Conclusions

It can be argued that the Cold War became a war of resources, and one in which the UK effectively dropped out of at the start of the 1960s. It could be further argued that the collapse of Communism in Russia was also due to the collapse of a command economy directed to large military and technological programmes. However, let us concentrate on the UK.

As already mentioned, most of the projects discussed so far were military in origin, but many were never carried through to completion. This is not unique to the UK; similar cancellations happen in all countries developing new technology. One of the major factors contributing to the cancellation of such projects, not only in the UK but in the US, was the very rapid advance in technology during the 1950s.

In many ways, the major aerospace technologies, with the exception of computing and electronics, had become mature by the mid-1960s. Thus the jet engine, the rocket motor, supersonic aircraft and the rest had been successfully developed by this time. There have obviously been improvements, but they have been incremental rather than breakthroughs into new areas. It is also interesting that up until the 1970s, almost all technological advances came from government and military projects, whereas today the main driving force seems to be business and consumer interests, most notably in electronics and computing. Military spending is no longer the great driver of projects that it once was.

After the cancellation of Blue Streak there was virtually no further military interest in long-range missiles. The UK was left with the legacy of the work done so far on Blue Streak and Black Knight to pursue a rather half-hearted space programme. Considerable muddle in the subsequent policy left the UK disillusioned with space research – or, at least, with launchers – with the inevitable cancellations later in the 1960s.

The question then comes: why, when America, Russia and France were pursuing space exploration with vigour, and why, when countries such as China and India are launching satellites almost as a matter of routine, has the UK shown such little interest both at government level and among the people at large?

A useful German word can be used here: the Zeitgeist, which might be translated as ‘the spirit of the times’, or the outlook characteristic of the period. America and Russia were pursuing their race in space as a way of fighting the Cold War at one remove, in an attempt to show the rest of the world who was technologically the more sophisticated. Britain had no such interest: at the end of the 1950s it was beginning the long retreat from Empire, and at the same time beginning to suffer from the economic and social ills which were to plague the country for the next 30 or 40 years. Another phrase has been used of the government at this time: ‘managing the decline’. A country that feels itself to be in decline does not embark on new, challenging technological challenges.

As mentioned earlier, Macmillan’s initial announcement in Parliament in 1959 was greeted with the response: ‘… is it just an attempt to keep up with the Joneses?’ This was a fairly common attitude, as when Thorneycroft, then Minister of Aviation, was interviewed on television about the proposed Blue Streak launcher and ELDO in 1961. Ministers, when interviewed on television, have to expect difficult questions – but the tone of the questioning is interesting.

Mr. Mackenzie: But couldn’t it be argued that we, in Britain, have after all only a limited number of technologists available, even in any aspect of this area and that we might be better advised to get them off working, for example, in exploration of the problem of supersonic aircraft, or some more obviously commercial operation, rather than this rather exhibitionist activity of rocketeering?

Minister: There’s nothing exhibitionist about the brilliant Rolls Royce and de Havilland engineers who’ve, incidentally, done a great deal more than keep this in mothballs. We’ve just done two fully integrated static firings. The work is going well ahead and the Americans will tell you themselves that the payoff in other forms of industry – in metallurgy, electronics and the rest – have wide application to civil industry as a whole, is very great if we go into it.

Mr. Mackenzie: But are we remotely in this competition? One knows how very far the Russians have gone, and the Americans and one has the awful feeling that this is the kind of feeble rearguard, final action to show the flag.

Minister: Don’t be so depressed, Robert. This is not a rearguard action at all. We are in this for eternity, all of us. It isn’t just the question of doing it with the Atlas or the Blue Streak. We shall be making these rockets: I hope we shall be making them in Europe for a long time ahead, with great advantage to ourselves, to the world and to all the countries, including the smaller ones, that are in it.1

‘Exhibitionist activity of racketeering’, ‘feeble rear guard action’. And another quote from Mackenzie later in the interview: ‘But I don’t understand why, if the Americans are offering a launcher – which is presumably more advanced than the one we have – Blue Streak – why we may as well not write off Blue Streak and use their launcher for whatever purposes we’ve got in mind.’

And Mackenzie was wrong. Blue Streak was actually based on American technology, but it could be argued that in the process of anglicisation that a considerable number of improvements had been made.

Another example of the same frame of mind (and the frame of mind perpetually adopted by the Treasury) can be seen in a note from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John Boyd Carpenter, in July 1963: