COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For several months in advance of its final report on the loss of STS-107 the chairman of the Investigation Board had been briefing NASA and the media on what had been found. Speaking about what the final report might contain NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe had warned, “It’s going to be ugly… This is not going to be anything that anybody’s going to be particularly happy with.’’

Likewise, Bill Gerstenmaier, Shuttle program manager said:

“We are well aware of what is coming out of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and what is coming from the Shuttle Return to Flight discussions… We are looking at all of the systems on board the station and evaluating whether we need to do something directly or whether we made decisions in the past… we ought to go back and look at.”

NASA had been accused of excessive use of waivers during the preparation of the STS-107 flight. At the time of launch some 5,800 had been recorded during Columbia’s preparation. The Administration was accused of “bureaucratic fumbling and administrative missed signals’’.

The Final Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was published in August 2003. It established that the left bipod ramp had fallen off of the External Tank during launch and had struck the leading edge of Columbia’s left wing in the region of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Panels 6 through 9, on the internal bend where the wing root moves away from the fuselage. The suitcase-size block of foam caused a large hole in the RCC panels in a region that could not be seen through the flight deck windows. Columbia performed near-flawlessly throughout its mission until re-entry, when super-heated plasma entered the hole in the leading edge of the left wing and caused the destruction of the spacecraft. NASA management was severely criticised. Managers had refused requests from their engineers to have the orbiter photographed by a military reconnaissance satellite when the foam impact was identified on film of the launch. They had also adopted the attitude that if Columbia was fatally damaged then nothing could be done to save the crew.

The report made 15 recommendations for Return to Flight:

1. Initiate an aggressive programme to eliminate all External Tank Thermal Protection System debris shedding at the source with particular emphasis on the region where the bipod struts attach to the external tank.

2. Initiate a programme designed to increase the orbiter’s ability to sustain minor debris damage by measures such as improved impact-resistant Reinforced Carbon-Carbon and acreage titles.

3. Develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon system components.

4. For missions to the International Space Station, develop a practicable capability to inspect and effect emergency repairs to the widest possible range of damage to the Thermal Protection System, including both tile and Reinforced Carbon – Carbon, taking advantage of the additional capabilities available when near to or docked at the International Space Station… Accomplish an on-orbit Thermal Protection System inspection using appropriate assets and capabilities, early in all missions… The ultimate objective should be a fully autonomous capability for all missions to address the possibility that an International Space Station mission fails to achieve the correct orbit, fails to dock successfully, or is damaged during or after undocking.

5. Upgrade the imaging system capable of providing a minimum of three useful views of the Space Shuttle from lift-off to at least Solid Rocket Booster separa­tion… The operational criteria of these assets should be included in the Launch Commit Criteria for future launches.

6. Provide a capability to obtain and down-link high-resolution images of the External Tank after its separation.

7. Provide a capability to obtain and down-link high-resolution images of the underside of the Orbiter wing leading edge and forward section of both wings’ Thermal Protection System.

8. Modify the Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to make the imaging of each Shuttle flight while on orbit a standard requirement.

9. Test and qualify the flight hardware bolt catchers.

10. Require that at least two employees attend all final closeouts and intertank area hand-spraying procedures.

11. Kennedy Space Centre Quality Assurance and United Space Alliance must return to the straightforward, industry-standard definition of “Foreign Object Debris’’ and eliminate any alternate or statistically deceptive definitions like “process debris’’.

12. Adopt and maintain a Shuttle flight schedule that is consistent with available resources. Although schedule deadlines are an important management tool, those deadlines must be regularly evaluated to ensure that any additional risk incurred to meet the schedule is recognised, understood, and acceptable.

13. Implement an expanded training programme in which the Mission Management Team faces potential crew and vehicle safety contingencies beyond launch and ascent. These contingencies should involve potential loss of Shuttle or crew, contain numerous uncertainties and unknowns, and require the Mission Management Team to assemble and interact support organisations across NASA/Contractor lines and in various locations.

14. Prepare a detailed plan for defining, establishing, transitioning, and implement­ing an independent Technical Engineering Authority, independent safety programme, and a reorganised Space Shuttle Integration Office.

15. Develop an interim programme of close-out photographs for all critical sub­systems that differ from engineering drawings. Digitise the close-out photograph system so that images are immediately available for on-orbit troubleshooting.

Chapter 9 of the Report addressed the future of American human access to space.

The report noted:

“The Board observes that none of the competing long-term visions for space have found support from the nation’s leadership, or indeed among the general public. The U. S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more than 30 years without a guiding vision, and none seems imminent. In the past, this absence of a strategic vision in itself has reflected a policy decision, since there have been many opportunities for the national leaders to agree on ambitious goals for space, and none have done so.’’

The CAIB did note that almost everyone seemed to agree that “The United States needs improved access for humans to low-Earth orbit as a foundation for whatever directions the nation’s space programme takes in the future.”

Board members called for a national debate to define America’s future in space. The report highlighted the short-sightedness of developing the Shuttle in isola­tion. Lack of funding and an often-hostile Congress meant that for the next 20 years after the decision to build the Shuttle, NASA made little or no attempt to develop parallel “access to space’’ technologies until the X-33 and X-34 programmes of 1994. As a result, those programmes were begun with a limited technology base, and X-33 proved beyond the technological capabilities of Lockheed-Martin at that time. The Report then recognised NASA’s attempts to broaden their technology base with the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) in 2000, and promptly narrowed that vision once more with the decision, in 2002, to redirect SLI to commence the Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) with its proposed Orbital Space Plane (OSP).

The Board made it clear that they did not study NASA’s plans for the ISTP, or the OSP in depth. Even so, they concluded:

“Because of the risks inherent in the original design of the Space Shuttle, because that design was based in many aspects on now-obsolete technologies, and because the Shuttle is now an ageing system but still developmental in character, it is in the nation’s interest to replace the Shuttle as soon as possible as the primary means for transporting humans to and from Earth orbit.’’

CAIB members recognised that in the mid-term that replacement would, more than likely, be the OSP and demanded:

“The design of the system should give overriding priority to crew safety, rather than trade safety against other performance criteria, such as low-cost, re-usability, or against advanced space operation capabilities other than crew transfer. This conclusion implies that whatever design NASA chooses should become the primary means for taking people to and from the International Space Station, not just a complement to the Space Shuttle.’’

This represented a major change in direction for the OSP, which NASA had originally intended to begin flying while the Shuttle continued to operate.

The CAIB members stated that there was considerable urgency in developing the OSP, which would require commitment and financial support from Congress and the American people. They stated that America must be prepared to support the OSP as a long-term commitment, and not shy away from the long-term cost, as ISS was likely to be the primary destination for Americans in space for the next decade, or longer.

The report called the failure to develop a Shuttle replacement vehicle “a failure of national leadership” caused by continuing to expect major technological advances in that vehicle’’. The CAIB recommended that everyone concerned should agree that the overriding design principal of the OSP should be “to move humans safely and reliably in to and out of Earth orbit. To demand more would be to fall into the same trap as previous unsuccessful efforts.” The paragraph concluded, “Continued US leadership in space is an important national objective. That leadership depends on a willingness to pay the costs of achieving it.”

On August 26, Sean O’Keefe made a speech that was broadcast to all NASA field centres. In that speech he told NASA’s employees:

“We must go forward and follow this blueprint in an effort to make this a much stronger organization. All of us at NASA are part of the solution… ultimately… to return to the exploration objectives that they dedicated their lives to.’’