Supporting the High Range

As the X-15 program moved on to higher and faster flights, support became more difficult because it required more time to travel to the sites and more lakes for each flight. The minutes of the X-15 Operations Subcommittee on 9 March 1961 give some insight into the coordination required. The subcommittee membership included Richard J. Harer, Colonel Bud Anderson, Major Robert M. White, Major K. Lewis, Captain J. E. Varnadoe, Lieutenant R. L. Smith, Captain F. R. O’Clair, Joseph R. Vensel, Stanley P. Butchart, C. E. Sorensen, and Lieutenant Commander Forrest S. Petersen. White and Petersen were X-15 pilots, and several of the other members had long and distinguished flying careers (especially Anderson and Butchart), so the group was not without a certain amount of applicable expertise.-1961

The previous October Paul Bikle had written a letter to the X-15 Operations Subcommittee and the AFFTC outlining an increase in support that would be required as the X-15 program moved uprange to the more remote lakes. The letter provides insight into how complicated it really was to conduct X-15 flights. For instance, each of the uprange stations (Beatty and Ely) had an operating crew of eight people, and the Air Force had to arrange transportation for the crew "a few days prior to each X-15 flight and for their return to Edwards after the flight." Given that NASA frequently scheduled flights once per week, this required a constant movement of personnel. Beatty supported all launches, while the program only used Ely for the high-speed flights scheduled out of Wah Wah Lake beginning in June 1961.[97]

The subcommittee did not think that supporting Hidden Hills launches would place any additional burden on the AFFTC since the effort required was generally similar to that needed for Silver Lake. However, flights from Mud Lake and farther uprange would require a much greater level of support. In its letter, NASA increased the amount of support requested, largely based on the unknown factors of never having launched from uprange. The AFFTC agreed that the equipment and personnel requirements for the uprange lake sites (as listed in the NASA letter) were valid and, at least initially, appropriate. The Air Force hoped, however, that subsequent experience could reduce some of the requirements.[98]

One of the attachments to Bikle’s letter provided the details of the support he was requesting.

This example uses a launch from Wah Wah Lake because it was the most comprehensive. The X – 15 launch would take place 20 miles north of Wah Wah Lake and would require the X-15, NB-52, and two chase aircraft. An emergency team would be located at Wah Wah Lake in case the X-15 engine did not start or some other emergency required an immediate landing. This team would consist of two Air Force 500-gallon fire trucks, an H-21 helicopter, eight firemen, an Air Force pilot as lake controller, an Air Force crew chief, an Air Force doctor, an Air Force pressure-suit technician, and a NASA X-15 specialist. Delamar Lake, the next contingency landing site, was 120 miles away. One Air Force 500-gallon fire truck, four firemen, four Air Force flight crew, two Air Force paramedics, and a NASA X-15 specialist would staff it. A Jeep would carry a nitrogen purge system to safe the X-15 after landing. One hundred and fifteen miles closer to Edwards was Hidden Hills, the primary emergency site in case the pilot had to shut down the engine early. Orbiting this lake were two F-104 chase aircraft that were intended to pick up the X-15 as it slowed down at the nominal end-of-mission, but could also provide assistance in the event of emergency. An Air Force C-130 waited on the lake to evacuate the X-15 pilot in case of an emergency landing, along with an Air Force 500-gallon fire truck, four firemen, two pilots, four Air Force flight crew, two Air Force paramedics, and a NASA X-15 specialist.-1991

Back at Edwards, the NASA radio van, an H-21 helicopter, the NASA lake controller, two Air Force fire trucks, eight firemen, two Air Force flight crew, the Air Force flight surgeon, a pressure-suit technician, and a NASA X-15 specialist awaited. In addition, staged between Wah Wah Lake and Delamar were a NASA-provided Jeep and three NASA X-15 specialists in case the X-15 had to set down unexpectedly at a lake other than those manned for the flight. An F-104 also orbited between Delamar and Hidden Hills to provide chase if the X-15 had to slow down during mid­flight. It was a complex ballet.

As it turned out, however, the increase in support that NASA was requesting was not possible. For instance, NASA wanted three C-130 aircraft and four paramedics dedicated to each launch, but the AFFTC did not have these resources. The AFFTC only had four C-130s assigned, and two were normally at El Centro supporting activities at the National Parachute Range. The base flight surgeon indicated that he believed it would be acceptable to provide a capability for a flight surgeon to be on the scene of an accident "within one hour," and the AFFTC adopted this suggestion. In general, however, the level of support provided by the AFFTC was consistent with that requested by Bikle; it differed primarily in some convenience items, not in essential services. On the other hand, NASA had proposed sending crews to the uprange sites the morning of each flight (meaning in the dark, since the X-15 often flew near first light). The AFFTC believed it was easier to send the uprange crews up the day prior to each flight. In most cases the personnel stayed in hotels in the towns near the support sites and reported to the site by 0800 hours in order to be ready by 0830 to support a 0900 takeoff of the NB-52.[100]

By early 1961 the X-15 Operations Subcommittee reported that security restrictions concerning Groom Lake seemed to be easing, and everybody agreed that Groom Lake was a preferable landing site compared to Delamar Lake. The program hoped to gain permission to use Groom Lake in the future, and Captain Varnadoe agreed to contact the appropriate offices to determine the likelihood of that happening. As it ended up, although one black project (the U-2) was ending at Groom, another (the Blackbird) was getting set to begin, and the X-15 program never would obtain permission to use the lakebed.[101]

By this time the Edwards and Beatty sites of the High Range were operational and had supported 34 X-15 flights. The Ely station became operational in April 1961. One of the concerns of the X – 15 Operations Subcommittee involved directing rescue forces to a downed X-15 pilot. The H-21 rescue helicopters did not have onboard navigation equipment, and required direction to within five miles of the crash site. From that point they could use radio homing equipment to find the rescue beacon on the pilot. The beacon itself was relatively new and at that time NASA had only installed it on X-15-2; however, it would later install the beacon on the other two airplanes. North American had promised a 30-mile range for the beacon, but testing at Edwards revealed much less capability. The beacon was returned to North American and discovered to have only half­power in its battery (range is a square function, so this resulted in only one-quarter of the projected distance). The H-21 used an AN/ARA-25 direction (homing) finder to locate the beacon. The subcommittee believed it would be desirable to install an ARA-25 receiver on the NB-52s also to allow the carrier aircraft to locate the pilot and direct the H-21s to the site. In addition, the NASA budget included funds to install auto-trackers on the High Range telemetry antennas. Once installed, the antennas could be set to 2.443 MHz and automatically track the pilot rescue beacon.[102]

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Each X-15 pilot was issued a typed summary of lakebed information, along with hand-drawn sketches of the lakes and the marked runways. These were the lakes available in January 1966. (North American Aviation)

handled by NASA, although an AFFTC crane would be provided to lift the airplane onto a flatbed trailer.-103-