As ran up Russian and Ukrainian defense industry

As ran up Russian and Ukrainian defense industry

In the middle of September the government of Ukraine supported the offer of own Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and Antonov state aviaconcern on an exit of last of the joint Russian-Ukrainian enterprise «OAK – Antonov». The event it, alas, was expected long ago. It became logical continuation of the tendency which have arisen in 2014 to curtailment of military and technical cooperation between two neighboring countries.

How it occurred? And than everything can end for OPK of Russia and Ukraine?

Cooperation do not pour water

Cooperation of the military-industrial enterprises of Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine in the early nineties was a consequence of symbiotic existence of these productions within uniform USSR Military Industrial Complex. With Union disintegration the considerable part of production chains was broken off, however not less considerable part of chains remained and continued to function.

Here short digression in the main directions of military and technical cooperation of Russia and Ukraine in 1991-2014.

The Ukrainian CB Yuzhnoye and "Yuzhmash" worked together with RVSN Russian Federation in maintenance of fighting capacity of the intercontinental R-36M2 ballistic missiles (they "Voivode", they, on NATO classification, "Satan"), in ensuring starts of the carrier rockets "Zenith" and "Dnepr".

Ukrainian "Hartron" and "Arsenal" was engaged in procedural testing of systems of prompting of our Roar UR-100Н rockets and RT-2PM "Poplar".

Same "Arsenal" together with Ukrainian "Fotopribor" and "Lorta" participated in manufacturing of elements of systems of prompting for the Russian warplanes, surface-to-air missile missile systems, tanks, the anti-tank Chrysanthemum missile systems and control systems of well-known "crocodile" – the Russian fighting Mi-24 helicopter.

Not less if no more large-scale cooperation with domestic OPK was carried out Ukrainian by Motor Sich corporation and MKB "Progress", delivering to Russia aviation, helicopter and rocket engines. For understanding of scales of this cooperation it is enough to remind, for example, about signed between "Motor Sich" and holding «Helicopters of Russia» in 2011 the contract within which the Ukrainian party till 2016 should carry out production delivery by total cost over 1,5 billion dollars.

The Kharkov machine building plant "Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky" who is better known as for "FED", delivered a drive generators for engines of the main plane of the Russian military transport aircraft Il-76.

The Antonov state aviaconcern within joint JSC OAK-Antonov conducted development and preparation for a mass production of the An-70 military transport plane which the management of the Air Force of the Russian Federation planned to buy in number of the whole 160 boards. For comparison, own financial possibilities on acquisition of the Air Force latest car of Ukraine estimated in … five boards.

Kiev "Elmis" made the equipment for rapprochement system "Course" which is used for joining of cargo and passenger spaceships with a space station.

Absolutely special, in many respects unique, the role in military and technical cooperation of Russia and Ukraine was played by Nikolaev "Zorya-Mashproyekt" – she is the supplier of gas-turbine installations and reducers for the new Russian frigates which were in construction of projects 22350 and 11356.

Putting end under these calculations, we will remind that head Minpromtorga of the Russian Federation Denis Manturov in the first half of 2014 estimated the general portfolio of the Russian civil and military orders placed at the Ukrainian enterprises, at 15 billion dollars, or 8,2 % of gross domestic product of Ukraine.

Divorce with the property section

What was then? Then there was a revolution in Kiev, reunion of Russia with the Crimea and war in Donbass. Owing to these peripetias the new Ukrainian management headed for curtailment of military and technical cooperation with the Russian Federation.

Already on June 16, 2014 the Ukrainian president Peter Poroshenko published a resolute ban on cooperation of the Ukrainian OPK enterprises with the Russian contractors. In August of the same year the head of Security service of Ukraine Valentin Nalivaychenko confirmed that the country enters complete embargo on deliveries into Russia any military production, including production of a dual purpose: «This basic decision of the president – to take under complete control not only the state and state enterprises, but also private which not one year, and tens years had contracts with the enterprises in the territory of the Russian Federation». Also Nalivaychenko noted that «to break off contracts not so simply, but the Ukrainian power insists and will insist on it».

However, still before Kiev placed points over «i» in a question of military and technical cooperation with Russia, at Moscow the last illusions in this respect dissipated. And she too started to act.

On April 28, 2014 Vladimir Putin gave an assignment to the government to work a question on import substitution of production of OPK arriving from Ukraine. According to Putin, Russia should be necessary from one and a half to two and a half years to find replacement of military production from Ukraine. The president of Russia expressed so: «As to our cooperation with the Ukrainian partners in the field of OPK. It is of great importance for the Russian OPK and solving, key – for Ukrainian».

Thus, actions of the Ukrainian party did not become for Russia a surprise. No wonder that practically at the same time with news about introduction by Ukraine of military and technical embargo Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin answering in the government for "defense industry", reported that Minpromtorg prepared the plan of complete import substitution of the Ukrainian military production. «The plan grows out of scrupulous work of experts: where that, for what time and what money to make, and who specifically responsible», – declared Rogozin. That is characteristic, the Deputy Prime Minister appeared the big skeptic, than the president, and expressed opinion that on complete replacement at Russia three years will leave, and can be and more.

Thick and thin

Anyway, on June 16, 2014 military and technical "divorce" between Ukraine and Russia was de facto issued, the last nail with the plate "cooperation" was hammered into a coffin, and OPK of each of two countries began to try to survive alone.

Immediately it became clear that at the process participating parties it turns out very much differently. As though cynically it sounded, the situation began to develop in full accordance with a saying «While the thick dries, thin will die». It is easy to guess that as "thick" OPK of Russia acted. It does not mean at all that to Russian "defense industry" it was easy «импортозамещаться». It means that OPK of Ukraine was necessary much worse. Judge.

The giant "Yuzhmash" by the end of summer of 2015 almost completely stopped. The revenue of the enterprise fell to 82 %. The production in the old days working round the clock seven days in a week, at present functions only three days in a week. And in the fourth quarter it is planned to transfer "Yuzhmash" in general to a something ephemeral. At the enterprise because of huge debts often disconnect water giving and power supply. Skilled, most valuable shots run from plant. And very often run to Russia where there is a work and worthy compensation.

Why on "Yuzhmash" there was such situation? Because the enterprise lost orders, and not only Russian. The history with "yuzhmashevsky" carrier rockets for Brazil is indicative. It was initially supposed, what exactly they will be used at Alkantar’s Brazilian spaceport. But owing to constant shortage of money at the state "Yuzhmash" broke all stipulated terms of deliveries. And after a coup d’etat any financing of this development by Ukraine in general stopped. As a result Brazil broke off contract very favorable to Kiev with "Yuzhmash", having reaimed at the latest Russian carrier rocket "Angara".

"Motor Sich", in the 2013th taken the fifth place in a rating of the leading Ukrainian enterprises of hi-tech mechanical engineering on level of administrative innovations, and in the 2014th increased net annual profit for 13 %, in 2015 «доуправлялся» to serious problems. A third of all production of the company are helicopter engines. And they are put only on the Russian helicopters. And in general, to 90 % of production of "Motor Sich" went to Russia.

With the termination of these deliveries the Ukrainian enterprise loses enormous profits. Taking into account intentions of Russia in the shortest terms completely to pass in aircraft industry to use of engines of own production, "Motor Sich" risks to lose the Russian market completely and forever. Consequence: the compelled reduction in production, mass dismissals of the highly skilled personnel etc.

Similar problems with total loss of a sales market arise at «the gas-turbine queen» "Zorya-Mashproyekt".

The Antonov state aviaconcern so far managed not only to leave the joint enterprise with Russia, but also to endure change of the head that, frankly speaking, on advantage to the enterprise is not went. The rupture of cooperation with Russia also struck to "antonovets" heavy blow – first of all, in respect of financing of their development by the Russian customer. Prospects of a perenatselivaniye of "Antonov" on cooperation with the western countries can be estimated it is pessimistic. The history as Airbus did not want to participate in joint creation of the medium-range cargo aircraft is well memorable, but after receiving from "Antonov" of the technical documentation, after a while let out own car which is surprisingly similar to An-70. Worse than that: according to the former prime minister of Ukraine Nikolay Azarov, the Airbus airline management privately warned Kiev that will make everything not to start up their plane on the West European market.

The described – only top of an iceberg of the Ukrainian OPK which is promptly leaving under water. It is necessary to understand that the Ukrainian idea to compensate a loss from a rupture of military and technical cooperation with Russia through reorientation to the western markets gives an obvious manilovshchina. It is total out-of-date stanochny park, other standards of production and many other things will not allow Ukraine to make in blizhnesrochny prospect similar revolution in the OPK own forces. On it the country simply has no money. As is not present and «the kind uncle» abroad, having possibility (and the main thing, desire) to enclose the fantastic sums of reorganization of the Ukrainian OPK.

Certainly, the rupture of military cooperation of Ukraine and Russia occurred not without participation of the USA. It is known that in the spring of 2014 the head of subcommittee of nuclear weapons of the House of Representatives of the USA republican Mike Rogers made the amendment to the Pentagon budget in which text it was specified that it is necessary for USA to convince Kiev of the termination of cooperation of CB Yuzhnoye with Russia in a question of service of Satan rockets. And summer of the same year of the USA offered Ukraine the plan of compensation of losses from the termination of cooperation with Russia in OPK sphere. Within the plan expansion of military and technical cooperation of Ukraine with the USA and EU, and also «assistance and interaction was declared in implementation by Ukraine of military and technical cooperation in the markets of the third countries». Passed more than a year, however further good intentions Washington did not go.

"Thick" still dries

Well, and what Russia? Whether so everything is good with import substitution at "thick"? It is clear that everything is not so bad, as at "lean". But whereas? Let’s concern only pair of examples. They are laconic, but are very indicative.

Having lost "Motor Sich" production, «Helicopters of Russia» remained with open deliveries by requirement in 500-550 helicopter engines in a year. Last year within the import substitution program on the Russian JSC Klimov development of own production of helicopter engines of TVZ-117 family completely from the Russian accessories began. By the beginning of 2016 "klimovets" plan to make to 350 helicopter engines in a year. But it not earlier than the next year while engines it is annually necessary on 200 pieces more. Thus the company «Helicopters of Russia» already at present manages to report about 70 % of import substitution. What here you will tell, except «your affairs, My God» are wonderful?

Unexpectedly difficult there is a replacement and production of the Ukrainian enterprise "Zorya-Mashproyekt". In April of last year of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation set NPO Saturn a task to replace import of ship engines. In June of the same year the head of United Shipbuilding Corporation Alexey Rakhmanov declared that tests of domestic ship gas-turbine installations will be complete by the end of 2016. Then term "moved down" till 2018. Conversations then went that under domestic gas-turbine installations the redesign of frigates already standing on building berths is required … Generally, the problem at present remains unresolved.

It is aggravated and that listed by Russia in 2012 advance payment of 2 billion rubles on delivery by the Ukrainian party of gas-turbine installations for frigates under construction, seemingly, somewhere "was dissolved". Thus installations to the customer did not get.

Question price

According to official Russian data, the total amount of means necessary for replacement of production of the Ukrainian OPK, will make about 30 billion rubles. Such is the price which Russia should be paid for division of two branches once uniform system. The total price which should be paid to Ukraine, is not sounded yet. But may be that degradation and full disorder of Ukrainian "defense industry" becomes it.

Andrey Soyustov

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