for years while serving in the House of Representatives.

[337] Burrough, Dragonfly: NASA and the Crisis Aboard Miry pp. 262-264.

[338] Ibid.

[339] Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA, p. 20.

[340] The White House, National Science and Technology Council, “Fact Sheet: National Space Policy,” 19 September 1996; Brian McGrory, “Clinton Curbs Mars Project: Drops Manned Mission, Backs Robotic Probes,” The Boston Globe (20 September 1996), sec. A25; Kathy Sawyer, “White House Releasing New National Space Policy: Robots, Not Astronauts, May Travel to Mars,” The Washington Post (19 September 1996), sec. A29.

[341] Parsons, Public Policy, pp. 193-207.

[342] These interviews were conducted in an attempt to better understand policy making within two issues areas, health care policy and transportation policy.

[343] Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 231-240.

[344] The New York Times Index was also used to provide supplemental data.

[345] Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, pp – 253-259-

? Polls are designed to provide interested parties with information estimating how the mass public would respond to specific closed-ended options, such as “should the government fund human trips to Mars?” The fundamental principle of polling is that a sample population can represent the entire population if there is a sufficient sample size and the chosen methodology ensures a randomly selected sample. Opinion polls are utilized to measure: values, basic beliefs held by individuals that are relatively immune to change and perform a vital role in individuals’ lives and choices; opinions, judgments about current issues and policy alternatives; and attitudes, a category between values and opinions representing well thought out views utilized to evaluate new issues and alternatives. While polls measuring values and attitudes are useful because they provide information regarding long-term beliefs, the vast majority of polls relevant to policy makers assess opinions regarding contemporary policy issues. [Mathew Mendelsohn and Jason Brent, “Understanding Polling Methodology,” ISUMA (Autumn 2001): pp. 131-136.]

[347] Baumgartner and Jones found that the new CD-ROM format of the CIS annual permitted for efficient searches of policy issues—primarily because hearings are cross-referenced, reducing the possibility of double counting specific hearings, and streamlined selection of keywords. The dataset that was produced included a wide variety of information including the year of the hearing, the committee holding the hearing, and a summary of the topics discussed.

[348] Bryan Jones, John Wilkerson, and Frank Baumgartner, “Policy Agendas Project,” Center for American Politics and Public Policy, available from depts. washington. edu/ampol/navresearch/ agendasproject. shtml; (accessed 18 December 2001.)

[349] In 1957, the Public Papers series was created to provide an official compilation of Presidential letters, addresses, speeches, proclamations, executive orders, and other publicly issued materials. Volumes dealing with the Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations are incorporated into the series. In addition, the Clinton papers are now available online and there are plans to expand online coverage to include all presidential papers. The information included in the Public Papers is indexed in two ways: by subject and by name. The index entry for each subject contains a word or phrase that identifies the topic and one or more page numbers.

[350] Measured by tabulating the number of space-related addresses and speeches delivered (and catalogued in the Public Papers of the President series) by the president in a given year.

[351] Measured by tabulating the number of space-related Congressional hearings held (and catalogued by the Congressional Information Service) in a given year.

[352] This database also included a few studies conducted by national commissions (e. g. National Commission on Space), academic institutions, and interest groups.

[353] Portree’s goals for the Romance to Reality site were fourfold: to educate interested parties about the challenges and opportunities of exploring the Moon and Mars; to make the ideas of engineers and scientists widely available to the mass public; to provide an exciting glimpse of possible futures by looking into the past; and to foster the construction of a future that includes human activity on both the moon and Mars.

[354] Since this analysis was conducted, Portree has changed the format of the Romance to Reality: Moon and Mars Plans website. Thus, my results are based on data taken from the website as it existed in March 2002.

[355] President Reagan’s 1984 State of the Union, where he announced his decision to approve the Space Station Program, was the clear exception.

[356] On 14 January 2004, President George W. Bush proposed a long-range plan for the American space program that included phasing out the aging Space Shuttle, redefining a partially constructed Space Station, and developing a crew exploration vehicle to return humans permanently to the Moon.

[357] Malow interview.

[358] W. Henry Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA (Arlington, VA: Price WaterhouseCoopers, 2001), p. 11.

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