The ISS Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force

On October 16, 2001, a tearful Dan Goldin announced his resignation as NASA’s longest serving Administrator. His term of office had begun in March 1992 and lasted 8.5 years. Goldin had overseen the redesign of ISS to meet President Clinton’s demands. On his President’s instructions, it had been Goldin who invited the Russians to join the ISS programme. He had also overseen the initial privatisation of the Shuttle programme and the beginning of the ISS flight programme with its associated delays and massive budget overruns. In the end, it would be the budget overruns and the hardware cancellations that brought Goldin’s tenure to a close. In his retirement speech he told the audience proudly, “I had a lease on this programme. I am handing back that lease.’’

In July 2001, even as he prepared for his retirement, Goldin had established the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force (IMCE) under the leadership of Thomas Young. Predictably, it became known as the Young Committee. The Task Force was established to answer the criticism surrounding NASA’s management and funding of the ISS programme, with its huge overspend. The programme had overspent by $13 billion in just four years.

In setting up the Committee, Goldin told the media:

“In the last year we have successfully carried out all of the scheduled assembly missions to the International Space Station. We did so with unbelievable precision and execution, completing the second phase of Space Station construction. It’s an incredible management and engineering achievement, but we must ensure it is carried out in a more efficient and effective manner.

“Since April, we’ve been working to select a team of outstanding innovators in the fields of science, engineering, finance and business to advise NASA and the Administration how to maximise the scientific returns on the Station while living within the guidelines of the President’s budget… The financial management of the International Space Station needs an overhaul, but we’re going to do it in a

way that doesn’t sacrifice safety… This panel has been empowered to leave no stone unturned. We have experts in all fields that have the capacity to dig deep to help us restructure the business and financial approach to the programme.’’

Goldin’s resignation was effective from November 15, 2001 and the Final Report of the Young Committee was dated six days later. It read, in part:

ISS Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force Terms of Reference

These Terms of Reference establish the International Space Station (ISS) Manage­ment and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force of the NASA Advisory Council (NAC). The IMCE Task Force is chartered to perform an independent external review and assessment of cost and budget and provide recommendations on how to ensure that ISS can provide maximum benefit to the U. S. taxpayers and the International Partners within the Administration’s budget request.

In addition there are reviews of the ISS financial management tools being conducted by the IMCE Financial Management Team (FMT) to identify and recom­mend Agency-wide improvements in these tools. The report of the FMT will be integrated into the report of the IMCE Task Force…

The integrated final report is to focus specifically on the following items

• Assess the quality of the ISS cost estimates approved for the ISS Program, including identification of high-risk budget areas and potential risk mitigation strategies.

• Ensure that the program can remain within its available budget, assess program assumptions and requirements—specifically those that led to significant cost growth relative to FY 2001 budget estimates—and identify options for smaller growth and/or budget savings and efficiencies that offset any additional spending recommended by the Task Force and approximately $500 million in unfunded cost growth.

• Review the management reforms in the ISS Program Management Action Plan—particularly cost estimating and reporting issues, early warning of potential growth, and managing program reserves—and make recommendations for additional and/or refined management reforms. Integrate results from the FMT.

• Identify opportunities for maximizing capability to meet priority research program needs within the planned ISS budget and International Partner contributions.

• In addition, assess cost estimates for potential U. S.-funded enhancements to the core station (e. g. providing additional crew time for enhanced research) and recommend refinements as necessary to achieve high-confidence estimates.

SPECIAL FINDINGS

1. The ISS Program, while taking a conservative approach and making safety paramount, has achieved excellent progress in integration of diverse inter­national technologies.

2. NASA has not accomplished a rigorous ISS cost estimate. The program lacks the necessary skills and tools to perform the level of financial management needed for successful completion within budget.

3. The cost to achieve comparable expectations at assembly complete [original design complete with American Habitation Module and American CRV] has grown from an estimate of $17.4B to over $30B. Much of this cost growth is a consequence of underestimating cost and a schedule erosion of 4+ years.

4. A cost of $8.3B (FY02-06) is not credible for the core complete baseline [No American Habitation Module, no Node-3, and no American CRV] without radical reform.

5. The management focus is on technical excellence and crew safety with emphasis on near-term schedules, rather than total program costs.

6. The Program is being managed as an “institution” rather than as a program with specific purpose, focused goals and objectives, and defined milestones.

7. The financial focus is on fiscal year budget management rather than on total Program cost management.

8. Lack of a defined program baseline has created confusion and inefficiencies.

9. Current research support funding represents a 40-percent reduction in buying power from that originally planned.

10. The Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR) is not well coordinated with the Office of Space Flight (OSF) or the program office for policy and strategic planning. The scientific community representation is not at an effective level in the program office structure.

11. A centrifuge is mandatory to accomplish meaningful biological research. Availability as late as FY08 is unacceptable.

12. There are opportunities to maximize scientific research on the core station with modest cost impact.

13. Cost estimates for the U. S. funded enhancement options need further develop­ment to assess credibility.