FOUNDER AND CHIEF DESIGNER OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

Korolev, Sergey Pavlovich 1907-1966

Founder of the Soviet Space Program Chief Designer OKB-1 1946-1966

Chief Designer Sergey Korolev (this common spelling is not phonetically correct, Korolyov is proper) was the behind-the-scenes Soviet equivalent of von Braun in the US. His Experimental Design Bureau No. l (OKB-1) led the development of first military and, shortly thereafter, peaceful applica­tions of rocketry in the USSR. His identity was a state secret known only to an inner circle; to others he was simply the ‘Chief Designer’. While von Braun was openly engaged with the public and served as an enthusiastic communicator on the American civilian space program, Korolev worked under heavy state security. He V”as not even allowed w’as not made public until after his death.

A passionate advocate of space exploration. Korolev began as a young engineer leading a research group, GIRD, that built small rockets in the 1930s at the same time as Robert Goddard was making his rockets in the US. Korolev became a victim of one of Staling purges in the late 1930s. eonfessing to trumped up charges under duress. He was sent initially to a gulag before being transferred to the ‘sharashkas’. slave labor camps for scientists and engineers, where he could continue to work on rockets in exile for the military. As a result of the eonsiderable hardship he endured, he developed health issues that would persist for the rest of his life. He was released near the end of WW-II to evaluate the captured German V-2 missile and build a Soviet rocket capability.

In 1946 Korolev was appointed Chief Designer of a new department in Scientific Research Institute No.88 (N11-88) to develop long-range missiles. The R-l, which was basically a Soviet-built V-2, led to a succession of ever more powerful rockets named R-2, R-3 and R-5. He proved himself to be a very talented technical designer and manager, and in 1950 his department was upgraded to a design bureau, and then in 1956 was separated from N11-88 to become OKB-1. He began work in 1953 on an I CBM to deliver the heavy 5-ton nuclear warhead. This would require a rocket of unprecedented size and power. The resulting massive multi-stage R-7 (which NATO referred to as the SS-6 Sapwood) was first tested in the spring of 1957. long after technology had reduced the size of the warheads. It was overly large and awkward as a weapon, taking 20 hours to prepare for launch, and only a few were deployed before more praetical delivery systems were produced by competing organizations. However, the R-7N lifting power allowed Korolev to adapt it for space exploration purposes, including Sputnik, which proved to a reluctant Kremlin the political value of non-military uses for large missiles. Like von Braun, Korolev’s passion was the exploration of space, but he needed the military business to build his rockets. Thus his designs owed as much to his dreams as to hard military requirements. Korolev s lobbying to use the R-7 for space exploration, and his insistence on the large and militarily impractical cryogenic rockets best suited to this role, drew impatience from the military, which reacted by plaeing contracts with competitors, in particular Mikhail Yangefs OKB-586 and Vladimir ChelomeyN OKB-52.

Korolev was a charismatic man who through sheer perseverance, political savvy, technical expertise, and talent for leadership established the Soviet space exploration program on the backs of the military, with consequent resentment. Nevertheless, he triumphed because his space spectaculars won him the support of the Soviet political hierarchy and in particular Nikita Khrushchev. The R-7 in its various incarnations became the most reliable and most used space exploration launch vehicle in the 20th Century. The Soyuz version continues in use today to launch cosmonauts into low Earth orbit. The Molniya version launched all of the early Soviet lunar and planetary missions until the more powerful Proton developed by Chelomey became available, and later versions are still used for this purpose. His sudden death in January 1966 was a severe shock, and without his leadership the Soviet lunar program devolved into rivalry between factions, impeding progress and dashing any chance the Soviet Union may have had after their late start.

President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 11