Bibliographical note and bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Any book on Soviet and Russian lunar exploration has to face problems of infor­mation sources and their reliability. Even such apparently mundane and non­controversial matters as the paths taken by Soviet spacecraft as they circled the moon and the precise coordinates as to where they landed can be problematic, with official sources quoting different and even contradictory details – and then revising them! During the peak of the moon race, the official organs of Soviet government issued an economy of information on certain spacecraft and even disinformation on others. There is no official, comprehensive authorized history of the Soviet moon programme, which makes the assembly of the story all the more challenging, interesting and necessary. I have tried to put together the most accurate sources that best fit the known facts, ‘the best version of the truth available’ – but over time these will be superseded as new information sources become available. The story of the Soviet/ Russian moon programme is still, as the saying goes now, a ‘site under construction’.

A book such as this invariably relies on a variety of diverse sources. Some of the main elements are outlined here. First, there has long been a Western tradition of analyzing the Soviet lunar programme, putting together the best possible version of the truth available from official statements, Western intelligence analysis and an examination of trajectories and orbits. Here, Stoiko (1970) and Gatland (1972) were the pioneers, both giving due prominence to the lunar programme. They were followed by Clark (1988-2005) who has made multiple, penetrating, in-depth analyses of the performance of Soviet spacecraft and has invariably been vindicated by the official story emerging years later. Their work has been supplemented by specialized studies such as those of: Vick in analysing Russian rockets and launch facilities (1994­6); Rex Hall, who identified the members of the cosmonaut squad and their roles

(1988-2003); Gordon Hooper (1990), who assembled their biographies; and Jim Harford (1997), who penned the authoritative biography of Sergei Korolev. Others have brought different knowledge to bear – for example, in the area of tracking (Sven Grahn); the analysis of hardware (David Portree, 1995; Nicholas Johnson, 1994); the performance of rockets (Berry Sanders, 1996-7); and the development of space equipment (Don P. Mitchell). Mark Wade and Anatoli Zak have done much to assemble what is now known of the Soviet moon programme and make it globally and readily available on the Internet to amateurs, professionals and historians alike. Recently, Pesavento and Vick (2004) wrote a lengthy heretical series in the historical magazine Quest, re-opening the debate about Soviet lunar capabilities and intentions during the pivotal years 1968-9.

Following Soviet accounts of their early lunar programme required a challenging effort to separate the respective strands of reporting, science, human interest, engin­eering and achievement, news management and even disinformation. Soviet lunar missions were publicized in standard English language outlets, such as Radio Mos­cow’s World Service, magazines, periodical and miscellaneous grey literature (e. g., Science and Life, Soviet Weekly, Sputnik, Soviet booklet series). These were all used where they were available. Scientific outcomes were published in a number of special­ized international journals.

The precise nature of the Soviet lunar effort did not become clear until a number of designers, scientists and journalists were given or took the opportunity to speak more openly about the Soviet side of the moon race. Most prominent of these was Chief Designer Vasili Mishin (1990), but he was accompanied by a number of scientists, journalists and colleagues, such as Leskov (1989), Chernyshov (1990), Rebrov (1990), Filin (1991), Afanasayev (1991) and Lebedev (1992). On its 50th anniversary, in 1996, the Energiya design bureau published its official history, full of hitherto unknown details of its moon programme. Russian journalists and space enthusiasts have now been able to tell the story of their country’s space programme. In a detailed 13-part series, Varfolomeyev (1995-2002) has reconstructed, for Space­flight, the technical history of many of the key rocket programmes of the period. Perhaps the most remarkable contemporaneous document from the period was the diary of the head of the Soviet cosmonaut squad, General Nikolai Kamanin, whose record has been painstakingly and faithfully reconstructed by Hendrickx (1997-2002), whose endeavours in translating and interpretation are an enduring contribution to history. Cosmonauts (e. g., Alexei Leonov) and designers (e. g., Chertok) have now written memoirs. Soviet historical documentation from the period has now become more widely available and here Siddiqi (2000) has made the most impressively scholarly interpretation, one likely to be the principal point of reference for many years.

As the generation that managed the Soviet lunar programme begins to pass on, the preservation of that record becomes more important. In recent times, writers such as Yuri Surkov (1997) have now come to publish the scientific results of Russian lunar and planetary exploration. The first attempt to assemble a web-based inventory of Soviet lunar science was undertaken by the American space agency, NASA, where the Goddard Spaceflight Centre began to put together an archive of Soviet lunar and planetary science which was made available on the Internet in the NSSDC Master catalogue.

[1] os is Old Style, the calendar in use before the Bolshevik revolution, which ran twelve days behind the rest of Europe. New style dates are given for those born after the revolution.

[2] Ocean of Storms;

• Sinus Meridiani; and

• Sea of Tranquility (not the Apollo 11 site).

[3] Lunar orbit insertion (110 km).

• Lunar orbit adjustment (110 km by 16 km).

• Descent to the moon.

[4] Although the rocket would be built in Kyubyshev and Moscow, it would be assembled and integrated at Baikonour Cosmodrome, saving transit time.

• Savings would be made on ground testing. Although engines would be tested individually, there would be no testing of all the first-stage engines together on a dedicated test stand. This was in dramatic contrast with the United States, where the large new F-1 engines were tested in large-scale facilities in Huntsville, AL.

[5] The selection of cosmonauts for the general moon programme.

• The division of this group into candidates to train for the around-the-moon flight (L-1) and the moon landing itself (the LOK and the LK). Some cosmonauts belonged to both.

• Selection of cosmonauts for the first around-the-moon and landing missions.

• Decline and disbandment of the group. All then returned to mainstream missions.

[6] Alexei Leonov and Oleg Makarov;

• Valeri Bykovsky and Nikolai Rukhavishnikov;

• Pavel Popovich and Vitally Sevastianov;

• Valeri Voloshin and Yuri Artyukin; and

• Pytor Klimuk and Anatoli Voronov.

[7] Improved aerodynamics, with reduced diameter down from 17 m to 15.8 m.

• Four new vernier engines to improve roll control.

Real L-1S, dummy LK Real L-1S, dummy LK Mockup LK, mockup LOK Real LOK, dummy LK Real LOK, LK, block D