The Tu-144 Flight Experiments Project

While negotiations were underway in 1993, leading to the agreement between the United States and Russia to return a Tu-144D to flight status as a supersonic flying laboratory, the HSR Program Office selected NASA Dryden to establish a Project Office for all Tu-144 activ­ities. This initially involved developing a rapport with a British com­pany, IBP, Ltd., which served as the business representative for Tupolev, now known as the Tupolev Aircraft Company (or Tupolev ANTK) after the economic evolution in Russia in the 1990s. Ken Szalai and IBP’s Judith DePaul worked to establish an effective business relationship, and this paid dividends in the ensuing complex relationships involving NASA, Rockwell, McDonnell-Douglas, Boeing, Tupolev, and IBP. A degree of cooperation flourished at a level not always observed in NASA-Russian partnerships. Having a business intermediary such as IBP navigate the paths of international business helped ensure the success of the Tu-144 experiment, according to Dryden Tu-144 Project Manager Russ Barber.[1464]

Originally, the Tu-144 flight experiment was envisioned as a 6-month, 30-flight program.[1465] As events unfolded, the experiment evolved into a two-phase operation. This was due, in part, to the inevitable delays in an enterprise of this magnitude and complexity, to learning from the results of the initial experiments, and to data acquisition issues.[1466] By 1995, after two meetings in Russia, the HSR Program Office, Boeing, Rockwell, McDonnell-Douglas, and Tupolev established the requirements for returning a Tu-144D to flight and fabricating an instrumentation system capable of supporting the postulated lineup of experiments.[1467] [1468] From a list of some 50 proposed experiments, the NASA, industry, and Tupolev officials selected 6 flight experiments for inclusion (a 7th was later added).11

A somewhat complex international organization developed that, despite the superficial appearance of duplication, ended up working very smoothly. NASA Dryden represented the HSR Program Office as the overseer for all Tu-144 activity. Boeing was contracted to install the instrumentation system, a complex task with over 700 individual pressure transducers, accelerometers, thermocouples, boundary layer rakes, pressure belts, microphones, and other sensors. NASA Dryden installed a complex French-built Damien digital data acquisition system (DAS) for five of the original six experiments.[1469] The remaining experiment, a NASA Langley Structure/Cabin Noise experiment, used its own Langley-built DAS.[1470] In a sense, traditional roles had to be adjusted, because Boeing, as the contractor, directed NASA, as the Government Agency and supplier, when to provide the necessary sensors and DAS.[1471] Boeing and Tupolev would install the sensors, and NASA would then calibrate and test them. The Damien DAS ultimately became problem­atic and led to some erroneous data recording in Phase I.[1472]

Tupolev assumed the role of returning the selected Tu-144D, SSSR – 771114, to flight. This was no trivial matter. Even though 771114 had last flown in 1990, the engines were no longer supported and had to be replaced (as discussed in a subsequent section), which necessitated major modifications to the engine nacelles, elevons, and flight deck.[1473] As Tupolev was completing this work in 1995 and 1996, IBP acted as its business interface with NASA and Boeing.

In general, the HSR program funded the American effort. The cost to NASA for the Tu-144 flight experiment was $18.3 million for 27 flights. Boeing contributed $3.3 million, and it is estimated that Tupolev spent $25 million.[1474] Tupolev gained a fully instrumented and refurbished Tu-144, but unfortunately, after NASA canceled the HSR program in 1999, Tupolev could find no other customers for its airplane.

During the initial program definition and later during the aircraft modification, a number of HSR, Dryden, and Langley personnel made numerous trips to Zhukovsky. HSR managers coordinated program schedules and experiment details, Dryden personnel observed the return to flight efforts as well as the instrumentation modifications and pro­vided flight operations inputs, and Langley instrumentation technicians and researchers assisted with their experiment installation. Among the Dryden visitors to Zhukovsky was NASA research pilot Gordon Fullerton. Fullerton was the NASA pilot interface during these development years and worked with his Tupolev counterparts on flight deck and opera­tional issues. In an interview with the author, he recalled the many con­trasts in the program regarding the Russian and American methods of engineering and flight operations. Items worthy of minute detail to the Russians seemed trivial at times to the Americans, while American prac­tices at times resulted in confused looks from the Tupolev personnel. By necessity, because of a lack of computer assets, the Tupolev pilots, engi­neers, and technicians worked on a "back of the envelope” methodology. Involvement of multiple parties in decisions was thus restricted simply because of a lack of easy means to include them all. Carryovers from the Soviet days were still prevalent in the flightcrew distribution of duties, lack of flight deck instrumentation available to the pilots, and ground procedures that would be viewed as wholly inefficient by Western air­lines. Nevertheless, Tupolev produced an elegant airplane that could fly a large payload at Mach 2.[1475]

As the American and Russian participants gained familiarity, a spirit of trust and cooperation developed that ultimately contributed to the project’s success. The means of achieving this trust were uniquely Russian. As the various American delegations arrived in Moscow or Zhukovsky, they were routinely feted to gala dinners with copious sup­plies of freely offered vodka. This was in the Russian custom of becom­ing acquainted over drinks, during which inhibitions that might mask hidden feelings were relaxed. The custom was repeated over and over again throughout the program. Few occasions passed without a cele­bratory party of some degree: preflight parties, postflight parties, wel­coming parties, and farewell parties were all on the agenda. Though at times challenging for some of the American guests who did not drink,

these social gatherings were very effective at cementing friendships among two peoples who only a few years before uneasily coexisted, with all of their respective major cities targeted by the other’s missiles. To a person, the Americans who participated in this program realized that on a personal level, the Russians were generous hosts, loyal friends, and trusted colleagues. If nothing else, this was a significant accomplish­ment for this program.

Nineteen flights were completed by early 1998, achieving most of the original program goals. However, some data acquisition problems had rendered questionable some of the data from the six experiments.[1476] The HSR Program Office decided that it would be valuable to have United States research pilots evaluate the Tu-144 in order to develop corporate knowledge within NASA regarding SST handling qualities and to ascer­tain if the adverse handling qualities predicted by the data collected actu­ally existed. Furthermore, there were additional data goals developed since the inception of the program, and a seventh experiment was orga­nized. The resumption of the test flights was scheduled for September 1998. The HSR Program Office and Boeing selected Gordon Fullerton from Dryden and NASA research pilot Robert A. Rivers from Langley as the evaluation pilots. Fullerton had been the Dryden project pilot for the Tu-144 modification and refurbishment, and he was familiar with the Tupolev flightcrews and the airplane. Rivers had been the HSR project pilot for several years, had participated in every HSR flight simulation experiment, served on two HSR integrated test develop­ment teams, and had performed an extensive handling qualities eval­uation of the Concorde SST the previous year. To accompany them to Zhukovsky were two NASA flight control engineers, Timothy H. Cox from Dryden and E. Bruce Jackson from Langley, and Boeing Tu-144 project handling qualities engineer Norman H. Princen. Jackson had completed extensive work on flight control development for the HSCT Reference H model. During summer 1998, the team members worked together to develop a draft test plan, flew both the Ames and Langley 6-degree-of-freedom motion simulators with the Reference H model, and began studying the Tu-144 systems with the rudimentary information available in the United States at that time. On September 4, they departed for Zhukovsky.