Losing Faith in NASA

Despite any progress that may have been made during mid-June, the emergence of a series of crises at the end of the month halted any momentum the administra­tion had gained. On 26 June, NASA held a press conference to reveal that its engi­neers had discovered a crippling flaw in the main light gathering mirrors of the $1.5 billion HST. The space agency reported that this defect would mean the largest and most complex civilian orbiting observatory ever launched would not be able to view the depths of space until a permanent correction could be made—which would likely have to wait two to three years for an astronaut visit with newly manufactured parts. Although many of the instruments aboard the HST would still be functional, the impacted wide-field and planetary camera would be inoperable (reducing by 40% the planned scientific work of the platform). Project managers announced they suspected the problem was in one of two precisely ground mirrors, although they were not sure which one. The two mirrors had tested perfectly on Earth, but once in orbit, they failed to perform together as expected—they were not tested together on the ground because of the huge potential expense and inability to replicate a zero-g environment. Associate Administrator for Space Science Dr. Lennard Fisk disclosed that the agency was forming a review board to investigate the problem.[303]

Two days after the HST revelation, NASA was forced to ground the entire space shuttle fleet because the Columbia and Atlantis had developed deadly hydrogen leaks. NASA was forced to admit that they did not know the cause of the leaks, although one possibility was a misalignment between the external tank and the orbiter vehicles. Program managers announced that expert teams of engineers were working feverishly to solve the problem before at least two missions were postponed to make way for the upcoming launch of the Ulysses spacecraft—a probe designed to study the sun. Coming on the heels of the HST announcement, this effectively killed any energy generated by recent administration activities designed to garner support for SEI.[304] The Washington Post opined, “the failure of the telescope, which two months ago rode into space amid great fanfare in the hold of a Space Shuttle, led more than a few Americans to wonder whether their country can get anything right anymore. The questioning became even more poignant…when the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announced that the shuttles, too, would be grounded indefinitely because of vexing and dangerous fuel leakages. [These prob­lems] may foster beliefs that the United States is a sunset power, incapable of repeat­ing its technological feats of the past.”[305] On Capitol Hill, Dick Malow recalled thinking that these problems greatly hampered the administrations ability to make a case for SEI. “There were a lot of other things on NASA’s plate and that hiccup certainly was a detractor. Given the budget environment, Hubble became the focus and SEI tended to get pushed back” on the congressional agenda.[306]

During this same period, the House Appropriations Committee released its mark-up of NASA’s budget. Although the space agency would receive a significant overall increase of $2.1 billion ($800 million less than the president’s request), the entire budget for SEI was eliminated. Fears that had been raised during budget hearings in April were confirmed. The committee had surgically removed all new monies associated with the initiative (see Table on next page).

Space Station (advanced programs)	$20M
Advanced Launch System	$40M
Heavy-Lift Vehicle	$10M
LifeSat/Centrifuge	$8M
Lunar Observer	$15M
Exploration Mission Studies	$37M
Pathfinder Program	$154M
Civil Space Technology Initiative	$45M
TOTAL	$329M

SEI Budget Cuts

The budget report indicated that the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs should remain NASA’s top priorities. It stated that even if additional funds became available in the future, they should be directed toward these important programs rather than being targeted at SEI.[307] Chairman Traxler was quoted in the Washing­ton Post saying, “We didn’t have the money.”[308] The Senate Commerce Commit­tee promptly followed suit with the release of an authorization bill that similarly eliminated funding for SEI. Senator A1 Gore, who authored the legislation, said he feared that funding the initiative would endanger on-going efforts, in particular the Mission to Planet Earth.[309]

By early July, NASA was clearly reeling from this series of setbacks—with SEI a clear casualty, and in some respects a cause, of the outspoken criticism focused on the agency. The view within the White House was that the space program had been terribly crippled.[310] In his memoirs, Vice President Quayle wrote, “The Shuttle seemed to be grounded all the time with fuel leaks; the mirror on the Hubble tele­scope couldn’t focus; and the agency was pushing a space station design that was so overblown it looked as if we were asking to launch a big white elephant. The mood

at the Space Council was grim___ I was searching for a solution for NASA.”[311] On

11 July, Vice President Quayle invited a group of space experts (including Tom Paine, Gene Cernan, Dr. Bruce Murray from the California Institute of Technology, and Dr. Hans Mark of the University of Texas) aboard Air Force Two for a meeting to discuss the systemic problems with NASA. He asked for opinions regarding the appropriate actions, if any, the administration should take. During the meeting, an idea emerged to establish a task force to examine how the space program could be restructured to better support an era of sustained long-term space operations. Quayle liked the idea.

Six days later, Vice President Quayle hosted asecond meeting at the White House with senior administration officials Bill Kristol, Mark Albrecht, Admiral Truly, and Chief of Staff Sununu to discuss procedures to create such a panel. Quayle recalled

in his memoirs:

I wanted [the study] to get NASA moving again. If that was going to happen, then the commission had to have the authority to look into every aspect of the space agency. The result was a long negotiation about the commission’s scope. Truly’s original position was that it should look only at the future management structure of NASA—that is, what would come after the space station was built. “No,” I said, “it will look at the current management situation.” Truly next tried to exempt programs from review, and I said “No, programs will be reviewed as well.” He asked that the space station be “off the table” and said that we would all be better served if both it and the Moon-Mars missions were off limits to the commission. In other words, the commission shouldn’t pay attention to all the most important things we were trying to do during the next couple of decades. “I’m sorry,”

I said to Truly, “but everything is on the table, and let the chips fall where

they may__ ” I tried to soothe Truly’s feelings by making the commission

report through him to me.

By the end of the meeting, Quayle had directed Truly to put together an outside task force to consider the future long-term direction of the space program. That same afternoon the White House announced the creation of the board. On 25

July, the White House announced that Martin Marietta CEO Norm Augustine had been selected to chair the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U. S. Space Program. The 12-member task force was charged with reporting its findings within 120 days.[312] For all intents and purposes, combined with the work being conducted by Tom Staffords Synthesis Group, this put SEI on hold for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps the final blow for SEI came when final House-Senate budget delibera­tions began a few months later. In early September, upholding the cuts that appro­priated had made earlier, the Senate released a bill that eliminated all funding for SEI. The Senates intent was to maintain NASA’s core programs and remove any funding for new projects. The report accompanying the bill explained the Senate’s motivation for eliminating support for SEI:

…the Committee recommendation includes no funds for the Moon-Mars initiative because of the very severe limits imposed upon the overall NASA

budget__ The large increase recommended by the Presidents budget…

simply cannot be accommodated within a framework that restrains all domestic discretionary programs at the level insisted upon by the

administration___ The Committee believes that it is premature to proceed

with an extensive planning and technology program oriented toward a manned mission to return to the Moon and then to Mars without a clear, sustainable revenue source available for such an undertaking. NASA’s preliminary studies on a manned mission to the Moon and Mars estimate a total program cost of over $500,000,000,000. The Committee believes that these figures will likely underestimate the potential cost of such a mission, and believe that moving on such an initiative, in the absence of providing a way to pay for it, is ill-advised in an era of enormous fiscal constraint.[313]

The following month, House-Senate conference report was released, confirming the elimination of all funding for the initiative.[314] The real world result of these budget cuts was the death, at least from a congressional perspective, of SEI.

Dick Malow recalled, “because of the budget crunch SEI was an easy target. By that time, it became viewed as a non-starter. We were barely able to fund Station and were supporting Shuttle strongly. Given the budget climate we couldn’t spend $400 billion. The initiative started to fall off the cliff by the middle of 1990. The Administration kept going through the motions, but SEI basically went from birth to death in twelve to fifteen months, and was never heard from again. Station, on the other hand, was continually pushed by the administration.”[315] [316] Stephen Kohashi concurred with this assessment, remembering, “the primary concern regarding the FY 1991 NASA appropriation was having to deal with the rising cost profile of previously initiated projects such as the Space Station, Earth Observation System, and space science missions. No one had the stomach to commit to another program start, no matter how modest the initial price given the relative magnitude of out – year costs.

The only good news during this period was the decision by the House and Senate authorization committees to reinstate a small amount of funding for SEI-related research. In middle November, the authorizers approved $21 million for explora­tion mission studies. The purpose of these analyses was to “seek innovative tech­nologies that will make possible advanced human exploration initiatives, such as the establishment of a lunar base and the succeeding mission to Mars, and provide high

yield technology advancements for the national economy___ ”[317] This would prove to

be the only funding the initiative ever received.