Meanwhile

On 15 June 1962 Brainerd Holmes issued Requirements for Data in Support of Project Apollo, in which he called for three types of information about the Moon as a matter of priority, certainly within the next few years. First, environmental data on particles and fields in space near the Moon to assist in the design of manned spacecraft and assure the safety of crews both in flight and on the Moon. Second, information on the physical properties of the lunar surface in order to confirm the design of the Apollo landing gear. Third, photo-reconnaissance and topographical data in order to facilitate early selection of Apollo landing sites. Holmes had not consulted Homer Newell in drawing up this list of requirements, he simply expected that since Apollo was the agency’s pre-eminent program Newell would arrange for the information to be provided as soon as possible – and pay the bill out of his own office’s budget. But Newell’s Space Sciences Steering Committee had its own priorities.

Holmes supported the unmanned lunar projects which would provide information for Apollo, but opposed those intended to undertake tasks which astronauts would soon be able to do. He therefore opposed Prospector, which was to collect and return lunar samples to Earth. Accepting this logic, Newell set out to ensure that astronauts performed useful science while on the Moon.[21] Soon after being appointed Director of the new Office of Space Sciences, Newell arranged for the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, now chaired by the Princeton geologist Harry H. Hess, to arrange a series of joint workshops to discuss the best way to undertake space science. The first Summer Study was held at the University of Iowa between 17 June and 10 August 1962, with over 100 representatives of NASA, academia and industry. The aim was to evaluate past and current programs, and recommend future

programs. Afterwards, the Space Science Board issued a summary report, A Review of Space Research, in which it acknowledged that Apollo would start off as “an engineering effort”, but expressed the hope that “scientific investigations will later become the primary goals”.

In September 1962 Gene Shoemaker began a 12-month secondment to NASA to assist the Office of Space Sciences. His motivation for taking this post was partly to increase his chances of becoming one of the astronauts who would have the good fortune to undertake field geology on the Moon. Don Elston served as Acting Chief of the Branch of Astrogeology in Shoemaker’s absence.

On 11 October 1962 Robert Seamans called in Homer Newell, Brainerd Holmes, W. H. Pickering and Oran Nicks, and told the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office of Space Sciences to coordinate their lunar activities. Newell was told that his priority was to support Apollo’s requirement for data about the Moon. Nicks was to coordinate, and report how unmanned missions could best contribute to Apollo. In particular, could further Rangers provide some of this data by delivering a surface package incorporating a penetrometer to measure the strength of the lunar surface. When on 15 October Newell publicly announced five additional Rangers for 1964 equipped with the high-resolution TV system, he emphasised they “would increase the probability of obtaining lunar surface detail information that could be used in the manned landing system’’. Newell was also considering another series for 1965 which would deliver surface capsules. If these rough landers were funded, they would be primarily for scientific research. For these, Newell asked the Aeronutronic Division of Ford, which had developed the seismometer, to investigate a small TV camera capable of being delivered to the lunar surface in a capsule. On 22 October Holmes and Newell announced that a Joint Working Group would be formed, composed of representatives of their two offices. Chaired by Gene Shoemaker, at least during his period of secondment to NASA, it would be responsible for recommending to the Office of Manned Space Flight “a detailed program of scientific exploration’’ and for recommending to the Office of Space Sciences “a program of data acquisition to assure a timely flow of environmental information into planning for manned projects’’. It would also be responsible “for establishing and maintaining close liaison with field centers, government agencies and universities in the development of an integrated scientific program for manned space flights’’.

Seamans’s directive that the Office of Space Sciences fly lunar missions primarily in support of Apollo, rather than for purely scientific purposes, renewed Newell’s determination to ensure that Apollo crews conducted proper science whilst orbiting the Moon and on its surface – the Manned Spacecraft Center, being fully occupied with the engineering challenge of sending men to the Moon, was slow to pursue this aspect of the program.