Policy Streams, SE1, and the Space Policy Community

Although the original intention was to primarily utilize the Policy Streams Model to guide the historical analysis of SEI’s failure, in writing this book it became increas­ingly clear that the theory could also be used to provide insights regarding important actors within the space policy community. The methodological core of Kingdons book were hundreds of interviews conducted over four years with congressional staffers, upper-level civil servants, political appointees, presidential staffers, lobby­ists, journalists, consultants, academics, and researchers.[342] One objective of these interviews was to determine which players were important in a given policy com­munity.[343] Due to resource limitations for this book, it was not possible to conduct a large number of comprehensive interviews. Instead, a survey was created to identify influential actors within the space policy community. This survey was circulated to a population of civil servants, presidential staff, lobbyists, academics, researchers, and members of industry. Those surveyed were asked to rate the importance of given actors within the community. This direct inquiry allowed for accurate coding of responses into one of four categories: very important, somewhat important, little importance, or no importance. The goals were twofold. First, to determine who the most influential players are within the space arena. Second, to determine whether SEI’s policy entrepreneurs effectively engaged key space policy community actors during the initiatives agenda setting and alternative generation processes.

No single actor has the same ability to set the space agenda as the president. Eighty-three percent of those surveyed considered the president very or somewhat important—very important represented 59% (see Table on next page). Although President Bush wasn’t heavily involved in SEI’s development, he endowed Vice Pres­ident Quayle with the authority to push forward the initiative. Before ascending to the presidency, Bush was an outspoken proponent of the American space program and was already leaning toward a commitment to human exploration beyond Earth orbit. Armed with a presidential mandate to fashion a long-term strategy, Quayle was able to force SEI onto the national agenda. Throughout the agenda setting pro­cess, he was the crucial policy entrepreneur advocating for the initiative.

Vice President Quayle was aided in this effort by National Space Council Execu­tive Secretary Mark Albrecht. Within the space policy arena, presidential staffers were collectively among the most frequently discussed actors. Ninety-eight percent of those surveyed considered the presidential staff very or somewhat important— very important represented 74%. During the Bush administration, the staff had more influence over the space policy agenda than at any time in the history of the space program. This was primarily due to the broad role of the Space Council. Combined with budget and policy analysts from OMB, OSTP, and the NSC, there was arguably more attention given to space issues than under any other presidential administration. The centrality of Mark Albrecht and Richard Darman as key policy entrepreneurs for SEI provides evidence of staffer influence. Although strong presi­dential support was a requisite component for pushing the initiative onto the national agenda, having a dedicated staff working on these issues was an important factor.

Presidential appointees were also among the most frequently discussed actors in the agenda setting process. Ninety-six percent of those surveyed considered presi­dential appointees very or somewhat important—-very important represented 81%. As NASA Administrator, Admiral Truly was heavily relied upon to advocate on SEI’s behalf. Although several commentators have questioned whether he was ever sincerely supportive of the undertaking, he was critically important in shaping the proposal that was eventually embraced by Vice President Quayle. The full member­ship of the Space Council added to the influence of political appointees under the Bush administration. With regard to SEI, however, these cabinet-level officials were not heavily engaged during the agenda setting process.

GOVERNMENT ACTORS	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not Important
President	59%	24%	13%	4%
Presidential Staff	74	24	2	0
Presidential Appointees	81	15	4	0
Civil Servants	28	50	22	0
Congress	36	57	7	0
Congressional Staff	42	50	8	0

Importance of Government Actors in Agenda Setting

Congress is among the most frequently discussed actors within the space policy arena, although it was seen as significantly less important than the administra­tion—the opposite of what Kingdon found when looking at social and economic policy. Ninety-three percent of those surveyed considered Congress very or some­what important—but very important only represented 36%. Kingdon found that when a presidential administration decides to put forth a proposal, consulting with

Congress can be crucial for the eventual adoption of the initiative—although this doesn’t necessarily mean it won’t otherwise reach the national agenda. The Bush administration overlooked the importance of conferring with Congress when con­sidering SEI. Although Quayle and Truly did brief key members of Congress, this was only after the initiative had been formulated and the decision had been made to go forward. There was never any effort to create a coalition of congressional sup­porters or to engage potential congressional policy entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the administration did not adjust any of its plans based on the reactions of the Con­gress—particularly in the case of important staffers. Within the space sector, these staffers were equally important as members of Congress. Ninety-two percent of those surveyed considered congressional staffers very or somewhat important—very important represented 42%. This significant influence is probably due to the fact that staffers can spend more time gaining an understanding of the relevant technical details. Similar to congressional members, the value of obtaining staffer support was overlooked by key policy entrepreneurs within the administration.4

For the most part, non-governmental actors were not considered to be influential in agenda setting within the space policy community. The primary exception was the aerospace industry and interest groups representing those companies, although even this group was considered far less important than government actors. Professional and public interest groups, academics and researchers, mass public opinion, and the media were all seen as having limited significance. The SEI case study appears to be consistent with these general findings. The White Fiouse briefed industry leaders before launching the initiative, but the less than enthusiastic response did not sway the administration from its course. Likewise, although several influential academics and researchers were briefed to gauge reaction to the initiative, they did not participate in SEI’s development. The media and public opinion played no part in bringing SEI to the national agenda.

NONGOVERNMENT ACTORS	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not Important
Interest Groups: Industry	16%	66%	18%	0%
Interest Groups: Professional	2	38	56	4
Interest Groups: Advocacy	4	27	47	22
Academics & Researchers	2	49	42	7
Media	5	46	40	9
Industry	16	62	18	4
Mass Public Opinion	7	38	50	5

Importance of Non-Government Actors in Agenda Setting

The president cannot dominate alternative generation in the same way as agenda setting. This appears to be particularly true within the space arena, where the sci­entific and technical options require special training and significant effort. Only forty-one percent of those surveyed considered the president very or somewhat important—very important represented 13%. This lack of control over alternatives was one of the most important factors confronting successful adoption and imple­mentation of SEI. Due to a lack of in-house expertise, President Bush and Vice President Quayle were forced to turn to NASA to generate options for the explora­tion initiative. The agency, however, did not produce actual alternatives. Instead, the agency chose to put forward different timelines for the same basic approach. The lack of internal technical capability meant Bush and Quayle were largely at the mercy of NASA bureaucrats.

GOVERNMENT ACTORS	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not Important
President	13%	28%	42%	17%
Presidential Staff	49	38	11	2
Presidential Appointees	74	22	4	0
Civil Servants	60	33	7	0
Congress	24	49	27	0
Congressional Staff	33	51	16	0

Importance of Government Actors in Alternative Generation

The presidential staff is considered to be among the most important actors in alternative generation. Eighty-seven percent of those surveyed considered the presidential staff very or somewhat important—very important represented 49% percent. Kingdon contended that the staff has sway because it is able to “engage in the detailed negotiations—with departments, the Hill, and the major inter­est groups—that will produce the Administrations proposals and that will clarify the Administrations bargaining positions.”5 In the case of SEI, the Space Council actually abdicated its authority to direct the alternative generation process when it allowed NASA to conduct the 90-Day Study in a policy vacuum. Without clear direction from the Council regarding key budgetary constraints, the space agency was allowed to produce a plan that didn’t match up with political reality.

Political appointees were mentioned as the most influential actors in the space sector. Ninety-six percent of those surveyed considered presidential appointees (e. g. NASA Administrator) very or somewhat important—very important represented

74%. Kingdon writes that there are few cases of confrontation between the White House and appointees because the latter “finds it prudent to bend with the presi­dential wind, and the President finds it politically embarrassing to be portrayed as being at war with his major advisors.”6 SEI was a clear exception to this rule. Admi­ral Truly clearly wasn’t a strong advocate for the initiative. Under his leadership, NASA flouted requests from the Space Council to provide President Bush with a variety of strategic and technical options. Instead, Truly was committed to carry­ing out a study that drew heavily on technical approaches that had been developed during the past several years by the NASA Office of Exploration—which resulted in the selection of a single program alternative.

Career civil servants have much more influence on alternative generation than on the space agenda. Ninety-three percent of those surveyed considered career civil servants as very or somewhat important—very important represented 60%. Without doubt, NASA civil servants played a crucial role in the alternative genera­tion process for SEI. The TSG was the most important actor in producing options for the initiative—even though it ultimately developed a single highly expensive alternative. The Space Council was highly critical of this result, but was equally to blame because it failed to provide the agency with clear, written guidance adequately explaining the key constraints facing SEI. Combined with Admiral Trulys reluc­tance to fully support the initiative, this ultimately doomed its chances for adoption and implementation.

Although Congress is a somewhat important actor for alternative generation in the space sector, it is not considered to be among the most influential. Seventy-three percent of those surveyed considered Congress very or somewhat important—but very important only represented 24% percent. As with the agenda, within the space arena it appears that it is crucial to consult with Congress to understand the con­straints facing specific program alternatives—as opposed to members of Congress actually developing those options. With regard to SEI, Congress was never brought into this process. Likewise, congressional staffers were not terribly influential in alternative generation. Eighty-four percent of those surveyed considered congres­sional staffers very or somewhat important—-very important represented only 33% percent. Unlike in other issue areas, where staffers become heavily involved in draft­ing legislation and negotiating agreements between interested parties, most Hill staffers lack the expertise to develop the very detailed technical plans needed for an initiative like SEI. This has often resulted in mission agencies like NASA having an inordinate amount of influence over the alternative generation process.

With a few exceptions, the non-government actors examined do not have a great deal of impact on the alternative generation process. Interest groups representing the

NONGOVERNMENT ACTORS	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not Important
Interest Groups: Industry	36%	42%	22%	0%
Interest Groups: Professional	45	11	40	4
Interest Groups: Advocacy	9	27	46	18
Academics & Researchers	20	46	28	6
Media	4	20	45	31
Industry	47	36	15	2
Mass Public Opinion	6	19	45	30

Importance of Non-Government Actors in Alternative Generation

aerospace industry were considered only somewhat influential—professional and advocacy groups were much less important. Academics and researchers affect alter­natives more than agendas, primarily because they can match the technical expertise enjoyed by civil servants at NASA. For this very reason, the aerospace industry itself was deemed to be the most influential non-government actor. This is not surprising considering the fact that throughout the history of the space program, government contractors have frequently been turned to during the development of technical alternatives. In the case of SEI, non-government actors had no discernible impact on the initial generation of alternatives. During the course of the 90-Day Study, the TSG did not seek inputs from any of the outside actors with the capability to generate strategic and technical options for the initiative. Instead, the agency relied solely on its own expertise and judgment. In the end, the outcome was a process that resulted in the production of a single alternative.