Mars-71 and Mars-73 series, 1971-1973
The energy requirements for a Mars flight were larger in 1971 than in 1969. This, and several engineering problems with the multiple instrument modules used in the Mars-
Figure 5.11 Mars 3 spacecraft (courtesy NPO-Lavochkin). |
69 design, prompted yet another redesign. In the new version, the propulsion system at the base of the spacecraft formed the main structural element, and a single instrument module was mounted at the base of the cylindrical fuel and oxidizer tank system, forming a torus around the engine. As before, the solar panels, antennas, and thermal control system were attached to the side of the propellant tanks. New digital electronics were provided based on the avionics for the final stage of the N-l rocket. Advantage was taken of this heritage to save mass by removing the control system of the Proton Block D and allowing the spacecraft to manage the upper stage engine operations.
The higher energy requirements of the 1971 launch opportunity did not allow the orbiter to carry the entry vehicle into Martian orbit, so it would have to be deployed prior to orbit insertion. The higher atmospheric entry velocities and the decision to perform a soft landing, demanded a new entry vehicle design with a larger aerobrake possessing a shallower cone angle. The parachute would have to open at supersonic velocities, which was unprecedented. The final entry vehicle design was a modular stack consisting of the aerobrake at the forward end, the egg-shaped lander nested in the aerobrake, the toroidal parachute container on top of the lander, and a propulsion assembly at the rear of the entry vehicle. For the cruise, the entry vehicle was carried on top of the orbiter.
Lacking a sufficiently precise Mars ephemeris to provide accurate targeting of the entry systems prior to launch, it was decided to send an advance spacecraft to enter orbit around the planet and provide the navigational data necessary for the following two orbiter/lander missions to target and deploy their landers inbound to the planet. Unfortunately, the launch of the orbiter failed in May 1971 due to a stored command error. This accident had two very negative effects, the first being that the American Mariner 9 spacecraft would become the first to orbit Mars, and the second being that the two orbiter/landers would have to rely on a back-up, realtime and less accurate optical targeting technique. The launches were successful, and Mars 2 and 3 were on their way. The Mars 2 lander crashed w’hcn the back-up targeting system failed. On December 2, 1971, the Mars 3 entry system succeeded and its lander became the first to touch down on Mars. Unfortunately, the lander transmitted for only 20 seconds before failing and returned no useful data. Both parent spacecraft successfully achieved orbit.
The 1973 Mars launch opportunity was even less energetically favorable, making orbiter/lander combinations impractical. The lander would have to be deployed by a flyby vehicle. Four spacecraft were launched in July and August 1973, two orbiters and two flyby/landcrs. The spacecraft were essentially the same as in 1971, but the 1973 spacecraft were plagued by electronics problems due to manufacturing changes in a transistor used throughout the system. The engine on Mars 4 failed to ignite and the orbiter sailed past the planet. The Mars 5 orbiter succeeded, but failed after only about one month in orbit. The Mars 6 carrier had telemetry difficulties throughout its cruise, but managed to deploy its lander. The entry vehicle performed properly and transmitted the first in-situ atmospheric data, but no signal was ever received from the lander after it was dropped in close proximity to the surface. Mars 7 failed to put its lander on a proper trajectory, causing it to miss the planet.